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The history of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health information 
technology (HIT) has been characterized by both enormous successes and 
catastrophic failures. While the VA was once hailed as the way to the future of 
twenty-first-century health care, many programs have been mismanaged, delayed, or 
flawed, resulting in the waste of hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars. Since 2015 
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has designated HIT at the VA as 
being susceptible to waste, fraud, and mismanagement. The timely central research 
question I ask in this study is, can healthcare IT at the VA be healed? To address this 




originally designed to be the flagship initiative of the open government 
transformation at the VA. The Open Source Electronic Health Record Alliance 
(OSEHRA) was designed to promote the open innovation ecosystem public-private-
academic partnership. Based on my fifteen years of experience at the VA, I use an 
autoethnographic methodology to make a significant value-added contribution to 
understanding and modeling the VA’s approach to innovation. I use several 
theoretical information system framework models including People, Process, and 
Technology (PPT), Technology, Organization and Environment (TOE), and 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and propose a new adaptive theory to 
understand the inability of VA HIT to innovate. From the perspective of people and 
culture, I study retaliation against whistleblowers, organization behavioral integrity, 
and lack of transparency in communications. I examine the VA processes, including 
the different software development methodologies used, the development and 
operations process (DevOps) of an open-source application developed at VACI, the 
Radiology Protocol Tool Recorder (RAPTOR), a Veterans Health Information 
Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA) radiology workflow module. I find 
that the VA has chosen to migrate away from inhouse application software and buy 
commercial software. The impact of these People, Process, and Technology findings 
are representative of larger systemic failings and are appropriate examples to 
illustrate systemic issues associated with IT innovation at the VA. This 
autoethnographic account builds on first-hand project experience and literature-
based insights. 
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Figure 1 Map of the Dissertation 
 
Figure 1 shows how this dissertation is organized. Each of the chapters that follow will use a 
map to outline and organize my research. In the introduction, I offer my original contribution 
to the information science and software engineering field. I also explain why this subject 
matter is critical and timely. Then I address the research questions and their hypotheses. 
Having done that, I describe the autoethnographic methodology in more detail. The literature 
review which follows the description makes the case for the research. I look at my problem and 
place it among the most important current theories, findings, and concepts that exist. I identify 




findings are presented and then I reflect upon them based on the applicable theory. I conclude 
my research with a unique interpretation and establish several innovative conclusions. A 



















Abraham Lincoln: ““To care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow,  
and his orphan.” 
Martin Luther King Jr: “Our lives begin to end the day we become silent about things that 
matter.”  
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Table 1 Abbreviations 
 
Abbreviation Explanation 
BI Behavioral Integrity 
BRD Business Requirements Document 
CAS Computational Archival Science 
CASCI   Center for Advanced Study of Communities and Information  
CHIDS Center for Health Information & Decision Systems 




CMS Content Management System 
COTS Commercial-off-the-shelf 
CPRS Computerized Patient Record System 
CT Computerized Tomography 
CTO Chief Technology Officer 
DevOps Development Operations 
DevSecOps Development Security Operations 
DOI Diffusion of Information 
DOD Department of Defense 
eHMP enterprise Health Management Platform 
EHR Electronic Health Record 
FOIA US Freedom of Information Act 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
GWOT  Global War on Terrorism  




HCI Human-Computer Interaction 
HIS Health Information System 
IaaS Infrastructure as a Service 
IP Intellectual Property 
IR Interventional Radiology 
IRB Institutional Review Board 
IT Information Technology 
JCAHO Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization 
KM Knowledge Management 
LAS Laboratory for Analytic Sciences 
MAS Medical Appointment Scheduling  
MHS Military Health Systems 
MIM Master of Information Management 
MR Magnetic Resonance 
MUMPS 
 





NSA National Security Agency 
NSR New Service Request 
OAWP Office of Accountability and Whistleblowers Protection 
OI&T VA Office of Information & Technology 
OIG VA Office of Inspector General 
OSEHRA Open Source Electronic Health Record Alliance (Agency) 
OSS Open Source Software 
PaaS Platform as a Service 
PACS Picture Archive and Communications System 
PCS VA Patient Care Services 
PDF Portable Document Format 
PMAS Project Management Accountability System 
PPT People, Process and Technology Improvement Model 
RAPTOR Radiology Protocol Tool and Recorder 




RadLex Radiology Lexicon 
RFP Request for Proposal 
RIS Radiology Information System 
RSNA Radiology Society of North America 
RT Representation Theory 
SaaS Software as a Service 
SIIM Society of Imaging Informatics in Medicine 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats 
TAM Technology Acceptance Model 
TOE Technology, Organization, and Environment 
TOE TAG Technology, Organization, and Environment plus Technology 
Acceptance Models Failure Groups 
TOE TAM Technology, Organization, and Environment plus Technology 
Acceptance Models 




UMD University of Maryland 
VA US Department of Veterans Affairs 
VACI Veterans Affairs Center of Innovation 
VAI2 Veterans Affairs Innovation Initiative 
VAOIG VA Office of Inspector General 
VBA Veterans Benefits Administration 
VHA Veterans’ Healthcare Administration 
VHPI Veterans’ Healthcare Policy Institute 
VIC VA Innovation Center  
VistA Veterans’ Health Information Systems and Technology 
Architecture 
VIP VistA Intake Program 





Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The figure below illustrates the organization of the introduction chapter. I initially 
introduce the who, what, where, and when of the problem and the relationship among them. I 
then introduce the three research questions and discuss the orienting concepts that are used to 
direct and inform the study. I introduce myself and the autoethnographic methodology; in doing 
so, I describe the original contribution I make to the conceptual and theoretical field. 
 








The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has designated the US Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA) at high-risk in terms of its 
susceptibility to waste, fraud, and mismanagement; information technology (IT) challenges are a 
major contributing factor (GAO, 2015). A White House investigation found a ‘corrosive culture’ 
(Politico, 2014) and recommended the VA be restructured and reformed. The history of VA IT 
has been characterized by both enormous successes and catastrophic failures. Some programs 
were mismanaged, delayed, or internally flawed, to the extent that they could not be saved, 
resulting in the waste of hundreds of millions of dollars (Independent Budget, 2016). Over the 
past ten years, the number of Veterans has decreased rapidly, while per-patient spending has 
skyrocketed. VA policy expert Dr. Colin D. Moore asks (2015), “Why does the VA continue to 
expand despite a decades-old reputation for scandal and mismanagement?” To address these IT 
issues, the White House has made the overhaul of VA medical records a centerpiece of its 
broader government reform efforts (Politico, 2018). Access to care and patient safety depend 
upon a modern health IT platform, especially an electronic health record (EHR) system, which 
directly impacts the quality and delivery of care to Veterans. White House opponents suggest 
that this approach is wrong (Newsweek, 2019) and likened this to “rip[ping] the battery out, 
saying the whole car doesn’t work, so they can sell the parts”. 
In contrast to significant department-level IT failures, the VHA has, for more than 30 
years, successfully developed, tested, and implemented a world-class comprehensive, integrated 
electronic EHR system. The current version of this system, which is based on the Veterans 




Architecture (VistA) public domain software, sets the standard for EHR systems in the United 
States and has been publicly praised by Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama and many 
independent observers. (Independent Budget, 2016) (JCAHO, 2008). VistA was awarded an 
Innovations in American Government Award by the Ash Institute for Democratic Governance 
and Innovation at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government in 2006.  
Unfortunately, the VA has not maintained or modernized VistA. One of the IT challenges 
with VistA is that it was originally designed and developed in the 1970s, a lifetime ago in IT 
terms. VistA supports daily healthcare operations and patient care and has been essential to the 
department’s ability to deliver health care to veterans (GAO, 2018). While several former 
Secretaries of the VA stated that VistA would be modernized, the VA in 2018 signed a no-bid 
$16 billion contract to scrap VistA and go with a proprietary commercial solution. The shelving 
of VistA is a knee-jerk reaction that wasted billions of dollars (Politico, 2017). Experts warn that 
the VA built the most important medical computer system in history and is now about to spend 
billions of dollars discarding it (Open Health News, 2017). One critic referred to it as “a mix of 
sad and silly folly” (Shannon, webpage 2018). A VA doctor quoted by Politico claims that the 
Trump administration’s IT actions have “taken a broke system and broken it completely” (2017). 
The failure of VistA presents a systemic dysfunction of an unsustainable culture of innovation 
within the VA.  
Considerable efforts were made to modernize VistA, but those too were shelved, despite 
being sufficiently well-developed and tested to be suitable for launch. The example I focus on in 
this study is The Radiology Protocol Tool Recorder (RAPTOR), a Veterans Health Information 
Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA) radiology workflow module that was part of the 




explicitly designated as part of the VA VistA Evolution Product Roadmap and was included in 
future budgeting as the highest priority for radiology (VA, 2014). The figure below shows the 
bidirectional interface between VistA and RAPTOR. From the user’s perspective, RAPTOR acts 
as a radiology web dashboard into VistA; it is essentially a radiologist’s version of VistA. 
RAPTOR helps manage radiology workflow and serves up medical images in a web viewer. 
 
 
Figure 2 RAPTOR to VistA integration 
 
RAPTOR was designed to integrate into existing VA medical imaging department VistA 
workflows and, in so doing, simultaneously improve safety, quality, efficiency, and compliance 
(OSEHRA, 2016). RAPTOR’s potential benefits include replacing the existing paper-based 
process with a tailored electronic workflow (Medverd, 2012). RAPTOR is a means to modernize 
VistA and its proposed benefits are described in detail in both the literature review and the 
findings section of this research. For the RAPTOR case study, I propose that the VACI was not 
able to overcome institutional obstacles from the OI&T, and PCS. VACI initially supported the 
design and development of the software. In the operations phase, VACI has limited resources 




did not provide any resources to support the design, development, and testing of RAPTOR. This 
lack of communication, integration and coordination resources resulted in a delayed schedule of 
transition.  
The design and development of RAPTOR cost over $2 million (from prototype inception 
through user acceptance testing) (VA Contract VA118-11-RP-0173) and were delivered on time 
and on budget. After successfully completing the VA intake process, RAPTOR could have been 
introduced nationally (Bulson, 2014). User acceptance testing and enterprise security testing was 
successfully completed in four pilot sites and the project was voted one of the Top 5 Health IT 
projects of the year by the Society of Imaging Informatics in Medicine (SIIM) and Radiology 
Business Journal (RBJ) (Proval, 2012). It also successfully passed the Open Source Electronic 
Health Agent (OSEHRA) software quality certification (OSEHRA Technical Journal, 2016).  
However, although the application addresses an ongoing need to improve advanced 
imaging safety, quality, and compliance, RAPTOR has never been implemented within a live 
clinical setting for everyday use. This research seeks to understand why. It does so by focusing 
on DevOps software processes using an autoethnographic methodology.  
This research comprehensively investigates many attributes that impacted the project and 
the organization. I am studying the decade long development process underpinning the RAPTOR 
project in order to gain insight into innovation at the VA more broadly. The VA OIG told 
Congress (2017) of the VA’s struggles to design, procure, and/or implement functional 
information technology (IT) systems. The VA has a high number of legacy systems needing 
redesign, improvement, or replacement, including VistA. Redesigning and replacing systems 
have been a major challenge across the government and are not unique to the VA (VA OIG, 




a broader innovation problem and is not unique to the VistA case. It occurs regardless of whether 
the software is developed in-house or externally. Hence the broader emphasis on IT healthcare 
innovation. 
The original contribution that this study makes is twofold. First, I am focusing on the 
autoethnographic approach applied to existing data. This paper seeks to advance an 
understanding of my case study as it is applied to VACI software project RAPTOR. I am also 
offering initial findings based on the Toulmin Method, of findings and supporting data. This 
dissertation contributes to the academic literature, which has yet to investigate innovation in 
VACI which in the literature review, I categorize as a semiformal organization. The current 
academic research focuses on clinical innovation in the VA (as detailed in the radiology 
information systems, organizational innovation and knowledge management, data visualization, 
and human-computer interaction sections of the bibliography), but the current news reports that 
the VA is replacing VistA reveal a “buy-first” strategy (Shulkin, 2017, Blackburn, 2018) that 
internal IT software development innovation is not a priority. The literature does not address the 
cross-disciplinary, systematic-approach to DevOps innovation in understanding innovation at the 
VACI. There are therefore gaps in the current literature that my research seeks to fill using an 
autoethnographic account of open-source information technology projects within the VACI. This 
study will, therefore, be the first of its kind. Second, there is a more general contribution. It seeks 
to advance knowledge in software engineering DevOps more broadly, particularly when it comes 
to challenges to innovation in large organizations, and to help in the development of mitigation 
strategies to respond to these problems. 
With that in mind, the autoethnographic account I present here will investigate the 




interaction (HCI) underpinning it. Ultimately, I am interested in why it was canceled. A 
limitation may be that I am not able to truly answer “why”, but an autoethnography can help 
document the processes and decisions that were made that led up to the cancelation. 
My case study examines the people, process, and technology (PPT) improvement model 
(Prodan 2015; IBM 2011) as it is applied to VACI software project RAPTOR. Using the PPT 
model as a guideline to research and to answer the broad question of “why are HIT innovations 
successfully developed and then never introduced clinically, despite its benefits?” and the 
secondary question “can the VA IT be healed?” These are the central research questions driving 
this research. 
I will examine the VA based on its desired goals. VA CTO Peter Levin quotes (Fedscoop 
video, 2010) Secretary Shinseki on the “VA’s emphasis on transforming the people, process, and 
technology”. Levin lists on his fingers, “cultural change, business process reengineering, and 
technology renovation”. He said that the Secretary was in the process of transforming this 
310,000-person agency that is moribund, paper-bound, and a stovepipe culture. As my evaluation 
focuses on matters related to VA stakeholders, I examine the interactions between people, 
processes, and technology as understood and judged from those inside the program or activity 
(Greenwood, 2006). Thus, to answer these questions, I draw upon several different theories that 
were introduced to me at the UMD Center for the Advanced Studies of Communities and 
Information (CASCI). I will answer my research questions using adaptive theory methodology 
which Layder (1998) defined as a combination of the pre-existing theory and theory generated 
from data analysis in the formulation and the actual conduct of empirical research in order to 




My case study examines the VACI software project using the people, process, and 
technology (PPT) improvement model (Prodan 2015; IBM 2011). I am using the PPT as a central 
organizing concept because it is the model that the VA used to transform itself. The PPT has 
been used specifically by the VA in response to the Obama Open Government Transformation 
(Levin Fedscoop video, 2010). In the figure below, I place the VACI within the PPT 
improvement model. PPT is a holistic model that has been used in IT (IBM, 2008) and across 
industries (Prodan, 2015) for more than thirty years. I will examine each of the RAPTOR case 
study’s three dimensions: technology (what types of HIT software and tools are used); 
organization (how HIT is managed); and process (how HIT software procedures are followed). 
In the literature review, I first examine the VA organization and then propose several technology 
innovation models including the PPT. The PPT will serve as a set of guidelines that direct data 
collection efforts. This research uses concepts from PPT to guide theory generation efforts. 
 
 





Using the PPT model, I propose three subsidiary research questions to supplement the 
central research question, why RAPTOR was never introduced. These are on:  
 
● People: How does the VA organization, culture, and communication influence innovation? 
● Process: In what ways do the breakdown of VA software, clinical, and management 
processes impact innovation? 
● Technology: Is information technology the cause of the rejection of VA VistA and 
RAPTOR? 
 
Figure 4 Three PPT Research Questions 
 





This section is an overview of the mixed methods approach I will use to assess the VA 
barriers to innovation, the VACI organization, and the fate of the RAPTOR project. Through a 
narrative literature review, I have collected technical information my team used to design and 
develop RAPTOR over the past eight years. To understand the VACI organization, I am using an 
adaptive theory system methodology that I first became aware of through my participation in the 
UMD iSchool Center for Advanced Study of Communities and Information (CASCI). In 
addition, I will collect, analyze, and interpret the data I have collected to test these models and 
develop a new theory based on the data. A case study is my approach to organizing and 
presenting the data. I focus on a single RAPTOR case study and gain insights by comparing it to 
my experiences with VA OI&T (as an internal software developer for VistA), PCS (integrating a 
teleradiology COTS), and a contra-example with the NSA innovation. One lesson on going back 
to school is that RAPTOR is not the only focus of my study, but I have learned how to approach 




In this thesis, I use the autoethnographic methodology to describe my work with the VA 
since 2002. Autoethnography is a research approach that systematically describes a personal 
approach to understanding cultural experience. (Ellis, 2016). Although autoethnography is not a 
common research method in IT, it has been shown to be an effective (Anderson, 2006; Atkinson, 
2006; Costello, 2016; Ghita, 2016) qualitative method on not only understanding stakeholder’s 
viewpoint but also the broad context of IT. Rowe (2012) lauds autoethnography for information 




of those who live what we want to study is the best way to go.” Rowe (2012) calls it “privileged 
research” in that it is rare that the opportunity is granted for the amount of time and resources 
needed to “describe situations that are rarely observed,” such as paradoxical or insider 
conditions.  
My expertise is based on thirty years’ experience in software engineering, and especially 
the twelve years of information technology experience at the VA, and three additional years at 
the Department of Defense (DOD) Military Health Systems (MHS). During these years, I 
worked as a practitioner (Stringer, 2015) on many successful and unsuccessful projects at the VA 
and the DOD, including their Electronic Health Records (EHRs). My unique observations 
originate from diverse technology roles at each of the three parts of the VA organization, which 
is shown in the timeline table at the end of this section. At the VA Office of Information 
Technology (OI&T), I was a VistA software developer. At VA Patient Care Services (PCS), I 
was an enterprise architect supporting the VA Chief Radiologist. On the RAPTOR project, I 
served as “jack-of-all-trades” amongst a small team including innovator, designer, developer, 
and manager. My years working with VACI on RAPTOR will be the focus of this research. 
Thus, the methodology is an investigation into my own situation. The advantages and challenges 
of the autoethnographic method are described in detail in Chapter 3.  
Although I am not a veteran myself, my family has many current and former military 
personnel. My father credits the VA for saving his life after World War II, and it is at a VA 






My research approach can be summarized in the table below.  Coming from a STEM 
background and profession, from a non-academic, practical, business based, background, one 
area I learned about was research methods.  Since I have been back to school, I've learned these 
ideas have labels that come out of philosophy.  I define epistemology what we believe is seen 
through our experiences, culture and surroundings.  An example of this is how one could define 
HIT failure.  The VACI could define RAPTOR as a success as contractually we delivered the 
software on time and on budget and successfully passed UAT.  The VA radiology community 
could define the project as a failure as the VACI were unable to provide the application to them. 
My reasoning emphasis is highly inductive.   With inductive, the researcher is free to 
change the approach based on considerations.  I surveyed the available methods and evolved to 
autoethnography based on the conditions of the data available.  My plan is to use my research to 
build theory, and conclusions rather than prove existing theory.  Inductive is also less structured 
than deductive reasoning, as there is no guiding theory.  My contribution will be to develop 
theory.  Content analysis is widely used qualitative research technique.  
Table 2 Summary of my research approach 
Approach Theoretical Stance 








Methods (techniques for collecting data) Document analysis, observation, and 
optionally non-formal interviews 
Qualitative Descriptive Analysis How the data will be processed in order 
to answer my research questions 
 
Timeline  
Below is a timeline of relevant events that impacted my research. This includes both personal 
events and organizational events. My personal timeline is important as it shows my experience 
with VA software, and autoethnography is a research method that uses personal experiences 
("auto") to describe and interpret ("graphy") cultural texts, experiences, beliefs, and practices 
("ethno") using personal events.  
Table 3 VA Milestones and My Personal Timeline 






VistA OSS - In the early 1980s, VA made 
its software available without restriction 
in the public domain to other government 
and private sector organizations, in 
compliance with the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA). VA recognized 
this opportunity to support widespread 
EHR adoption and offered the use of 
VistA as the standard-bearer for EHR 
implementation around the world. 
I graduate from the UMD (BS 
Electrical Engineering) and 
begin my career in software 
engineering. Most (almost all) 
of my experience is with 
government organizations 




For the development of VistA, the VA 
was named a recipient of the prestigious 
Innovations in American Government 
Award presented by the Ash Institute of 
the John F. Kennedy School of 
Government at Harvard University in 
2006. The VistA electronic medical 
records system is estimated to improve 
efficiency by 6% per year, and the 
monthly cost of the EHR is offset by 
eliminating the cost of even a few 
unnecessary tests or admissions. 
After graduating with a 
Master of Science degree, I 
begin working in healthcare 
information technology. As 
part of my job as a DOD EHR 
system engineer, I am directed 
to study the VA EHR VistA. I 
work to promote data sharing 
between DOD and VA. I am 
the lead author on DOD VA 
data sharing research report. 
2005 - 
2009 
The VA receives an influx of new 
patients due to the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT).  
At the VA’s request, I directly 
support the VA, while 
working for my own 
engineering consulting firm. 
In my first VA OI&T contract, 
I support the VistA 




technical design, development 
and testing expertise for the 
existing and the reengineering 
systems for multiple VistA 
Imaging software 
development releases such as 
DICOM (Digital Imaging and 
Communications in Medicine) 
Query and Retrieve, Remote 
Image View TeleReader and 
Tele-Ophthalmology, HL7 
Transmission to Commercial 
PACS, and Import 
Reconciliation Workflow for 
Portable Media such as CDs.  
2009 President Obama’s Open Government 
directive results in the VA Innovation 
Initiative (I2) 
I am awarded a VA Certificate 
of Achievement at both the VA 
VistA eHealth University 
Conference (VeHU) and 
Information Technology 
Conference (ITC). I am an 
active participant in the 
Federal Health Architecture 
(FHA) Consolidated 
Healthcare Informatics (CHI) 
Workgroup and the Joint 
DoD/VA Interagency Imaging 
Sharing Integrated Project 
Team. I served as a VA VistA 




Integrating the Healthcare 
Enterprise (IHE) Radiology 
and Eye Care Technical 
Committees, DICOM 
Committees, VA/DoD Joint 
Imaging Team, and the Office 
of the National Coordinator for 
Health Information 
Technology.  
2010  VA Modernization Report highlights the 
need to innovate VistA. The report 
recommends moving forward with open-
source software.  
I move from supporting OI&T 
to the Chief Radiology 
Consultant for PCS. 
I become aware of the VA 
Innovation Initiative (VAI2). 
2011 VA establishes the Open Source 
Electronic Health Record Alliance 
(OSEHRA) as the central governing body 
that oversees the community of EHR 
users, developers, and service providers. 
My company wins the first 
RAPTOR VA Innovation 
Initiative (VAI2) development 
contract from VACI for the 
RAPTOR prototype. 
2012 VA Innovation Initiative (I2) changes the 
scope and leadership direction to the VA 
Center of Innovation (VACI) 
RAPTOR proof of concept is 
built and studied. 
2014 VistA Evolution Program, an effort to 
modernize VistA, is launched. 
RAPTOR agile web 





2015 A new OSS policy is initiated to evaluate 
open source solutions (along with larger 
enterprise solutions) when acquiring or 
developing new software. This policy 
requires that the use of open source 
development practices be considered 
when VA or a VA support contractor 
develops software. 
RAPTOR User Acceptance 
Testing (UAT) completed at 
four sites. 
I present at several open-
source conferences (including 
Drupal Government 
Developer Days and 
OSEHRA). 
2016 RAPTOR ’s Javascript software library is 
reused by the Daily Plan application. This 
is an example of code reuse in open 
source software applications.  
I am a UMD iSchool Ph.D. 
Student with the intention of 
studying RAPTOR utilization 
using mixed methods. 
2017  RAPTOR is approved by the OI&T VistA 
Intake Process. 
I complete UMD classes and 
start preparing the iSchool 
integration paper on 
RAPTOR. 
2018 VA plans VistA sunset. VA does not 
introduce RAPTOR clinically. VA signs a 
sole-source $10 billion contract with a 
proprietary EHR vendor. 
I present my iSchool 
Integration paper on RAPTOR 
and am approved to a Ph.D. 
candidate. My poster is 
accepted to iConference 2019.  
2019 VistA has remained the top-rated EHR, 
despite neglect and attrition in the 
programmer ranks.  
I prepare a proposal (namely 
Chapters 1,2,3) to study the 
RAPTOR story and research 





2020 It is estimated that the EHR replacement 
contract will be closer to $16 billion 
dollars and will not be completed for 10 
years. 
I plan to prepare the results, 
conclusions, and lessons 







Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
This literature review will survey and unify several diverse strands of literature research 
at first the VA enterprise level and then at the RAPTOR project. It uses theory and concepts from 
many diverse frameworks, including academic, organizational, management, behavioral, 
information science, computer science, and investigative journalism domains. Even before I 
started my Ph.D. program, I collected articles on the literature review topics. I have been using 
an adaptive methodology approach, utilizing the concepts derived from foundational theories as 
orienting concepts, go into the data, refine the findings, go back to the data, then ultimately 
constructing a theory of IT healthcare innovation. An interdisciplinary literature review 
strengthens the foundation of the research and indicates where my research fits within the larger 
information science community. I will integrate the theoretical frameworks and concepts that I 
learned at the UMD iSchool to assess the VA barriers to innovation, the VACI organization, and 
the fate of the RAPTOR project. To understand the VACI, I will use technology system models. 
I first became aware of these through my participation in the UMD iSchool Center for Advanced 
Study of Communities and Information (CASCI). In addition, I have selected several distinct VA 
“insider” assessments that I believe have influenced VA leadership. They are the VistA 
Modernization Strategy (2010), the VistA Evolution Roadmap (2014), and the RAND 
Corporation assessment for Choice (2015) and the Harvard Business Review (2016). Through a 
narrative literature review, I examine the information science domains my team used to design 
and develop RAPTOR.  
For a public institution, much of the VA is hidden in plain sight. Moore notes that 




There is, for example, no book-length monograph on the history of VA health care” (2015, p. 
338). Therefore, I will show below how the VACI is structured as a semiformal innovation 
organization and how, because of several organizational challenges, including changes in 
leadership and scope, the VA limited the VACI’s resources. I will show that without the support 
of other parts of the organization, particularly OI&T, and PCS, innovative software applications, 
including RAPTOR, were shelved.  
In this literature review, I will elaborate on innovation technology frameworks to assist 
with my theory building, including the People, Process, Technology (PPT) model; the 
Technology, Organization, and Environment (TOE) model; Davis’s Technology Acceptance 
Model (TAM); Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Technologies (SWOT) diamond; 
Semiformal managerial organizations; and, DevOps (IBM, 2008) (Davis, 1989) (Burton-Jones, 
2013).  
 The figure below shows the case for this research. It organizes the most important 
concepts at the VA department level, the VACI semiformal organization, and the RAPTOR 





Figure 5 Literature Review Map 
 
Framework for Researching Innovation 
 
The literature review first broadly examines theoretical models of DevOps innovation and maps 
the foundational to the “state-of-the-art” concepts to the VA and VACI. I will study VACI 
software engineering using the overlapping domains conceptual framework based on Lincoln & 
Korpman’s pioneering examination on computers, technology, information science, and 
informatics (Lincoln & Korpman, 1980, p.259). I initially look at VACI, a semiformal 
organization, and research innovation models. I examine the conceptual framework of the 
RAPTOR project and the process involved in innovating the software. For the development of 




computer interaction, and knowledge management, as well as data visualization to explore, 
measure, and verify the efficiency and effectiveness of the VA’s radiology protocol workflow. 
RAPTOR Application Development theory, from Computational Archival Science (CAS), 
Organizational Innovation and Knowledge Management (KM), Computer Interaction (HCI) in 
radiology information systems (RIS), and Electronic Health Records (EHR) information systems 
and data visualizations will inform the analytical framework. 
A Short History of the VA 
 
 
The VA was created in 1921 by President Warren Harding and Congress to care for 
neglected and disabled veterans of World War I. From the start, the VA has been plagued by 
scandals and complaints of inefficiency. The VA's first director, Charles Forbes, was convicted 
of embezzlement and kickbacks. Forbes’s fall in Washington illuminates President Harding’s 
efforts to bring business efficiency to the government (Stevens, 2017). Harding’s Presidency is 
known today for his cabinet’s corruption and his extra-marital affairs. In 1946, Winston 
Churchill was quoted as saying, “those who fail to learn from history are condemned to repeat 
it.” Today’s political headlines suggest that we have learned little from the days of Harding's 
Presidency.  
My father, a World War II (WWII) veteran, spent several years after the war recuperating 
at the VA. He served in the US Army Signal Corps in the China-Burma-India war theater. At 
war’s end, he was down to about half his normal body weight due to diseases brought on by 
harsh jungle conditions, such as malaria and dysentery. While recovering at a VA hospital he 




at the VA after WWII, many deserving veterans failed to receive services. Newspaper headlines 
of the era are noted (Longman, p.15) for capturing the lack of quality care at the VA, “Veterans 
Hospitals Called Backwaters of Medicine “and “Third-Rate Medicine for First-Rate Men”. In 
1947, a government commission uncovered enormous waste, duplication, and inadequate care in 
the VA system and enacted major reforms. Longman notes (p.14) that it was not just scandals, 
but also blundering attempts to avoid scandals that have marred the entire history of the VA. 
In my “baby boomers” generation, we have seen vast improvements in combat medicine 
that had the consequence of a lifetime of post-battlefield care that previous generations had not 
experienced. Baby boomer veterans also experienced an ungrateful nation who were not able to 
separate their feelings for a misguided war and the people who served. The book and movie 
“Born on the Fourth of July” was my introduction to the history of VA scandals. In the late 
1980s, the veteran population from WWII, Korea, and Vietnam wars totaled about 28 million 
and the VA’s budget was around $26 billion. The VA’s medical expenses have increased over 
the past 10 years and there have been increases to both total costs as well as individual patient 
expenditures, despite a drop in the veteran population. Currently, the veteran population is down 
to 20 million, but the budget has increased to over $200 billion. The VA is forecasting that the 
veteran population will be less than 14 million in 20 years (VACI, 2019). The number of 
veterans is falling rapidly, while per-patient spending growth has skyrocketed. The problem is 
not a lack of money; instead, the VA is plagued by long-running difficulties. Longman (2010) 
describes the VA as “a gigantic, unionized bureaucracy, micromanaged by Congress and 
political appointees, and best by an uncertain budget, an aging infrastructure, and a legacy of 
scandal.”  




million people are potentially eligible for VA benefits and services. Roughly 9 million are 
enrolled and more than 5.3 million received care in 2017. There were roughly 600,000 patients’ 
admissions and nearly 57.5 million outpatient visits. The VA operates more than 1,300 care 
facilities, including 875 ambulatory care and community-based outpatient clinics, 154 medical 
centers, with at least one in each state. There are 136 nursing homes, 43 residential rehabilitation 
treatment programs, 206 Veterans Centers and 88 comprehensive home-care programs. There are 
several external stakeholders who impact innovation at the VACI, including the media, 
Congress, OI&T, Patient Care Services, and clinical users. 
 
VA Environment 
The VA environment is highly regulated and non-competitive. The VACI noted that “despite 
significant increases in appropriations and a decline in Veteran populations, care to veterans 
remains problematic” (Akinyele, M., 2019). Recent VA problems of suicides and addiction have 
received media attention as full-blown crisis. The Military Times reports that the VA’s own 
accountability reporting notes the agency’s over-prescription of opioids to its continued struggles 
to get veterans in front of doctors in a timely fashion (Military Times, 2018).     VA advocates 
note that the press has a responsibility to cover the VHA, as it does other healthcare systems, 
reporting not only on problems but also on innovations, research, and patient care (Gordon & 
Craven, 2018). Former VA Secretary David Shulkin said (VHPI report, 2018) he was “frustrated 
with the VA’s environment” during his tenure. Shulkin also claimed a major challenge of the job 
was contending with unbalanced coverage of the agency. “Of course, there are a few bad actors 
in the agency, there are 370,000 people in it,” Shulkin said (VHPI report, 2018). “But the 




people are getting extraordinary care. We didn’t get the type of balanced reporting that would 
have helped us accelerate the culture and morale improvements that are underway,” Shulkin 
concluded. “Bad news gets more attention than good news.” These statements show the 
importance of perception and communication to the VA culture at the Secretary level. 
This grassroots effort also required a change in culture. VA Secretary Kizer (1994 - 
1999) advocated “taking down the barriers that keep people from doing the right thing” and said 
that “people tried to do the right thing in spite of the rules”(Gordon, p. 32, 2018), It is fair to say 
that these roadblocks and cultural complacency are still an issue within the VA. OI&T has an 
antagonistic relationship with the rest of the VHA. According to the Senior Enterprise Architect, 
Richard Pham, “you will have a challenging, I outright say an antagonistic relationship with the 
IT department” (Pham, 2015) 
One of the VACI governing principles (Brown, VeHU presentation, 2010) was that 
applications would “be piloted in a safe harbor environment”. This was realized by the sandbox 
environment that is described in the technology section. 
It is important to differentiate between the struggles that the VA is having in information 
technology innovation and the amazing advances it has made in clinical research and effective 
cost control (Oliver, 2007). As noted by Gordon (2018), the VA is a research powerhouse and 
has made advances in medical care, equipment, and pharmaceuticals that now benefit the entire 





Figure 6 The VACI semiformal organization mission and name changes 
 
VA Innovation Program 
 
The VA’s Innovation Program was formed in 2010, as part of the VA Secretary’s agency 
transformation to a 21st Century organization. In fact, the VA Innovation Initiative (VAI2) was 
highlighted as the “flagship initiative” of the VA Open Government Plan of 2010. The US Open 
Government Plan candidly noted that the, “VA has not always been the model of government 
performance or service delivery.” It (VA Open Government Plan of 2010, p.3) listed the 
attributes of “strong leadership, good governance, and a new commitment to creating a culture 
that is open, transparent, participatory, and collaborative.” The innovation program was formed 
to promote innovation. Over the past 10 years, the name of the VA’s national innovation 
program has changed at least four times, from VAi2 to the VA Center of Innovation (VACI and 
VCI), the VA Innovators Network and currently is called the VA Innovation Center (VIC) (see 




I presented at the VA eHealth University Conference in August 2010 in Tampa, Florida 
where I attended an “Introduction to Innovation” session, which was presented by Chuck Brown, 
the Director of the Innovation Program. The Innovation Portfolio (Brown, 2010) stated, “The 
VACI enables a steady flux of high-value innovations into the VA, moving them from concept to 
operational implementation.” The VACI is “taking a lean startup approach and applying methods 
like the user-centered design to achieve results quickly”. This “grassroots” organization is how 
the VistA EHR was formed in the 1970s (Longman, 2010) (Gordon, 2018). The VA’s internal 
innovation group is known as the “Hardhats” and the “Underground Railway” given that they 
shared information and collaborated to serve enterprise needs. They are avoiding being shut 
down by executive management by going to the national media and convincing Congress to align 
with their goals.  
In recent years, the VA work environment has been deemed by the government to be at 
high-risk. A VA internal leadership task force noted that it displayed obstructionist attitudes and 
clearly lacked integrity (GAO, Wagner, 2015). Since 2005, the VA Office of Inspector General 
(OIG) has completed 80 criminal investigations, involving wait times, and issued 18 reports 
identifying deficiencies, and in some cases concluded that wait times had been detrimental to 
patients’ health (VA OIG, 2014). Rubenstein (2018) reported that patients complain about the 
length of time it takes to get appointments, the amount of bureaucracy involved in becoming 
eligible for treatment, as well as falsified records, and even preventable deaths.  
Oversight  
According to the GAO At-Risk List, every two years the GAO reports to agencies and the 
public, the areas that are at high risk due to their vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and 




(GAO At-Risk List, 2015, 2017). The current OI&T organization is seen by GAO as having 
“inadequate oversight and accountability”, “information technology challenges”, and being “at 
risk to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement and in need of transformation.” 
A 2019 update to the GAO high-risk series noted that “leadership commitment has 
regressed” (GAO-19-157SP). Another report (GAO-19-476T, 2019) notes that “over many 
years, VA has experienced challenges in managing its IT projects and programs” and specifically 
to OI&T “its ability to deliver”. An accounting of all the oversight and investigations of the VA 
includes VA OIG, the FBI, the White House, Congress, corporations, and the press. In the OI&T 
transformation (p.9) noted with slightly veiled frustration, “Several high-profile media reports 
over recent years also highlighted how the build-up of bureaucracy over time had impacted care 
and services for our Veterans. We were the subject of study upon study, assessment upon 
assessment. Hundreds of findings, hearings, and interviews indicated everything that was wrong 
with OI&T…” 
Representative quotes from oversight experts on their frustration are from a March 30 
GAO Report include, “Our Hands Were Tied At Every Decision Point,” “Instead of Our 
Expectation To Work With A Leadership Team That Genuinely Desired Positive Change, We 
Were Met With A Leadership Team That Displayed Obstructionist Attitudes, and Clearly 
Lacked Integrity.” These quotes reveal organizational behavioral integrity issues with VA 
oversight.  
One of the most significant and notorious project failures was replacing the legacy 
scheduling system (GAO-10-579) which is about 35 years old (it was first used in 1985). What is 
noteworthy is the various software solutions that the VA attempted and failed at over 35 years, a 




replacement project first started in 2000 and ended in failure in 2009. In 2013, the VA launched 
a Medical Appointment Scheduling System (MASS) contest, under the America COMPETES 
Act. that served as a “proof-of-concept” prototype. The winner of the contest, MedRed stopped 
hearing from the VA (Politico, 2014) after the contest ended. The VA then awarded a scheduling 
contract to Epic that it subsequently cancelled during its pilot. “We knew that scheduling was a 
serious problem,” said Peter Levin, the VA’s Chief Technology Officer (CTO) quoted in Politico 
(2014), “We didn’t know it was an acute problem”. This quote is a remarkable and accurate 
summation of what I experienced at the VA when scheduling was involved. 
Theoretical Models for Innovative Organizations and Context 
It is noted above that the VA listed strong leadership and good governance as 
requirements to achieving innovation. Biancani (2014) noted several different innovation 
organizational model structures based on VACI in terms of the semiformal organization model. 
Ketti (1993, 2002a, 2002b, 2015) notes that much of the academic research on organizational 
innovation is in the commercial, manufacturing, international or private domain. The federal 
government and public bodies have different organizations, cultural norms for people, 
technology, and processes. Innovation creation and adoption in organizations is a highly complex 
process. It can be subjective, therefore illogical, and hard to research. Public-Private Partnerships 
(PPP) are used as a tool to improve the bleak success rate of federal innovation. (Ketti, 1993, 
2002a, 2002b, 2015) The systematic study of non-adoption and resistance to adoption is as 
crucial as the study of adoption, but it is a largely unexplored field. 
People, Process, Technology 
On his first day in office, President Obama required (Obama, 2008) the federal 




Secretary Shinseki fulfilled this executive order in the VA Open Government plan (Version 1.3, 
2010) by using the People, Process, Technology (PPT) Model. This PPT model is a well-used in 
both academic and popular organizational literature (Prodan, 2015) (IBM, 2011). Leavitt (1976) 
proposed PPT as a way of explaining the critical success factors for organizational change. I now 
propose examining each of the three PPT elements of VACI capabilities.  
 The People breakout figure below illustrates the significant areas (by my observations) 
where I want to examine the People element of the PPT model. Under people, I examine the 
organizational structure and culture, the private-public-academic partnership, and public 
communications. Groups of people create an organizational culture through shared values and 
behaviors. At the VA, the mission of serving Veterans is a very strong shared value. Secretary 
Shinseki’s Open Government Plan (V.1.3, 2010, p.7) promised a changed culture that will be 
open, transparent, participatory, and collaborative. The plan detailed that, “creating an 
atmosphere of openness at VA, the second-largest Federal agency, will require not only 
leadership from the top of the organization, but also significant efforts to integrate these values 
into our business processes” (V.1.3, 2010, p.16). In the VA Blueprint of Excellence, one of the 
strategies (#4, p. 20) includes “engaging and inspiring employees to their highest possible level 
of performance and conduct”. This culture was realized by the VA Innovation Initiative, which 
required employee participation in the ideas, selection voting, and implementation. In the 
findings section, I will investigate what were the organizational behavior issues that inhibited the 







Figure 7 The People details within the PPT model 
 
 
People: How does the VA organization, culture, and communication influence innovation? 
Behavioral integrity (BI) is defined (Dineen, B. R., Lewicki, R. J., & Tomlinson, E. C., 
2006). when an organization’s words and actions are in alignment. BI has been shown to be 
associated with a broad range of effective transformational leadership behaviors (Simons, 2011). 
Simons (1999, 2002, 2008) has confirmed that BI is influenced by personal characteristics 
(specifically leadership behaviors) and contextual characteristics (specifically organizational and 
environmental factors). What role does BI, culture, and environment play in preventing 
innovation from thriving? It is the VA’s goal to develop a culture of safety by reducing and 




was an easy fit to address the VA’s core values regarding Veteran-centric health care. I argue 
that failing to introduce RAPTOR represents a discrepancy between VA values and actions, and 
that the VA’s BI is misaligned. RAPTOR can improve the quality of care, patient safety, and 
regulatory compliance (VACI Good News Story, 2012). Tudor (2018) found that an automation 
tool to assist in the radiology order entry protocol selection of advanced imaging studies is a 
prime target to alleviate labor-intensive tasks. RAPTOR was identified in the VistA product 
roadmap as a “best practices workflow tool” and certified for quality (OSEHRA Technical 
Journal, 2016). RAPTOR ordering functionality automates the correction of erroneous orders 
(RAPTOR Requirements, 2014). It was noted by VA employees that this correction feature 
could potentially be perversely abused by allowing users the ability to unethically improve their 
order and schedule imaging departmental metrics.  
The perceived ease of use in the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) is an important 
theoretical consideration that I will use to explain why RAPTOR was not released (Davis, 1989).  
Cleaning and migrating erroneous legacy data revealed by introducing new systems is a 
common quality issue in computational archive systems (Rahm, 2000, Hasan, 2007). Erroneous 
legacy orders are an integrity problem. Holding up the implementation of a timesaving 
application while refusing to clean up legacy data is an ethical issue. Going into production will 
bring to light many lingering erroneous radiology orders. These occur when the order is not 
entered correctly and must be modified by the technologist. Paradoxically, this order 
housecleaning has not occurred, due to ethical considerations. 
What are the ethical ramifications with the huge backlog of erroneous radiology orders? 




employees are testifying to Congress about VA exam ordering data and the broken process to 
either ignore or delete the data. This ongoing, sensitive issue of order data was first made clear to 
me by one of the acceptance sites, noted this issue when erroneous data was exposed by turning 
on RAPTOR.  
“Erroneous orders. Going into production here in Portland has brought to light many 
lingering erroneous orders in our system. These occur when the order is not entered correctly and 
must be modified by the technologist, e.g., the clinician orders chest CT, then also orders 
abdomen/pelvis CT rather than one order for chest, abdomen, and pelvis. The tech attaches the 
abdomen and pelvis exam to the chest order, leaving the order for the abdomen and pelvis an 
orphan which must be deleted. Those cases are not being consistently deleted and therefore when 
one opens the Raptor worklist, the first several pages consist of STAT exams ordered several 
days earlier. This is not a Raptor problem but a housekeeping problem we need to solve locally. 
The problem is that a radiologist trying to protocol cannot tell which orders are legitimate and 
which are chaff.” 
This issue is not unique to a particular site as the Washington Post (Davidson, 2019) 
notes that Iowa City has tens of thousands of radiology orders, that whistleblower Jeffery 
Dettbarn testified on the retaliation that he received by reporting on the process of canceling 
these orders. 
If VA HIT is to help solve the veteran’s health care and help improve patient safety, HIT 
projects must succeed. Yet, HIT projects fail at a rate of up to 70%. Failure in this context is 




occurred, such as a project delay, a substantial cost overrun, a failure to meet an intended goal or 
complete abandonment of the project.” 
Process: In what ways does the breakdown of VA software, clinical, and management 
processes impact innovation? 
 The Process breakout figure below shows where I want to examine the Process element 
of the PPT model. Under process, I examine the development-operations coordination, software 
engineering process, the user acceptance testing (UAT), the project management processes, and 
the role of patient scheduling on radiology workflow. 
 
Figure 8 The Process details within the PPT model 
 
The software engineering process model I propose to use to examine the VACI is 
DevOps, a blend of two terms, development, and operations. DevOps originates from modern 




(Huttermann, 2012). DevOps is constantly evolving, and a clear definition is elusive. I propose a 
conceptual DevOps model (see the figure below). The model illustrates the overlapping domains 
of information science (on the left, represented in blue) and operational tasks (on right, 
represented in orange). This figure below sheds more light on the types of tasks performed in 
RAPTOR in the information science domain and by the VACI in the VistA sandbox to support 
users and administrators. It is important to note the large integration tasking (bidirectional green 
arrow) in the figure below. This integration represents a key DevOps handoff at the VACI to 
OI&T.  
 
Figure 9 RAPTOR DevOps Process 
 
DevOps is a software development methodology that combines software development 
(Dev) with information technology operations (Ops). Walls (2013) defines DevOps as a software 
culture that, when combined with several software development practices, enables rapid 
development. I am choosing the DevOps process model to understand the development of 




development process and spans from the planning to the implementation stage. The evolution of 
DevOps was made possible by the spread of cloud-based virtual technologies. The adoption of 
DevOps is, however, more complex than the adoption of Agile since changes at the 
organizational level are required. DevOps also requires new skills, coordination, and 
communication. 
The figure below from Gartner (2015) illustrates many of the possible DevOps tasks 
within the PPT framework. The figure below is a key illustration that shows the RAPTOR 
DevOps tasks. It is more concise than the figure above. My development team performed the 
design, coding, building of the servers, and acceptance testing. Additionally, we were required to 
load VistA data into our application. We were also required to build the servers for UAT. After 
the UAT, the software developers were dependent on the VACI for operational deployment and 
in order to monitor the application.  
 





To explore this issue, I will need to communicate with key stakeholders from various 
parts of the organization. As an established insider, I have familiar working relationships with 
many key stakeholders and can draw on my established professional network. I will interview 
stakeholders familiar with and influenced by VA organizational factors. This semi-structured 
process has been approved by the UMD IRB.  
 




Figure 11 The Technology details within the PPT model 
 
Despite a considerable body of literature (listed extensively in the bibliography) on 




research into proprietary vs. OSS concerns by US public sector organizations. In fact, during the 
RAPTOR project, the head of the VACI requested that I write a paper justifying the project’s 
intent on using OSS (RAPTOR Options Analysis Report, 2011). Thus, it is important to reassess 
the factors inhibiting OSS adoption and enhancement within the VA. 
This study will explore OSS communities and attributes through the lens of the 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis, 1989; Burton-Jones, 2013). I will use HCI in 
radiology, imaging informatics, information science, information technology, and workflow 
analysis to show the technological innovations of RAPTOR. 
The VA is shutting down award-winning OSS applications for proprietary commercial 
applications (Politico, Healthcare IT News, 2018). It may be the case that the marginalization of 
OSS at the VACI has little to do with software development issues or the acceptance of users. 
Although VA official policy encourages open source applications (VA Memorandum, 2014), the 
VA has not nurtured such open-sourced behavior (Open Health News, 2018). The annual 
Medscape Electronic Health Record (EHR) Report consistently ranks VistA the number one 
EHR (Medscape 2014 - 2017). Although OSS applications are championed by users and have 
passed all software quality certifications, they will be retired by the VA (Healthcare IT News, 
2018).  
VACI as a Semiformal Organization 
As a reaction against the “rigidness” of the VA, the VACI was organized to increase the 
rate of innovation at the VA. Several of the modernization goals of the VistA Modernization 
Strategy includes, “maintain clinician end-user involvement in requirements identification, 




adaption to changing business needs.” (p. 34, Table 5). Agile development is very different from 
what I experienced with multi-year development lifecycles as a VistA developer under OI&T.  
Banani and McFarland (2014) noted that organizational divisions make innovation 
difficult. They coined the term semiformal organization to refer to intra-organizational groups 
promoting new collaborations. Semiformal organizations are both structured and chaotic and 
mobilize around new ideas. Everyone’s participation is encouraged and offered in administrative 
decisions and voluntarily semiformal roles are occupied by employees. This type of project team 
increases informal communication. 
Characteristics of semiformal organizations include process flexibility, collaboration, and 
cross-functional teams. These semiformal structures support the exchange of knowledge and 
encourage networking among potential innovators. The extracurricular metaphor fits well with 
this type of organizational structure. “Toucan (aka Two-can) is a slang expression in the software 
industry that represents a two-person team – one highly technical and the other understands the 
needs of the users and is a user. This two-person team is what we used in RAPTOR.  
The radiologists and technologists serve as Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) on the 
application development but takes a lower priority to “real clinical work”. This is because they 
often put in extra time, meaning that they spend some of their time engaging in volunteer or 
unpaid labor.  
I used Biancani and McFarland (2014) to understand that the VACI has characteristics of 
a semiformal organization. Radiologists retain their local formal memberships and have an 




VACI was encouraged through employee voting and contests. VACI was created because of a 
recognition that large government organizations can create barriers to innovation (Brown, 2010). 
It is a semiformal organization (Biancani and McFarland, 2014), unlike the other VA divisions, 
Patient Care Services (PCS) and the Office of Information Technology & Operations (OI&T) 
Having established that VACI is semiformal, but not an incubator or “skunk-works”, I 
want to research what IT innovation models work well in the context of semiformal 
organizations. The VACI was organized as participatory “grassroots” or a “bottoms-up” program 
(Brown, 2010). The initial idea was the creation of employee-driven initiatives that the VACI 
would support, from concept to operational implementation. The VACI website described this 
approach as, “government experts…teamed with private-sector doers taking a lean startup 
approach and applying user-centered design to achieve results in months, not years” (VACI, 
2014). The VA Open Government plan said, (p.27-28, Version 1.3 June 25, 2010 ), “VAi2 is our 
structured and sustainable vehicle for spurring innovation and introducing the best ideas into 
day-to-day operations within VA. Going forward, we will continue to conduct both employee-
driven and industry-driven events in both bottoms-up programs that encourage a broad range of 
ideas) and top-down (directed programs focused on major challenges) fashion.” The process that 
VACI selected new innovations, its mission and focus lasted only a few years.  
There have been several VACI rebranding transitions over the past few years. In 2014 – 
2015, the VACI was reorganized to feature “Shark Tank” competitions. This rebranding was an 
attempt to avoid large projects and to spread more resources to spark innovation (VA Innovators 
Network, 2015). This project initiation rebranding is known as “Spark-Seed-Spread”. The 
current VA innovation organization is rebranded as iNET or Innovation Network. The current 




Currently, the VACI is being reorganized under the Office of Enterprise Integration. This 
organization chart is shown in the figure below. It has important to note that the VACI is not 
aligned with either technology (OI&T) or clinicians (PCS). This “orphan” structure provides a 
lack of ownership and the ability to not follow through on projects.  
 
Figure 12 The VACI is organized within the VA Enterprise Integration 
 
What message is communicated by broken websites? The VA’s culture of poor 
transparency and communication is illustrated by broken links and outdated information. As 
shown in the figures below, the VACI website has been under maintenance since the Trump 
administration implemented the Mission Act in 2018. The website displays the message that “a 
new and improved website is coming soon” for over a year (VACI, 2018, 2019). I also note that 










Figure 14 VAI2 website is broken (accessed in 2019) 
 
Adaptive Theory Process 
My case study needs a theoretical framework, but I found that the VA Center of 




characteristics fit my observations. I will further investigate several organizational innovation 
models on Effective Use Representation Theory (RT), TAM (Technology Adoption Model), 
TOE (Technology, Organization, Environment Model), TIS (Technology Innovation System) 
and OIS (Organization Innovation System). These models help identify the determinant factors 
for adoption or non-adoption of the RAPTOR technology. It would be worthwhile to investigate 
which of these individual technology innovation models, or a combination of these models, 
would fit a semiformal organization. 
I propose to use Adaptive Theory using the following process. Adaptive Theory is based 
on a hybrid approach between the data and the research (Layder, Chapter 6). My initial suspicion 
is that to understand the VACI requires innovation theory using orienting concepts on a 
semiformal organization. At the heart of adaptive theory are a set of concepts. They are like 
lenses that help me filter the data and make sense of it. I have chosen an adaptive approach 
because I have not found an existing model that fits my collected data. I need to adapt and 
propose a new model. I am taking the pre-existing concepts and they will be adapted once I dive 
into my data. I will let the data help shape and, if necessary, discard or reform the concepts. My 
findings is an organized group of concepts and a systematic way of understanding this case 
study, which I can then weave together into a theory. As I investigate the organizational 
innovation models below, I will propose the steps of my adaptive methodology. 
 
Organizational Innovation Models  




either TOE or TAM types. In their literature survey, Oliveira & Martins claim that “most studies 
on IT adoption at the firm level are derived from these two theories” (2011, p.110). These 
models help identify the determinant factors underpinning the adoption or non-adoption of 
RAPTOR technology. It is worthwhile to investigate which of these individual technology 
innovation models, or a combination of these models, would fit a semiformal organization. This 
following section was presented at the UMD CASCI on November 6, 2018, to gain insight, 
gather feedback from the iSchool community and to socialize model the proposed integration of 
the two foundational models TOE TAM. I am going to integrate TOE and TAM to make my own 
hybrid model. I will use this new model to orient my data and concepts. The resulting data will 
be the input to how I formulate my conclusions on the failure of innovation within the VA and 
point to a remediation process for organizational resilience. 
The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) 
Since RAPTOR is a radiology module of the VA VistA EHR, I feel like I am well 
equipped to find a model to explain technology adoption behavior at VACI. One takeaway from 
the Oliveira & Martins reading and the UMD CASCI November 2018 discussion is how these 
models relate to other theories and models. My focus is on RAPTOR technical acceptance over 
performance. Having established that VACI is a semiformal organization and that VACI is using 
the DevOps process, I am interested in the various knowledge-sharing frameworks and 
psychological theories that can be found in the existing literature (Anwar, 2017). I now begin to 
model TAM on the open-source policy and telehealth implementations of VA OI&T as shown in 




Table 4 VA Innovation vs. TAM Model 
 VA Innovation TAM Model – perceived ease of use and perceived 
usefulness,  
  
RAPTOR ● perceived ease of use – Radiologists perceive 
that RAPTOR replaces manual, error-prone 
paper process  
● perceived usefulness – Radiologists receive 
multiple perceived Benefits including Patient 
Safety (see Table of RAPTOR benefits) 
 
 
Open Source Policy ● perceived ease of use – Improved performance 
● perceived usefulness - Moves VistA innovation 




Telehealth ● perceived ease of use – TeleReader improves 
manual, error-prone process 
● perceived usefulness – Replaces transportation 





The link between culture, organizational processes and technology usage has been clearly 
established in the literature (cf. Alavi et al., 2006). Research on organizational culture (Pope and 




climate” positively influenced an individual’s intentions to share knowledge. Pope and Butler’s 
research (2012, Section 2.2) showed that “attitude”, “perceived behavioral control”, “subjective 
norms” and “organizational support” have positive effects on technical adoption intention, which 
in return affects knowledge sharing and communication behavior.  
 
Figure 15 Technology Acceptance is an organizational innovation decision 
 
Organizational impact on Innovation Decisions 
 
In my experience with the VA, organizational behavioral integrity had an impact on 
innovation decisions. In the TAM model, I define commitment to be organizational competence 
and consistency. Management support is needed to help to overcome barriers and training and 
education are needed to increase knowledge of the innovation. When employees want to adopt 




Operational technology support and access require resources if the system is to be properly 
maintained. 
In addition to technology and the environment, there is another component: the 
organization itself. Note that the model’s constructs (usefulness, user’s perception) are often 
beyond the remit of software innovation. Although the TAM model is effective, it does not focus 
on the organization itself. With that in mind, I will seek to elaborate upon it and further develop 
it in the following section. 
Technology, Organization, Environment (TOE) Framework 
 
Figure 16 TOE Framework (from Tornatzky and Fleischer, 1990) 
 
The figure above is a classic enterprise business model that shows the relationship 
between Technology, Organization, Environment (TOE) and Innovation (Tornatzky and 
Fleischer, 1990). TOE provides a holistic picture for user adoption of technology, its context, 




diffusion, factors influencing business innovation-adoption decisions and to the creation of better 
organizational capabilities and technology innovation. 
As shown in the TOE model above, the cross-functional area in the middle of the TOE is 
the Technological Innovation Decision (TID). We can deconstruct the TID, where attitude and 
perception impact user behavior, acceptance, and adoption. In the model, TID attitude and 
perception impacts the decision to innovate. 
Integrated TOE TAM model 
I have introduced the TOE and TAM individually, and they serve as building blocks for 
combining the two models. I now will argue that TOE and TAM can be integrated into a single 
organizational innovation model, as shown in the figure below. Oliveira & Martins (2011, p.120) 
conclude, “In terms of further research, we think that for more complex new technology adoption 
it is important to combine more than one theoretical model to achieve a better understanding of 
the IT adoption phenomenon”. I will now examine whether an integrated TOE TAM can be used 
to describe semiformal organizations. The TOE framework needs to be strengthened by 
integrating it with innovative models that have clear constructs. Therefore, researchers have 
advocated the integration of TAM and TOE so that the predictive power of the resulting model 
can be improved and some of their individual limitations can be overcome (Abdelhadi, 2018; 






Figure 17 TOE TAM can be integrated into a single model 
 
TIS applied at the VACI  
At the project level, TIS can be useful for the knowledge field or product (RAPTOR), 
breadth (VHA Innovation Portfolio), depth (Project Lifecycle) and domain (radiology IT, open 
source software). I propose to investigate the TIS theory in the semiformal organization, where 
the functions are determinant factors that can be dissected to understand the events that shaped 
the project’s outcome. Is there an Organizational Innovation System? TIS at the project level 
seeks to understand the emergence, growth, and performance of new technological fields. The 
nature of actors/markets may obstruct TIS formation. 
Starting with Representing Effective Use, I will show that TOE and TAM can be 
integrated and useful for finding determinant factors that lead to the adoption of technology. 
Functional dynamics and relationships are part of new organizational research in healthcare. This 




focused on the development, diffusion and use of a particular technology (in terms of knowledge, 
a product or both)”. 
 
Figure 18 Bergek (et.al. 2008) breaks down Technology Innovation Systems 
 
 





In shaping my adaptive theory, I developed the following process. Step 1, I first reviewed 
the existing innovation models in the process described above. Step 2 is on taking these models, 
proposing a modified integrated version, and then using that as a launching pad for the rest of the 
dissertation. I am looking at OIS failure groups within a modified TOE TAM TIS model. In 
particular, the OIS Failure Groups (adopted from Van Lancker, et. al. 2016, Table 1) 
Table 5 Organizational Information System Failure Groups  
 
 OIS failure groups Explanation    
Dimensional blindness 
failure 
Overlooking operations or not focusing on 
integration soon enough  
 
Iteration failure An improper balance between too much 
iteratively and too little feedback loops 
 
Resource failure Too few operational resources available within 
the VACI to successfully generate, develop and 
diffuse the innovation 
 
Representativeness failure Improper radiology and OI&T stakeholder group 
representativeness, non-representative 
organization or individual for the group, or non-
representative individual for the organization 
 
Cooperation failure Too few strong OI&T ties in the innovation 
network, leading to, for example, trust issues and 





Lock-in failure Too many strong ties, leading to, for example, 
‘group think’, resulting in myopia and inertia 
within the innovation network. This is true with 
open source development. 
 
Hard institutional failure The lack or underdevelopment of formal 
arrangements, e.g. collaboration contracts, IP-
arrangements, and non-disclosure agreements. 
Low radiology priority.  
 
Soft institutional failure The lack or non-alignment of informal 
arrangements, e.g. shared vision, social values, 
culture and norms, mutual trust, goals of the 
different partners and business models. Severe 
problem with VACI 
 
Capacity failure The lack of certain capacities of VACI to 
maximally benefit from innovations, e.g. 




I then considered and added Kaptein’s ethical factors adopted from 2013.  
Table 6 Ethical Factors (adopted from Kaptein, 2013) 
 
 Ethical factors Explanation    
Clarity Clarity for contractors, and employees as to what 





the expectations, the better people know what they must do 
and the more likely they are to do it. 
Role-modeling Role-modeling among administrators, management, or 
immediate supervisors: the better the government 
examples, the better people behave, while the worse the 
example, the worse the behavior. 
 
Achievability Achievability of goals, tasks, and responsibilities set: the 
better equipped VA employees and contractors are, the 
better they can do what is expected of them. 
 
Commitment Commitment on the part of contractors and employees in 
the 
organization: the more the organization treats its people 
with respect and involves them in the organization, the 
more these people will try to serve the interests of the VA. 
 
Transparency Transparency of behavior: the better people observe their 
own and others’ behavior, and its effects, the more they 
take this into account and the better they can control and 
adjust their behavior to the expectations of others. 
 
Openness Openness to discussion of viewpoints, emotions, 
dilemmas, and transgressions: the more room people 
within the VA must talk about moral issues, the more they 
do this, and the more they learn from one another. 
 
Enforcement Enforcement of behavior, such as appreciation or even 
reward for desirable behavior, sanctioning of undesirable 
behavior and the extent to which people learn from 





the enforcement, the more people tend toward what will be 
rewarded and avoid what will be punished. 
 
In the Literature Review theory section, my proposed refined model I will call the TOE 
TAG, G is for Groups, as in grouping of failure. I present my pre-data ‘guess’ of what the 
proposed refined PPT model. TOE TAG combines TOE TAM, PPT with a hybrid of OIS failure 
groups and ethical factors shown in the tables of ethics above. 
In the next findings section, my Adaptive Theory process continues with the following 
steps: Findings Step 1. Using PPT, I present findings using the models discussed in the Literature 
Review Step 3. I use the models as a framework from which to begin the discussion and structure 
my writing. The emphasis in the findings chapter is on presenting the facts: ‘this is what’s going 
on’. Then, in the summary, I reflect on how well the models apply and suggest some minor 
amendments (if necessary) Then in Step 2, Using PPT, Ethical factors and OIS Failure groups to 
map to RAPTOR data collection. Keeping my emphasis on the findings chapters and presenting 
the facts using my models from Literature Review step 3 as a hook. 
RAPTOR Level Introduction 
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is the largest healthcare system in the United 
States. A current headline (Politico, 2017) warns that the VA built the most important medical 
computer system in history and is now about to spend billions throwing it away. The White 
House has made the overhaul of the VA’s medical records a centerpiece of its government 




This research studies and proposes to redesign a key part of the VA’s VistA (Veterans 
Information Systems and Technology Architecture) Electronic Health Record (EHR) system. 
This research could result in saving the government from throwing away VistA and wasting 
billions of dollars and improving care to the nation’s veterans. My research proposes applying 
information systems methodology to the VA radiology workflow. It serves as a case model that 
could help shape the national discussion on VistA for the modernization of legacy government 
health information systems. 
CTO Peter Levin defines VA innovation as invention plus implementation (Fedscoop, 
2010). Levin highlighted seven attributes of implementation: open architecture, modular, 
scalable, standards-based, extensible, reliable, and maintainable. This definition is important to 
note now in the literature review as implementation is a critical issue that I will revisit in detail in 
the findings and conclusion section. 
Conceptual Framework 
This study will use the overlapping domains' conceptual framework. The interacting 
domains are computational archives, human-computer interaction, knowledge management, and 
data visualization, each of which are used to explore, measure, and verify the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the VA’s radiology protocol workflow. Lincoln & Korpman (1980, p. 259) used 
overlapping domains to illustrate the introduction of computers into the medical clinic. This 
framework assists the researcher by raising, “issues that are difficult to resolve by the methods of 
information science or medical science applied in isolation. The melding of these two 
disciplines, together with the contributions of other disciplines, has created a new field of study 




concentrate on a single domain but on the areas that domains overlap to consider an integrated 
approach to broader problems in HIT.  
 
 
Figure 20 Overlapping Domains Conceptual Framework 
 
My motivation for returning to UMD was to design research that can be used to redesign 
and automate a key radiology component of VistA, considered to be the most important medical 
computer system in history. The overlapping information science domains steered my first two 
years at the University of Maryland iSchool. Initially, my action research focus was on studying 
the VistA radiology paper workflow and releasing an automated tool that works with VistA. This 
research would have been used to understand the process involved in measuring the design, 






Radiology Information System Context Mapping 
At one time, VistA was generally recognized as the most integrated and best Electronic 
Health Record system in the world. (Longman, 2007) VistA currently provides each veteran with 
a digital medical record; this has improved the quality of care, patient safety, patient, and 
provider satisfaction, and bought about lower costs. As open source software (OSS), it has value 
for the global healthcare community (VistA Modernization Report, 2010).). However, as one of 
the US government’s oldest legacy information technology systems, VistA must be updated and 
modernized for the VA to continue to meet the needs of the veteran community. The overlapping 
domains shown in the figure above illustrate the major radiology and technology influences that 
need to be addressed by this research. 
Radiologists review clinician orders for advanced diagnostic imaging exams and assign 
specific protocol instructions that direct how each exam must be acquired. Performance of this 
department function can impact patient safety, quality of care and productivity, yet its 
importance is often undervalued and not automated. This protocoling is predominantly a paper-
based manual process at VHA facilities nationwide.  
Paper processes have inherent shortcomings. Lost and duplicated exam requests 
negatively impact efficiency. Information necessary for optimized protocol selection can be 
missing from paper processes. If it is not available on paper, this information can be cumbersome 
to obtain when the data is stored in disparate health information repositories. This lack of 





Figure 21 RAPTOR Context Map 
 
Cousins and Robey (2005) examine how patterns of technology use are shaped by 
context of use, and how these patterns affect individuals. Recordable electronic transactions 
assure responsibility and authentication of documentation. The provision of secure provider 
communication protects patient privacy. Electronic emulators of paper processes are at risk of 
providing non-optimized functionality and falling short of efficiency and quality targets if 
enough system interoperability is not achieved. Diverse health system requirements, including 
consent for contrast agents, application of conscious sedation protocols and documentation of 
order changes, can be automated within an optimized electronic dashboard solution. Utilization 
of open standard, open source architecture and tools could result in improved reliability and 






Open Source Software Strategy  
 
What is an appropriate strategy for modernizing VistA and transitioning it to a more 
current and innovative architecture? “When you look at the big trends in the IT industry, open-
source is used everywhere. In fact, some of the most successful mega IT systems have a 
significant open source component,” said Dr. Seong Mun, CEO of the OSEHRA (Healthcare IT 
News, 2017).  
I have experience with several diverse software strategies at the VA, but when 
developing RAPTOR, I choose the open-source software strategy. As shown on my timeline (in 
the introduction), my initial OI&T experience with VA was as a legacy VistA developer. I was 
directed by VA employees (both technical and clinical) to develop new functionality in a 
waterfall methodology to meet VA’s specific requirements. My next experience was as a PCS 
software architect to assist with the integration of COTS software for teleradiology and PACS. 
COTS Software was evaluated and certified based on performance and interface standards 
(Henderson, Dayhoff, Casertano, 2010) However, other strategies of software methodology, 
including agile, open source are a way forward to modernize VistA.  
Around ten years ago in 2010, the VA Modernization Report provided a vision of VA 
open source development. This vision (VistA Modernization Report, p.7) foretold, “a state of the 
art, open source medical application development environment with a comprehensive suite of 




researchers, commercial medical and non-medical products companies, national health services, 
etc. with a superset of the functionality in today’s VistA system”.  
VA Assistant Secretary Roger Baker described the reasoning behind the VA’s open-
source software policy in 2010: “I just think we’re going to move VistA innovation forward 
much more quickly if we go the open-source route.” (Fierce Government website Q&A quoting 
VA Asst. Sec. Roger Baker, 2010). He added “... how do we then get back to moving the 
innovation forward in VistA, and that’s really what the whole open source campaign is all about. 
Medical records systems have moved forward a tremendous amount in the United States since 
the time that VistA was started. And the private sector is doing a lot of stuff that we need to be 
able to incorporate into VistA. So, our thought is that by being part of an open-source 
community based around VistA (OSEHRA), the VA can encourage private sector folks to either 
directly contribute the open-source—you know, make improvements. Or integrate their products 
with the open source, so we can very easily buy a working product, instead of having to go down 
the government route.”   
Assistant Secretary Baker’s reasoning is that ancillary system integration would be 
cheaper with open source systems. Baker said, “I believe we’ve got to go the open-source 
route…we have two important projects to integrate private-sector packages into VistA going on 
inside the government right now—one is for laboratory and one is for pharmacy. Both of those 
projects are going on five years, to integrate the private sector product into VistA because we are 
doing it the government way. That is far too long. We need to be able to go out and say, ‘I’m 
interested in a pharmacy package, in six months I’m going to buy one that I prefer, from all the 




going to buy, that could be 200 or 300 million dollars. So, you know generating the private-
sector interest in it” (ibid.). 
This section shows that the software industry in general, the VA and the RAPTOR 
project are targeting an open-source software strategy to maximize resources and maintain 
technical currency. In the private-public academic partnership section, I will expand more on the 
specific benefits of open source software, but next, I will discuss several challenges with this 
strategy. 
Open Source Challenges 
 
As RAPTOR was designed initially for the VA, it is important that the software satisfies 
VA’s unique requirements to ensure interoperability with other VA systems and data 
provenance. This requires many diverse and atypical domains to be mastered. The application 
development requires a deep understanding of the VistA’s patient data. It also requires an expert 
understanding of advanced imaging protocols to display and input premedication regimens, such 
as contrast administration and radiation dose. This domain is reflected in the contraindication 
rules’ engine. Additional expert knowledge of the data utilized by radiology departments and 
Radiology Information Systems (RIS) is essential. Insight into workflow optimization, efficiency 
measures and quality feedback loops to users are required. The two figures below show the 
current VistA radiology protocol workflow. The applications are shown at the top, the users are 





Figure 22 The Physical Representation of VA Radiology Protocol Workflow: Part One 
 
 






Open source agile application development requires self-contained infrastructure and 
tools and participation in testing certification conducted by the Open Source Electronic Health 
Record Agency (OSEHRA) (Ito, 2016). RAPTOR has been certified at OSEHRA Level 2 (which 
is more rigorous than legacy code). OSEHRA Certification criteria comprise eight categories, 
including a code review, documentation, and testing (OSEHRA Certification Standards 
document, 2016). 
As an example of anti-disciplinary thinking, IT design, development and testing require a 
deep understanding of software design, content management systems, knowledge algorithms, 
web services, data visualization, and security. 
This project requires an understanding of the customer and the customer’s environment. 
Expertise with the VA, including national and local executives, administrators, radiologists and 
especially its mission to support our nation’s veterans, is critical to getting the project completed. 
RAPTOR Literature Review 
 
This literature review will survey and unify several diverse strands of research. It serves 
to verify and validate that the approaches I have taken to evaluate the root causes of innovation 
failure are aligned with evidence-based practices and theory within the field of information 
systems. Interdisciplinary research strengthens the project’s foundation and shows where it fits 
within the larger scientific community. I have grouped the literature and bibliography according 
to the categories within iSchool studies. Thus, theory from Computational Archival Science 




(HCI) in Radiology Information Systems (RIS), and Electronic Health Records (EHR) 
information systems and the data visualizations literature will inform the analytical framework. 
Computational Archival Science Literature Review 
 
The UMD’s Digital Curation Innovation Center (DCIC) Computational Archival Science 
(CAS) workshop was my first introduction to this unique interdisciplinary approach to 
information studies (Marciano 2016). The gateway seminars highlighted a diverse combination 
of CAS concepts and new approaches to research. They clarified the social justice record 
archiving and management work being researched in the DCIC and sparked ideas with my own 
areas of interest while simultaneously helping me learn about the array of topics that can be 
explored in information studies. Lemieux (2016) describes the practical examples of telling a 
story with documents. I acknowledge that there is a significant responsibility to telling my story 
and my research determines whose stories are told, how their importance is weighted. Marciano 
discussed combining data from multiple sources, to gather insights across diverse information 
sets. Often, archives are not designed to cultivate this cross-domain thinking, so Marciano 
advocates restructuring them into what he refers to as a data observatory, in which one can 
borrow patterns of thought from computation to organize them into levels. 
In the gateway seminars, I researched and presented a medical imaging data curation case 
study (Kuzmak, 2013). This Department of Defense (DOD) VA case study looked at data 
curation issues, including public-private partnerships, chains of custody, trust, information 
retrieval & access, archive retention strategy, provenance, and standardization. This case study 
investigated streamlining the importation of DOD Digital Imaging Communication in Medicine 




System). (Kuzmak, 2012) Understanding users in their environment is inherently 
interdisciplinary. Marciano (CAS Symposium, 2016) notes that CAS is an interdisciplinary 
research field, where the importance of humanity must be addressed in large data sets and in 
digital curation and interface design. My systems engineering background provides a 
foundational understanding of the semantic interoperability of Electronic Health Records 
(EHRs). EHRs contain millions of records and contain patient's longitudinal histories.  
Organizational Innovation and Knowledge Management Literature Review 
 
Knowledge Management (KM) is defined as a systematic process for gathering, 
organizing, and communicating both tacit and explicit organizational knowledge that can be used 
by stakeholders (Schultze & Leidner, 2002; Alavi 2005; Massey & Montoya-Weiss, 2006). To 
implement and make full use of knowledge, an organization must have a clear understanding of 
how knowledge is formed, disseminated, and applied (Ipe, 2003; Hooff & Huysman, 2009). A 
systems-based approach to understanding the VA radiology workflow includes understanding the 
radiology community of practices, protocoling, VA management, and organizational and 
environmental issues. I applied ethnographic research on VA organization and structure, 
individual accountabilities, and key collaborations. I researched how grounded the VACI is in 





Figure 24 SWOT Analysis 
 
The KM tool shown in the figure above is the application of SWOT analysis. Srikantaiah 
(2008, p.19) recommends SWOT analysis as an excellent tool for organizational planning. 
SWOT provides an analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. It is an effective 
way of examining those four areas to strengthen the organization”. SWOT analysis is used to 
provide decision support of a project by evaluating the probability and level of risk of reward and 
failure. It will provide a blueprint pointing out where the organization is strong and where the 
opportunities exist to capitalize on those strengths. The analysis will also reveal what areas in the 
organization are weak and need to be addressed to improve the existing condition. The analysis 
will also caution the organization of the threats to watch out for pointing out what needs to be 

























The VA radiology workflow business process discussed above reveals significant 
problems with the protocol library and collaboration. A lack of collaboration is often a liability 
associated with specialization (Biancani, 2014). VA Radiologists frequently do not receive 
enough information on exam requisitions to optimize the quality and safety of their protocol 
decisions. Efforts to augment the clinical detail provided by the ordering provider can be 
cumbersome and negatively impact radiologist productivity and department efficiency. Issues 
associated with collaboration include: 
 
a) Inefficient paper-based processes.  
b) Lost paperwork. 
c) Duplication of paperwork (and effort). 
d) Potential for vague documentation of responsibility. 
d) Finding and engaging a subject matter expert (SME); and 
e) No ability to track real-time patient information. 
 
Biancani (2014) noted that accessing the digital library is influenced by selection 
efficiency. For RAPTOR, this knowledge is coded into a document that is currently paper based. 
Information diffuses as VA radiologists develop techniques to overcome the barriers, which are 
influenced by local contexts.  
There are two types of data - patient and protocol - and each requires a different KM 




knowledge in available repositories (Hansen, 2005). Protocol knowledge is carefully codified 
and stored in databases, where it can be accessed and used easily by radiologists.  
While this data is all already available in one form or another to most radiologists, it is 
not enough to simply be available. Data must be prepared in a logical and consistent manner to 
allow for its orderly assessment. Many hospital systems are plagued by multiple independent 
computer systems that barely interconnect. For a busy practitioner, this could result in an 
incomplete review of the data before decision-making occurs. This is not necessarily due to the 
information being unavailable or to information overload, but rather that the data is not in the 
right place at the time a decision is made. If a practitioner must open a new application, log in, 
enter a patient identifier, select a subject, select a test, and wait for each of the accompanying 
windows, usage may be inconsistent at best. (Lin, 2005) 
Anatomic and modality knowledge is closely tied to the person who is an SME on an 
acquisition modality, and this is shared mainly through direct person-to-person contact. The 
collaboration requires a personalization strategy, as knowledge is shared among radiologists. 
Based on the problems I have already discussed associated with digital libraries and 
collaboration; I will define concrete knowledge management actions I recommend that the VA 
adopt. I will explain my choice of strategic action and the likely value that its implementation 
will create for the organization. 
Each VA hospital has variable procedures contained in a protocol. These are documented 
in a protocol notebook, in which radiologists maintain a set of official protocols for their site on 
paper. The protocol documents are explicit and describe the best practices of the imaging 
department for various combinations of patient and imaging factors. There can be any number of 




The KM digital library application captures the protocol notebook content for users and 
the system to access as needed. There are several aspects to the protocol library content. When 
considering bases of explicit knowledge saved in electronic format, the taxonomy of modality, 
protocol, and template values are used and directly connected with the body of metadata used to 
define, identify, point, describe and characterize the contents of that knowledge base. This 
taxonomy is shown in the table below.  
Table 7 Aspects of Protocol Library Content 






A PDF containing a scanned image of the 







Key information about the protocol stored 
in a format that the program can index and 
use to match operations. 
 
E.g., Modality (such as CT, MR, etc), and 







Information to tell the system if the 
protocol is still active and when it was 










When the radiologist selects a protocol, 
the system knows to propose the input 
values associated with the selected 
protocol. 
 
These are values that have already been 
identified for the pre-population of fields 




One simple way to improve collaboration is to request those subject matter experts self-
identify their specialties. Radiologists can identify their modality and anatomical expertise. 
When a difficult case is presented, a radiologist can request collaboration with an expert. This is 
shown in the RAPTOR request collaboration screenshot in the figure below. 
   





HCI in Radiology, imaging informatics, information science, information technology, and 
workflow analysis literature review 
 
My research requires an understanding of human-computer interaction (HCI). HCI is a 
subset of Human-Centered Design (HCD) that is specific to electronics, computers, and digital 
media. On Facebook and Twitter social media, the VACI wrote (Facebook, July 19, 2019) that 
“human-centered design (HCD) is the bedrock principle of the Innovators Network”. The study 
of HCI is important, not only to understand the possibilities of computer automation but also to 
understand how humans behave and understand technology. Current HCI research (Barab, 2004) 
(Fry, 2007) Munzner, 2014) explores system design and development problems with no 
understanding of human factors considerations.  
Through my literature review, I found a rich history of healthcare information technology 
at the UMD HCI lab. I am aware of a specific example of UMD HCI research that eventually 
became a commercial radiology workflow product. Wongsuphasawat (et. Al. 2011) discusses a 
UMD HCIL tool called LifeFlow, which is used to visualize an overview of event sequences at 
hospitals. It summarizes all possible sequences and highlights the temporal spacing of the events 
within sequences of patient events. I am interested in the EHR domain, as I have worked in this 
area for more than fifteen years and have worked with some of the world’s largest healthcare 
organizations, including the US DOD and the VA. Some of the LifeFlow technology was 
acquired by Microsoft Health Solutions Group (MHG) and it evolved and was rebranded, first as 
Azyxii and later as Amalga. I met with Eric Weaver of the MHG in 2011 to discuss how 
RAPTOR and Amalga could be integrated with one another at a high-level. The story of this HCI 




proprietary software while RAPTOR remains open source. Amalga was marketed as a universal 
PACS.  
 Siegel (1998, 2004) documented some of the earliest radiology surveys that measured 
productivity changes by introducing healthcare IT, including PACS and hospital/radiology 
information systems (HIS/RIS). The 2004 survey found an initial 10.8% drop in productivity 
during the first year of PACS implementation, followed by a 27.8% increase in productivity 
beyond year one. This suggests there is a "learning curve" phenomenon that should be 
considered when institutions are planning for automation implementation. This is an important 
point: a new technology introduction may produce mixed results. My qualitative research will 
investigate users’ perception that new technology may not be welcomed due to the fear of a 
learning curve and loss of productivity. 
 Burton-Jones and Grange (2013) claim that state representation is the idealized model of 
all IT systems. Representation theory (RT) states that an information system is made up of 
several structures that serve to represent some part of the world that a user and other stakeholders 
must understand. I propose applying representation theory to this study. Using RT, RAPTOR 
developed a radiology protocol workflow state diagram, shown below. These states (active, 
approved, and complete) are familiar VistA radiology terminology (VistA Radiology, 2013). RT 






Figure 26 Radiology workflow state diagram 
 
Gassert et al. (2014) studied a specific case at the University of Colorado Hospital, where 
Interventional Radiology (IR) was recently introduced. This article investigates the IR workflow 
process. The authors looked at the paper process and then created a web form. I became aware of 
this article through a Google scholar search, as it references the RAPTOR Journal of Digital 
Imaging (JDI) article (Medverd, Cross, Font, Casertano, 2013) and Gassert writes that RAPTOR 
validates their work: “In the meantime, an electronic protocol workflow for cross-sectional 
imaging was designed and implemented in diagnostic radiology, an effort that has been 
undertaken elsewhere, as well (Medverd, 2013)”.  
 I used this article to compare University of Colorado Protocol templates from Epic and 
RAPTOR. Both designs have a grid-based data form that is based on the physical paper form. As 
it is based upon an existing paper form, there is consistency and affordance. The user is familiar 
with the placement of the data and knows that the header data is constrained. In RAPTOR, the 




view additional information, mapping to the existing radiology workflow action. The main idea 
behind grid-based designs is that solid visual and structural balance of web applications can be 
created with them. Sophisticated layout structures offer more flexibility and enhance the visual 
experience of visitors. In fact, users can more easily follow the consistency of the page, while 
developers can update the layout in a well thought-out, consistent way. 
 Morgan (et. al 2009) investigated the development of a radiology clinical dashboard, 
evaluating its effects on report turnaround time, and reporting the user’s impressions on their 
workflow. UPMC aims to be efficient by reducing inefficiencies associated with the current 
paper-based, manual processes, and supplanting the use of fax and scanning technology. 
Automation can result in the prevention of avoidable duplicate radiology studies, improving the 
traceability of records within radiology, improving cost savings related to improved regulatory 
compliance and improving QA/QC feedback and training. RTAT will result in prioritization 
alerts that enable timely responses to clinical alerts and prevent avoidable clinical errors. It will 
also result in a customizable workflow and improved safety checks.  
 Morgan (1998) proposes using mixed methods research in which the investigator collects 
and analyzes the data and integrates both qualitative and quantitative findings. Combining both 
quantitative and qualitative data will assist me in calibrating the findings of both approaches. 
Results in both areas focus on different aspects but are nonetheless complementary and lead to a 
more complete picture. This mixed methods research is characterized by the collection and 
analysis of quantitative data followed by a collection and analysis of qualitative data. The 
purpose of this research method is to use qualitative results to assist in explaining and 
interpreting the findings of a quantitative study. 




effectiveness has been supported by the data. This research has captured the current manual IR 
workflow and transitioned it into an electronic process. The results now estimate that automation 
has improved department efficiency by 24%. The average turnaround time initially increased 
from 22.5 hours to 24.3. After additional modifications were made, the time was reduced to 17.7 
hours. The authors have integrated a reporting system with a Radiology Information System 
(RIS). As a result, radiologists can learn the outcomes of their patients with much less effort. The 
authors intend that this tool be used to aid radiologists and to increase the efficiency of both 
teaching and research. This study includes data compiled by radiologists who hope to develop 
the system into a platform for the systematic, continuous, quantitative monitoring of performance 
in radiology.  
 Morgan et al. (2008, p.57) discuss a distinction between HIT and other HCI 
implementations. One difference is that “an inaccurate dashboard is worse than no dashboard”. A 
clinical decision support system has no value if users cannot trust the information. Moreover, if 
software errors are encountered, it may be difficult to overcome these first impressions. Some 
may say (Morgan, et.al. 2006) (Morgan, et.al. 2008) (Morgan, et.al. 2011) that these findings 
contradict the agile process, where system improvement is part of the process. The contradiction 
noted in Morgan (2006, 2008, 2011) between “perfect on arrival” and “constant refining” 
resulted in conflict between the agile process, user acceptance testing, and the additional round 
of development noted in this (Morgan, et.al. 2008) article. This is the difference between the 
perspectives of a software developer and a radiologist. This question is worthy of further 
investigation.  
 Alkasab (2013) created a web-based application that allows radiologists to create and 




systems to minimize manual input, such that radiologists can quickly flag cases for further 
follow-up without interrupting their clinical work. This research has integrated this case-tracking 
system with an electronic medical record aggregation and search tool. As a result, radiologists 
can learn the outcomes of their patients with much less effort. The aim of this tool was to aid 
radiologists in their own personal quality improvement and to increase the efficiency of both 
teaching and research. The study includes data compiled by radiologists who hope to develop the 
system into a platform for systematic, continuous, quantitative performance monitoring. It also 
highlights the Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC) aspect of radiology workflow. The 
researchers created a follow-up tool to track outcomes. RAPTOR expanded on this concept by 
including a QA mode. The RAPTOR QA mode is presented to users once the exam has been 
completed.  
 
Data Visualization Literature Review 
 
Plaisant (2004), of the UMD Human-computer Interaction lab, surveyed the data 
visualization literature to uncover challenges to information visualization evaluation. Usability 
testing and controlled experiments remain the backbone of evaluation. She found four thematic 
areas of evaluation:  
1: Controlled experiments comparing design elements.  





3: Controlled experiments comparing two or more tools. This is a common type of study; 
they usually try to compare a novel technique with the state of the art.  
4: Case studies of tools in realistic settings. The advantage of case studies is that they 
report on users in their natural environment doing real tasks, demonstrating the feasibility 
and in-context usefulness. The disadvantage is that they are time-consuming to conduct, 
and results may not be replicable and generalizable.  
Plaisant (2004) then discusses three possible first steps to improve information 
visualization evaluation and facilitate adoption: the development of data and task repositories; 
the gathering of case studies and success stories; and the strengthening of the role of toolkits. 
This article bridges the gap between data visualization and HCI. HCI concepts of case studies 
and usability testing made sense for tool evaluation. While Plaisant noted the challenges of these 
evaluation methods, she also noted their value. When it comes to visual memory and attention, 
people have two different memory categories, short and long term. Consider the human 
cognition of RAPTOR. The UI design has been described as “nice and clean” by the Chief 
Radiologist of the VA (personal correspondence with Chief Radiologist, Dr. Charles Anderson), 
with minimal clutter and clear navigation. The grid-based data has balance, as it is based on a 





Figure 27 Example of VA Form 519a 
 
The VA 519 form illustrates the limitations of the current paper-based processes. It is 
manually printed and then passed by hand through an extensive radiographic workflow. The 
diagnostic order is entered in the Computerized Patient Record System (CPRS) by the provider. 
An administrator prints out the order. This order is then assigned to a radiologist, typically 
randomly, and infrequently based on a specialty. The radiologist may have a resident who will 
act on their behalf; the resident or the radiologist will review the order, review the patient’s 





by handwritten, often illegible notes. The figure below shows a comparison between the form 
and the initial RAPTOR conception. 
 
Figure 28 Automating the VA Paper Process 
 
As it is based upon an existing well-known form, there is consistency and affordance. 
The user is familiar with the placement of the data. The user has a long-term visual memory and 
the designers can predict where viewers will focus their attention and each data element is 
consistent. For short- term attention, eyes beat memory. The data highlighted in the yellow block 
alerts the user to risk, as yellow signifies caution. This risk captures the user's immediate 
attention. The details of the risk are available below on demand. RAPTOR provides both data 
reduction and navigation. The UI design is based on the grid conceptual model. The main idea 
behind grid-based designs (Rogers, Y., Sharp, H., & Preece, J., Section 2.3.2), is that solid visual 
and structural balance of web applications can be created. Sophisticated layout structures offer 




understand the page, while developers can update the layout in a well-thought-out, consistent 
way. 
Wideman & Gallet (2006, p.29) concluded that it is possible to quantitatively study 
radiological workflow across multiple sites. This study assumed normal distributions for times 
associated with each workflow activity and included a table for specific activities, time, and 
number of events. The study performed a statistical analysis of the workflow. In the discussion, 
the authors focused on a single site due to variability issues. They also did not include 
technologist data, although they had originally planned to focus on multiple sites and roles. This 
study noted that actual times of specific activities would be longer than measured as they include 
patient-generated activities. The use of a straight-line fit to the data points is effective for 
visualizing improved exam time improvement, but visually limiting. In the initial Ph.D. action 
research phase of my work, I identified Wideman & Gallet’s quantitative study as a benchmark 
to measure against the RAPTOR project and overcoming the limitations of this study is a 
worthwhile research opportunity. My initial hope was to include multiple variables in addition to 
the average exam time. 
When visualizing large amounts of data, analysts may have difficulties finding interesting 
data points. If the analyst does not have a good feel for the data and its distribution, many queries 
may be needed to find interesting data sets. The result for most queries will contain either less or 
more data than expected; perhaps the data may even be null. Keim (1993) discusses the desired 
ability to control the process of query specification. Improvements to graphical processing, user 
interfaces, and data visualization software since this article was written, over 25 years ago, have 
allowed analysts to improve query specification using visual feedback. When planning for 




improved the software designer's understanding of what the efficiency and effectiveness issues 





Chapter 3: Methodology 
Overview of Methods 
 
In this methods chapter, I will give an overview of my narrative research approach and a 
justification for its use. I use the autoethnographic method to answer the three research questions. 
The figure below provides an overview of the methods chapter.  
 
Figure 29 Mapping of Methods Chapter 
 
Research approach  
My research approach relies on narrative and an analytical investigation into the events 
that occurred around me and my feelings about the outcome. My beliefs about my work and the 




can be debated and are situational, as I believe there are multiple views of reality. My research 
relies on my views and that of other stakeholders and the accepted theory that I have found most 
useful in understanding the work of the VA. Studying VACI in detail requires a long timeline as 
it has changed its direction at least four times in ten years, therefore I am researching the 
organization since its creation. I draw upon my 30 years of direct experience in the software 
industry and my direct experience with RAPTOR. In this research, I will focus on DevOps 
innovation at the VACI from 2010 to 2018. This time period covers my complete experience 
with the RAPTOR project, from planning through to the prototype stage, through User 
Acceptance Testing (UAT) and right up to release. This direct and immersive experience in the 
end-to-end DevOps lifecycle provides relevance and credibility to this research, which I 
achieved over the fifteen years of working in the VA and seven years in the development of 
RAPTOR. A timeline of activities important to this research is included at the end of this 
chapter. 
For this research, convictions, and personal views count. This epistemology is open to 
different interpretations depending on opinions, internal organizational beliefs, and gut feeling. 
As a scholar, I will describe the insider issues and the culture of an organization, both of which 
are not well known. The figure below lists my research approach and the ontological, 
epistemological, methodological assumptions that underpin the research. It also outlines the 
inductive reasoning and broader research design.  
I characterize epistemology as what I believe as seen through my experiences, within the 
culture, and surroundings of my work. In my research, I have experienced relativist perspectives, 
I acknowledge that multiple people have multiple realities and take away multiple meanings 




defined RAPTOR as a success, as the software was delivered on time and on budget and 
successfully passed UAT. However, the VA radiology community could define the project as a 
failure, as the VACI was unable to apply it.  
I surveyed the available methods and eventually settled on autoethnography because of 
the requirements of the research. I am using a bottom up approach, and I am using a long 
timeline of data collection and am researching the project in great depth. 
My approach is highly inductive. In induction, the researcher is free to change an 
approach based on emerging considerations. I will use the findings to build theory and 
conclusions rather than prove the existing theory. Inductive reasoning is less structured than 
deductive reasoning, as there is no guiding theory.   
Table 8 Summary of my research approach 
Approach Theoretical Stance 
Ontology (my beliefs about my situation) There are multiple levels of reality 
(relativist) 
Epistemology (how I come to know the 
world) 
Meaning is culturally defined 
Methodology Qualitative 
Design Autoethnography 




Methods (techniques for collecting data) Document analysis, interviews, and 
observation to get multiple perspectives 
Analysis How the data are processed and 




I define my methodology as an investigation into my own situation. Stringer (2015) uses 
the word ‘practitioners’ to describe researchers, implying that those engaged in an activity are 
well situated for an investigation. As my evaluation is to focus on the things that matter to VA 
stakeholders, I have conducted my research by examining the interactions between people, 
processes and technology (PPT) as understood and judged (Greenwood, 2006) from inside the 
innovation program or software development activity.  
Autoethnography is a research approach that systematically describes a personal 
experience to understand the cultural experience (Ellis, 2016). It is a qualitative method to 
systematically analyze (graphy) personal experience (auto) in order to understand a cultural 
experience (ethnos). Autoethnography is a context-conscious, qualitative research methodology 
that incorporates deep descriptions of evidence and personal reflection (Reed Danahay, 2009). 
Jackson and Mazzei (2008) describe the autoethnography process as a way of truth-telling and 
obtaining closure through research and writing. Ellis describes scholars who use the 
autoethnographic method as wanting to better understand the world we live in and change it for 




 LeCornu (2005) notes that “focusing on the relationship between reflection and learning 
and highlighting the dimension of personal growth through the concept of internalization”.  
 
Figure 30 The autoethnographic research process 
As shown in the self- created figure above (based on both the Kolb Learning (1984) and 
the Pastoral (Lartey, 2000) cycles, the autoethnographic research process can be modeled as a 
feedback loop. I created this process model when assessing this methodology. I found that with 
discipline, one dynamic activity leads to another. The figure above illustrates how the 




collection, management, analysis, and interpretations are a dynamic process. For example, I have 
been going through past correspondences and other documents and recollecting past experiences 
in a structured data collection harvest. Some important data is used depending on the story I am 
telling, while other data, perhaps that which is not as important to my narrative, is not used. 
Evaluating certain agency and project activities based on my narrative is an analytical and 
interpretative activity (Chang, 2008). As my story begins to take shape, I am using adaptive 
theory to continuously examine the validity of my data collection criteria to shape my findings, 
analysis, and interpretation. I am using the organizational innovation theory detailed in the 
literature review to help shape my data collection. 
I chose autoethnography to describe my work examining the VA since 2002. I will use 
my thirty-two years of technology experience as the basis for my autoethnographic approach. 
This includes my fifteen years at the VA and three additional years at the Department of Defense 
(DOD) Military Health Systems (MHS). I have worked on many successful and unsuccessful 
projects at the VA and the DOD, including their Electronic Health Records (EHRs). My unique 
observations originate from my diverse roles at each of the three parts of the VA, as shown in the 
timeline table in the introduction. At the VA Office of Information Technology (OI&T), I was a 
VistA solutions architect for the imaging software. At VA Patient Care Services (PCS), I was an 
enterprise architect supporting the Chief Radiologist. With VACI, I was the RAPTOR project 
innovator, designer, developer, and manager. My years working with VACI on RAPTOR will be 
the focus of this research, although I bring in other software and innovation experiences as 
counterexamples.  
At the outset of the research, I opted for a social constructivist approach and action 




because of the advantages it bought, particularly the greater level of insight, accessibility, and 
academic rigor it brings. However, it does bring challenges, including how to avoid bias, an 
important consideration when one considers the familiarity I have with the data and that the data 
is, in effect, collected, interpreted, and analyzed by just one person. This called for rigorous self-
analysis and corroborative data collection. 
Initially, I was prepared to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the VA radiology 
workflow. My original approach was to first measure the current manual error-prone paper 
workflow and then measure it again using RAPTOR (Casertano, 2018). However, as RAPTOR is 
designed to work with the now-canceled VistA, the cancelation forced me to change my initial 
scope, from understanding the use of the tool to researching the root causes of innovation success 
and failure at the VACI. As it is part of the VistA ecosystem, when VistA goes, so too does 
RAPTOR. 
Advantages and challenges of the autoethnographic method  
Drawing on the work of Costello (2016), I adopted the following three tables that help 
visualize the advantages and challenges of the autoethnographic method. The advantages of the 
autoethnographic method were an important consideration that resulted in the evolution of my 
methods from action research to autoethnography.  
Table 9 The Advantages of Autoethnography 




Offers a new 
perspective 
I have found that the current academic 
literature does not address the 
organization, innovation, technology 
issues that I experienced in my project. 
Some scholars are raising doubts about the 
value of IT theory to explain the actual 
practice.  
Autoethnography is suitable for new 
organizational forms of research, inquiry, 
and practice.  
(Grover & 
Lyytinen, 2015) 






depth of insight 
My personal introspective account 
provides rich insights into various 
technical and human elements of the VA 
organization and cultural environment. 
(Klein and Rowe, 
2008) 
  
Accessible When action research was made 
impracticable by the canceling of VistA, 
autoethnography provided a research 
method to make sense of what happened. 
(O’Riordan, 
2014) 




Analytic rigor An increase in the use of autoethnography 





Sense of Self Autoethnography is suitable content for a 
sense of self. The construct of ID Identity 
has been used in information systems. This 
research is an extension of that expression 
of one’s role, group, and personal 
identities. 
(Carter, et al. 
2017) 
 
Based on Costello (2016) and the references listed, the challenges of the 
autoethnographic method are shown in the tables below. These challenges include ethical issues, 
which are important when the same person is involved in primary data collection and analysis. 
Only with reflective self-analysis and corroborative data collection can rigor be achieved. The 
table shows that, in my research, the autoethnography method has advantages and disadvantages 




Table 10 Autoethnography Disadvantages 
Challenges Challenges for Autoethnography Reference 
Issues with Data 
Collection 
It can be difficult to get information 
from inside the organization. I can 
overcome this using my insider 
position and years of experience to 
collect significant data. Internal VA 




Ethical Challenges Intruding on the lives of others. I 
can overcome this challenge by 
communicating my findings with 
key stakeholders for confirmation.  
Prevent or minimize bias, a self-





Difficult to Evaluate Difficult to acquire and 
contextualize useful data. I can 
overcome this limitation by focusing 
on the RAPTOR case since I am 






Justifying my choice of research method, the table below offers a comparison between action 
research and autoethnography.  
Table 11 Comparing Autoethnography to Action Research 
Comparison 
attribute 
Action Research Autoethnography 
Value Proposition Method develops research The method is the story 
of self, project, and 
organization 
Perspective of time Observation and 
interpretation of the present 
condition 
Self- observation, and 
interpretation of the past 
and present condition 
Relationship to 
research 
Active  Meaningful experience 
Basis for 
examination 








Taking action that produces 
the desired outcome and 




project that produces an 
outcome and seeking lens 
of truth perspective 
Strategy for growth 
of knowledge 
Evaluating whether actions 
produced intended outcomes 
The reflective analysis 
builds on theory and 
models 
 
Methodological Evolution  
I chose autoethnography as my methodology after several years of reflection as a Ph.D. 
student. From my initial understanding of methods at UMD, I have attempted to find a 
methodology that would be the best fit. While I always knew that the focal point would be on the 
RAPTOR software application, it took time for me to settle on autoethnography. I started out 
with a focus on social construction, then action research and finally autoethnography. 
Autoethnography is a non-traditional methodology that I had to seek out, based on my 
circumstances and experience. It was not taught to me in the three methods classes I recently 
completed for my Ph.D. In fact, I am not sure that I was exposed to it at all, until after I 
presented my integrated paper, and became a Ph.D. candidate. 
Social Constructivist Research Epistemology 
My epistemological position (Crotty, 1998) is social constructionist, researching best 




communities. My theoretical perspective is phenomenology (Layder, p.67). I use the theoretical 
concepts of workflow process to reduce real world complexities to render it understandable, 
predictable and enable a reciprocity of perspectives. My real world (Gray, p. 24) research is an 
exploration of prevailing expertise via the agile experience. Value is attributed not only to the 
qualitative improvement of improved efficiency but also to the design of the process and 
application.  
In my experience and in my research, I have used the power of different communities or 
ecosystems. In the private-public-academic partnership figure below, I illustrate several 
important communities that I have utilized in my open source software development, and then 
researched and discussed in my dissertation. I discuss this partnership throughout my research 
and in my findings.  I have collaborated with a diverse group of stakeholders and used my own 
years of design experience, and research. I have collaborated with subject matter experts in 
radiology, VA, and software design communities to: Understand the current paper-based VA 
radiology process; Using concepts and code from “best of class” VA software applications; 
“Lessons learned” from previous software projects. 
After reviewing diverse viewpoints in a relativistic orientation, I constructed the concept 
and design framework. I propose using multiple methods to establish different views. I initially 
intended to use action research through the agile process and include the opinions and 
interpretations of participants. These participants consist of VA radiologists, medical 
technologists, and VACI executive managers. I rely on qualitative analysis of data to understand 





Figure 31 Private Public Academic Partnership 
 
As shown in the figures below, I had the opportunity to mentor six different Master of 
Information Management (MIM) UMD graduate students. This partnership was a “win-win” 
chance to innovate by: provide a challenging opportunity to learn modern tools; contribute to an 
important, award winning project; be a contributor in the open-source community; and, engage 





Figure 32 UMD iSchool as part of the Public-Private-Academic Partnership 
 
 





Figure 34 MIM iSchool poster on RAPTOR data visualization 
 
Initially, I was prepared to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the VA radiology 
workflow. My original approach was to first measure the current manual error-prone paper 
workflow and then measure it again while using RAPTOR (Casertano, 2018). The figure below 
shows my original step in the dissertation journey. It highlights the tool project goals that could 





Figure 35 Original RAPTOR Poster  
The poster (Casertano, 2017) I presented at the iSchool showcase in 2017 is shown in the 
figure above. This poster illustrates that my original intent of the project was to utilize RAPTOR 
and measure the efficiency and effectiveness of the radiology workflow. However, the inability 
to collect more clinical data has forced me to change my initial scope and begin researching the 
root causes of innovation success and failure at the VACI. Given that it is part of the VistA 
ecosystem, when VistA went under, so did RAPTOR.  
Action Research  
My second methodology was action research. Action research is defined by Blum (1955) as 
researching a social problem with a view towards improving the problem. As a VA VistA 
designer and researcher, I was interested in researching real-world problems with VistA using 




The ethical considerations and validity threats of this internal situation are examined in this 
research. The key characteristics of action research are decentralization and cooperation. Action 
research moves away from generalizable truths to an emphasis on the local context. One-size-
fits-all solutions do not work. 
  Action Research moves away from the conventional rules of research, as objectivity and 
generalizability must be redefined from tradition. There is no functional distinction between the 
researcher and the research subjects. People impacted by the situation have a voice and are 
empowered to help create and carry out the solutions to problems. In the RAPTOR software, 
radiologists became the designers with agile development. 
Action Research is designed to solve “real world” problems. Formal scientific research 
does not translate well to the social and behavioral sciences. The social world is dynamic and 
always changing, so objective generalizable knowledge is often irrelevant to the actual problems 
research practitioners face. Community-based action research is a democratic, humanizing, and 
empowering approach to inquiry that aims to solve problems and to make a difference in 
people’s lives in a specific way, rather than just writing a report or publishing a paper. 
 Ito (Weblong, 2016) says that when “the problems are massively complex…it is nearly 
impossible for us to divide them into existing disciplines”. An antidisciplinary project is 
described by Ito as being more than a listing of the sum of its parts. Ito (Weblog, 2014) writes 
that “interdisciplinary work is when people from different disciplines work together. But 
antidisciplinary is something very different; it is about working in spaces that simply do not fit 
into any existing academic discipline—a specific field of study with its own words, frameworks, 




My antidisciplinary viewpoint includes atypical combinations of interdisciplinary 
domains. This antidisciplinary behavior is exhibited throughout my research for the RAPTOR 
project. In the initial project review, the director of the VA Center of Innovation (VACI) 
requested a report (RAPTOR Options Analysis Report, November 2011) back to the Innovation 
Center on the innovative open source technology we proposed. I have defined the VACI as a 
semiformal organization (Biancani,2014, -.1306) Unlike counterexamples including NSA LAS 
and the MIT Media Lab (Ito, 2014) the VACI is not a physical space or location, but a virtual set 
of projects and contracts.  
 Stringer (2014) notes the value of phenomenologically focusing on people’s actual 
experiences. Creswell (1994) and Maxwell (2012) highlight the value of communities for their 
diverse expertise. Community-based action research is a democratic, humanizing, and 
empowering approach to inquiry. RAPTOR was designed with the input of several communities 
and is an open-source application. These communities have demonstrated that the open-source 
model can lead to reliable, predictable, safe, and robust applications, include software such as 
Apache, Drupal, MySQL, and Linux. 
OSS development methodologies typically result in high-quality software delivered in 
less time and at a lower cost than is achieved with alternative development methods. OSS is in 
wide use in many businesses and government agencies. The VACI has been initially cautious 
with the proposed open-source research approach. With the VistA Modernization Strategy, the 
VA proposes that an open-source approach to software development, launched with VA’s VistA 
EHR, provides the best framework to accelerate the rate of innovation, to provide more efficient 
component integration, to create an ecosystem that taps the best of the health care community to 




New users exhibit technology defamiliarization as they adjust from the paper process to an 
automated tool. The same protocols that were initially developed by a community of radiologists 
are now to be loaded as application templates. 
 
Use of Theory to Generalize from Case Studies 
As noted in the literature review, the PPT, TAM, TOE, and other theoretical propositions 
that went into the initial design of this case study will have formed the groundwork for an 
analytical generalization (Yin, 2014, p.40) driven by an adaptive approach. I propose that a new 
generalization (TOE TAG) will emerge from the case studies findings. My analytical 
generalization is based on corroborating and modifying the organizational innovation models 
discussed in the literature review. The theory generalization will be at a conceptual higher level 
(Yin, 2014, p.41) than the case study findings. As my role has evolved from inside VA innovator 
to outside UMD researcher, because I have deep insider knowledge and many years of 
experience on this case study, much of this information is unavailable to anyone else but me.  
 
Use of Validity on Research Design 
 I think about my research design as a “blueprint” (Yin 2014, p.45) for my research. The 
design addresses the research questions I am studying, what data I am collecting and presenting 
my findings, and how I will analyze my results. Yin (2014, p.45) notes that a research design can 
be judged for quality according to validity tests. My construct validity is that I have defined my 
research as innovation at VACI by focusing on the people, process, and technology that impacted 




internal validity concerns how I am making inferences. My autoethnographic method will” infer” 
that a project result was dependent on an event. My use of theory and checking with others will 
assist with validity. As RAPTOR was a module of VistA, and VACI was the VA’s signature 
approach to open participation, I will generalize on how the failure of the approach (open 
participation) led to the canceling of the software VistA. While I have looked at the appropriate 
models (people, process, and technology, and two main types of technology adoption, TOE 
TAM) and have based my design and collection on this theoretical framework. The reliability of 
my research is based on the history of the VA, both success and mainly the management failures. 
This history of failure has repeated throughout VA history. Reliability suggests that I could have 
performed this research on other VA software innovations and have similar results. In particular, 
the VA CIO announced that they are pursuing a buy first strategy, hence all innovation programs 
will be impacted.  
 
Ethical considerations, validity threats, limitations  
 
Twining et al (2016) points out that an important element of the design of a study relates to 
ethics. This is particularly critical within autoethnography research, where data are often 
personal and are collected from a small number of individual respondents. There are several 
ethical considerations and validity threats to the study. As a software developer and tester, I am 
aware of the implications of human-based research with software. Both the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) review by the VA and UMD Institutional Review Board (IRB) review 
provided an independent validation perspective and approval of the data collection. This 




Action research can involve insider observations, and this introduces the potential for bias. 
Herr and Anderson (2014) noted that insider positions have implications for a study’s 
trustworthiness and may have ethical implications.  
I chose a research design that controls threats to the validity of the project and improves the 
project’s credibility. I propose the following case study tactics for testing the validity of my 
findings and conclusions and the existence of potential threats to those conclusions. 
 Below are the case study tactics of my research designed to mitigate validity threats:   
● Deep insider research: I have more than 15 years’ experience working with the VA. at 
three different areas of the organization. Prolonged engagements aid validity. I can 
distinguish between the changes between the innovative open-source software 
development at VACI with RAPTOR, and what I experienced in internal VistA 
development in OI&T and commercial development in PCS.  
● Trust: As a Ph.D. candidate, my self-interpretation methodologies have been discussed 
with stakeholders from the VA who worked with me. I have a deep history with them and 
have gained their trust and continue to communicate with them on the details of my 
research.  
● Counterexamples: I have compared my work with three different areas (VACI, OI&T 
and, PCS) of the organization and summarized their software process differences: I have 
compared and contrasted VACI with NSA based on collaborating with Dr. Kathleen 
Vogel. Applying the same research design validates transferability. The counterexample 




with dedicated funding is a good example of a government led public-private innovation 
program.  
● Triangulation: The credibility of the study will be enhanced by adding multiple sources 
of information that agree. I have a very large reference list of academic and government 
publications. I have news journal websites and videos.  
● Member Checking: The plan is to publish and socialize the research. Project participants 
have fact-checked my research. I have included several past and current radiologists, and 
software developers that have provided excellent feedback. 
● Checking for Rigor: The rigor of my case study research design, its methods, and the 
design decisions impacts my approach to theory.  
● Rich data content analysis: I have deep experience with the VA organization and 
understand the history of culture and failure. I know where to find deep insider content to 
make my findings and conclusions. I have been filtering through all the documents and 
decide how much should I disclose in my writing.  
A review of the BI considerations when dealing with HIT failure is a reminder of the 
sensitivity of the human element of research. There are several ethical effects on the study. As a 
software developer and tester, I am aware of the implications of minimizing patient risk with 
software.  
 Both the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) review by the VA and the UMD Institutional 







Content analysis is a widely used qualitative research technique. I have collected data 
since 2002 on the VA VistA EHR. With inductive analysis, the researcher is free to change the 
approach based on ongoing considerations. I surveyed the available methods and evolved 
autoethnography based on the conditions of the data available. I am using a bottom-up project-
based inductive synthesis approach, where I am looking at long timeframe from 2002 to 2018. 
This timeframe includes several different roles of the VistA and RAPTOR software lifecycle and 
researching the VA in great depth. To reduce the breadth of my large data collection, my 
synthesis approach is to combine my content analysis and integrate using the PPT conceptual 
framework.  s 
I will adapt the organization information system theory, and conclusions rather than 
prove the existing theory. Inductive is also less structured than deductive reasoning, as there is 
no guiding theory. My contribution is to develop a new model using a conceptual innovation 
(Strike, Posner, 1983).  I synthesize loosely related phenomena information systems with ethics 
management in a highly conceptualized intuitive intellectual activity.  This synthesis is at the 




Collecting Autoethnographic data was straight-forward. I started working for VA – DOD 
collaboration since 2002, so my data access starts since then. From 2002 to 2012, I was a key 




I led a team of DOD engineers that studied VistA and made recommendations for collaboration. 
I have reviewed most of the data I collected and, based on my research design, I have only 
chosen the most applicable to my research questions. I have a huge collection of design 
information on VistA since I was a member of the software development team. I have had no 
issues with collecting data but have had to choose the best representative data to tell my story. I 
have collected data from several databases associated with the VA, VACI organization and 
RAPTOR over the past 10 years. Some of the proposed RAPTOR development data collected 
include: 
● The RAPTOR project team maintained Dia project tracking software throughout the 
project. The Dia was included in a monthly progress report that was contractually 
required from the developers to VACI. 
● The developers maintained an internal project database in MantisBT. MantisBT is an 
open-source bug tracking tool written in PHP. This was used internally for project 
management to coordinate between developers and track bugs internally. 
● The development team wrote the functional requirements document. 
● The development team wrote the test cases and results. 
● The Users Acceptance Test Report discussed the User Acceptance Testing process for 
each iteration of agile functional testing. This includes the three phases of testing:  
o 1. Viewing the VACI sandbox through a remote VMware view account 




o 3. Editing access to “clinical” UAT cloud data center boxes that displayed 
“clinical” data 
● The developers maintained an external test database in MantisBT to support User 
Acceptance Testing (UAT). 
● VACI maintained a sandbox tracking database at help.vacloud.us  
● The open-source options analysis report written by the developers 
● RAPTOR Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan 
● VistA document library (va.gov/vdl/) 
● OSEHRA document library  
● VistA Evolution Enterprise Health Management Platform (eHMP) documents including 
the VistA Evolution Plan  
  
 I will start my research with the Open Source Software (OSS) directive memorandum, 
VACI, and OSEHRA correspondence and project documents specific to technology and HCI 
software design issues. Key VA technology documents include the VistA Modernization 
Strategy (2010) and the VistA Evolution Roadmap (2014). I have over 15 years of organizational 
correspondences, meeting notes, strategy roadmaps, and presentations. I know that to enhance 
the credibility of this research I need to ensure that the perspectives of multiple stakeholders are 
included. I have requested additional documentation through the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA). I will recruit and communicate with key stakeholders from various parts of the VA, 




I have worked with, and groups I have joined and can formulate an integration of innovation at 
the VA. I interviewed stakeholders familiar with VA OSS communities and technological 
factors.  
Chapter 4: Findings 
 
I am comfortable to honestly tell my story of the RAPTOR project and the validity of the 
data and findings through my 17 years’ experience with the VA. I collected the VA organization 
data from 2002 to today. In the previous chapters I established how I collected the data and what 
it is intended to represent.  
This chapter will gather and provide the findings using the PPT models, process 
methodology, and information theories established earlier. I have organized the findings using 
the PPT model as shown below. I will conclude with a summary of findings that will interpret 






Figure 36 Map of Findings 
Introduction to Findings 
 
The RAPTOR case study findings are a computational archival systematic (CAS) review 
of the diverse data I have collected and analyzed over many years. With CAS thinking, I 
acknowledge that there is a significant responsibility in telling my story and outlining my 
research. I have combined data from multiple sources to gather insights across diverse 
information sets and use a diverse combination of information science theory to determine how 




I have organized a mass of information collected since I first started analyzing VistA in 
2002 (Casertano, et al, 2002). I have accompanied each finding with the significance of either 
highly relevant, relevant, or less relevant impact analysis as shown in the overall finding’s matrix 
below. A hybrid total of ten ethical issues failure groups were identified from a thematic analysis 
of the findings. The relevancy is based on the cumulation of two organizational criteria, OIS 
Failure Groups (Van Lancker, et. al, 2016) and the Ethnic Management Framework (Kaptein, 
2013). As shown in the table below, I found that the failure groups and ethical shortcomings map 
very well.   I name this hybrid TOE TAG, as an adoption of the popular TOE TAM research. The 
more a finding fit a failure group and an unethical behavior, the more relevancy was scored. 
Highly relevant earned a score of 10 to 8, relevant earned a score of 7 to 4, and less relevant 
earned from 3 to 1.  
 
Table 12 Summary of organizational innovation system failure groups (Relevancy Criteria)  
 
Hybrid of OIS failure groups 
plus Ethics Management  
Explanation 
Dimensional blindness failure  
+ Lack of Clarity ethics 
Overlooking one or more dimensions or not 
focusing on one or more dimensions soon 
enough plus the success criteria 
Representativeness failure  
+ Role-modeling ethics 
Improper stakeholder group 
representativeness, non-representative 
organization or individual for the group, or 
non-representative individual for the 
organization, plus the worse the example, the 




Resource failure  
+Achievability ethics 
Too few financial resources or human 
resources within the OIS to successfully 
generate, develop and diffuse the innovation, 
plus the better equipped 
people in an organization are, the better they 
can do what is expected of them 
Lock-in failure  
+Commitment ethics 
Too many strong ties, leading to, for 
example, ‘groupthink’, resulting in myopia 
and inertia within the innovation network 
plus misplaced commitment of leadership  
Soft institutional failure  
+Commitment ethics 
The lack or non-alignment of informal 
arrangements, e.g. shared vision, social 
values, culture and norms, mutual trust, goals 
of the different partners and business models, 
plus leadership commitment to innovation 
Cooperation failure  
+Transparency ethics 
Too few strong ties in the innovation 
network, leading to, for example, trust issues 
and difficulties in cooperation 
Openness failure  
+Openness ethics 
Improper balance between consulting and 
participating with too many stakeholders, 
plus lack of open discussion of viewpoints, 
emotions, dilemmas, and transgressions 
Hard institutional failure  
+Enforcement ethics 
The lack or underdevelopment of formal 
arrangements, e.g. collaboration contracts, IP 




plus sanctioning of undesirable behavior and 
the extent to 
which people learn from mistakes, near 
misses, incidents, and accidents 
Iteration failure Improper balance between too much needless 
iteration and too little feedback, plus a lack 
of coordination of responsibilities within the 
organization 
Capacity failure The lack of certain capacities of the 
innovation organization to maximally profit 
from the OIS, e.g. absorptive capacity or 
network management capacity 
 
 Each findings section – people, process and technology – begins with a specific table. 
After presenting a finding, I explain it and point to the data source, before presenting the next 
result then explaining it, and so on.  
I will use induction, using information about my experiences with my projects RAPTOR 
and VistA, my experiences with VHA, OI&T, PCS, and VACI to reach conclusions about the 
VA. This inductive reasoning was discussed in the methodology section. 
One common way to test the adequacy of a generalization is to confirm it with 
counterexamples. I use several different counterexamples to validate my case study and to 






Findings on People: The VA organization, culture, and communication influences 
innovation 
 
I researched and answered my question on people/organization/culture: How does the VA 
organization, culture, and communication influence innovation? My findings on culture, 
organization, and communication show the underlying people issues that currently plague the 
VA. As a semiformal organization, the VACI was designed as a bottom-up organization to foster 
a culture of innovation and transparency. VACI remains a rules-based instead of principles or 
mission-based culture, thereby hampering innovation. The government has often failed to sustain 
and maintain innovation over time.  
Organization communications can shape and omit the truth to emphasize a positive 
message and influence both internal and external opinion. The VA created a culture of 
groupthink with retaliation against whistleblowers. VACI uses social media in external 
communications to highlight successes and offset negative reporting. Internal VACI 
communication prematurely hailed RAPTOR as VACI innovation "good news” as management 
shapes and controls communications. VACI is recommending that the VA forget what made it 
successful in the past. This results in a lack of organizational behavioral integrity. The figure 






Figure 37 People Findings 
 
The table below organizes the people findings into culture, organization, and communication and 
labels them based on their relevance to my research question and maps the overall findings data 
source that follow.  
 
 
Table 13 Table of People Findings 







10 to 8  
#1. (very relevant) 





ingrained in the 




Phoenix had an 
impact on the 
VA’s culture and 









for RAPTOR for more 
than 4 years. They and 
many other potential 
users perceived 
RAPTOR’s usefulness. 
#2. After RAPTOR 
was awarded one of the 
top 5 Medical Imaging 
IT Projects of the Year 
(2012), VACI funded 
the prototype buildout.  
#1. Government have 
often failed to sustain 
and maintain 
innovation over time. 
#2. The failure to adopt 
organizational policy is 




7 to 4 
#4. The NSA LAS 
is an 
organizational 
#3. External radiology 
media prematurely 
publicized RAPTOR.  












3 to 1 
#5. VACI is 
recommending 
that the VA forget 
what made the 
VA successful in 
the past. 
#4. VACI uses social 
media in external 
communications to 
highlight successes and 
offset negative 
reporting. 
#4. VACI changed its 
name, leadership, and 





On his first day in office, President Obama made a presidential Open Government 
Directive (Obama, 2009) to all cabinet level agencies to be transparent, collaborative, and 
participatory. Peter Levin, VA CTO, said (Levin Fedscoop Video, 2010) that “this is the culture 
that he (Obama) is asking his administration to lead.” Levin said that VACI is the flagship 
initiative of the Open Government Plan. According to Linda Fischetti, the VA Chief Health 
Informatics Officer (presentation, June 10, 2010), VACI was formed to create, connect, and 
empower innovators. In other words, VACI is the VA’s innovation organization.  
The VA Open Government Plan (2010, p. 3) noted the impact of forming VACI 
(originally known as VAI2) would have on the agency’s culture. “We have developed a very 
exciting flagship program, the VA Innovation Initiative, or VAi2. This initiative will transform 
our business processes, provide transparency to our work, and create a collaborative effort 




the talent and expertise of individuals from both inside and outside government to contribute new 
ideas that will ultimately produce new, innovative solutions at VA.” 
The VA Open Government Plan (2010, p. 8) stated, “Section 3. Changing the culture 
from top to bottom: Creating an atmosphere of openness at VA, the second largest federal 
agency, will require not only leadership from the top of the organization, but also significant 
efforts to integrate these values into our business processes.” 
The VA Open Government Plan (2010, p. 9) also stated, “4. How we measure success: 
VA will know that we have been successful in our open government endeavors when the tidal 
wave of questions regarding the status of a claim recedes and Veterans receive the benefits and 
services they have earned, more quickly and more reliably. VA will use informal surveys on 
websites such as Facebook to monitor how we are doing. In the next calendar year, we will 
develop a short, formal, and web-based survey to determine whether stakeholders and the public 
have heard about our open government plan and whether it has been effective.” I have followed 
the VACI Facebook group since 2011 (Facebook, 2011) through its many changes, to understand 
the direction of VACI. 
I have attempted for several years to obtain additional data via FOIA requests. However, 
I was given the runaround with my FOIA requests. Initially, I was met with enthusiasm when I 
met with my old VA comrades, and promised whatever I needed. When months passed and 
nothing was forthcoming, I heard I was asking for too much and that I needed to document every 
document that I wanted. I kept after my VACI contacts from 2015 to 2020, but I have not 






Mission v. Rules Culture  
People Finding - Culture #1 (very relevant, TOE TAG Score = 10)  
 
There was once a unique culture of innovation at the VHA. The VACI was designed to 
replicate that culture of innovation. I first became aware of the VistA culture of innovation 
known as ‘Hardhats’ while studying VistA for a DOD research paper (Casertano, 2002). The 
VA’s culture of innovation transformed the VA (Longman, 2010, p. 42) into the nation’s best-
performing healthcare system. Longman exclaims that the VA succeeded in (2010, p.23) 
“creating a wonder of bottom-up engineering that many experts say points the way to the future 
of 21st century healthcare.” In my research I found that much of the effectiveness and durability 
of VistA can be attributed to the collaboration between technologists and clinicians that defined 
the development process. This paired programming is known as “Toucan” or “Two Can” (VistA 
Modernization Strategy, 2010, p.25). Ogrysko (2017) notes that there is a cultural legacy of 
partnership between clinicians and developers. Clinicians appreciate the ability to work with 
developers to implement modifications to their instances of VistA. Several clinicians expressed 
satisfaction with this capability, and fear losing it with an enterprise COTS system. While 
developing VistA at OI&T, the team had a user representative, and meetings with users, but there 
was a perception that our sequential "waterfall" approach to software development resulted in 
cumbersome processes, lengthy delivery times, and prevented us from gathering meaningful 
requirements and iterative feedback from our business partners – the end users. My RAPTOR 
work with VACI attempted to overcome this as the development team had a close relationship 




In the OI&T Transformation presentation, there is a quote that exemplifies this stagnant 
culture (2016, p.8): “Employees expressed frustration at the perception that there was a field-
based OI&T and Washington OI&T. Requirements in the field were not always passed on to 
decision makers at headquarters. OI&T developed IT solutions that meet the needs of a few 
without knowing what our business partners and field staff really needed from that technology, 
who relied on our IT solutions to address critical Veteran needs.” 
Some providers feel significant trust between clinicians and IT has been lost over time 
with respect to partnership in VistA and CPRS development. Part of this is related to the fact that 
EHR improvements are hampered by budget and approval processes and, additionally, 
disconnect exists between VA facilities and IT with regard to business planning. 
The Grant Thornton report asked (2017) about the importance of having VA clinicians 
having a say in their clinical practices, workflows, tools, and processes. pairing clinicians with 
developers. This software development process pairing is discussed further in the 
counterexample process finding. 
 
Whistleblower Retaliation  
People Finding – Culture #2 (very relevant, TOE TAG Score = 9)  
 
A factor in unethical practices in the VA was an organizational climate that actively 
discouraged the reporting of problems within the system and allowed retaliation against 
whistleblowers in violation of federal law (Molina, 2018). This retaliation increases the risk of 




easier it is to shift or shirk responsibilities (Kalstein, 2013). Retaliation against whistleblowers is 
ingrained in the VA culture. “For years, a culture of fear has developed for whistleblowers at the 
VA,” Senator Tom Colburn wrote in Friendly Fire. However, the fear of reprisal often deters 
whistleblowers from coming forward. The retaliation has become so severe that a new law 
formed a new agency, the Office of Accountability and Whistleblowers Protection (OAWP). My 
findings describe a toxic culture at the VA and its impact on IT. The finding of retaliation against 
whistleblowers is an example of the lack of transparency at the VA. The inspector general of the 
Department of Veterans Affairs has issued a scathing report (VA OIG, 18-04968-249, October 
24, 2019). finding that the OAWP has failed in its core mission of protecting whistleblowers, and 
instead has doubled down on the retaliation that is widespread in the agency. The VA OIG 
investigated adherence to whistleblowers protection and found significant failures in compliance.  
President Donald Trump heralded the new office to clean up a long-standing culture of 
retaliation against whistleblowers in the VA. Instead it has been used to retaliate against the 
whistleblowers it was created to protect, and to stifle their claims. The VA OIG found that the 
office’s first executive director, Peter O'Rourke, “leveraged his power as head of the 
whistleblower office to end investigations into allies and failed to provide basic reports to 
Congress on the office’s operations." The VA OIG found that a “hostile work environment is 
OAWP’s most common complaint” (p.17). 
When only a few people feel empowered to speak up, it is a sign that the VA is not 
particularly innovative, democratic or bottom-up, and that management does not want to know 




do not feel like they can be honest. The VA OIG found that the FOIA office has retaliation and 
backlog issues (p.89). 
The Washington Post (Davidson J., Politics Perspective, 2019) quotes Tom Devine, legal 
director of the advocacy group Government Accountability Project, that the VA “remains a free-
speech Death Valley for government witnesses. Retaliation is ingrained in the culture.” 
Iowa City VA Technologist Jeffrey Dettbarn, in sworn testimony to Congress (Dettbarn, June 25, 
2019), noted that, “There is a culture of fear and retaliation that the VA uses as the weapon to 
silence the whistleblower.” Dettbarn’s case is germane to RAPTOR’s functionality as it has to do 
with mass cancelations of radiology orders. Both RAPTOR’s functionality and the radiology 
workflow process are discussed further in the upcoming process finding. 
Scheduling Scandal  
 People Finding – Culture #3 (very relevant, TOE TAG Score = 8)  
 
The radiology scheduling scandal at Phoenix had a negative impact on the VA culture. 
The VA has a goal of trying to give its patients an appointment within 14 days of them first 
seeking care. Unfortunately, delays and irregularities in recording patient waiting times have 
been documented in numerous reports from government (GAO, 2012) and outside organizations 
for years and have been well-known to VA officials, members of Congress and veteran service 
organizations. 
The scandal in 2014 stems from allegations that employees were keeping a secret waiting 




(Federal News Network, 2014). A preliminary VA inspector general probe into the allegations 
found systemic falsification of appointment records at Phoenix and other locations.  
Software is not the only problem behind the vast VA scandal. VA policies were 
unworkable, managers had unreasonable expectations, and results were faked when employees 
could not meet the goals. An audit showed 57,000 veterans had been waiting at least three 
months for a first appointment. People died while waiting. These fatalities as well as the wait list 
scandal forced VA Secretary Eric Shinseki to resign. (Politico, 2014) 
 Five years after the scandal (July 2019), there are signs that this scheduling scandal still 
impacts the VA culture. In her testimony to Congress, Debra Draper, director of GAO’s 
healthcare system noted (Ogrysko, 2019), “At this time, we continue to be concerned that VA 
has not sufficiently addressed the reliability of its wait time data.”  
Another sign that the crisis continues is that schedulers are among the top ten highest 
turnover positions within the VA. During my time with the VistA and RAPTOR development 
teams, the VACI had a lack of resources. The VA OIG found that 96% of Veterans Health 
Administration facilities maintain at least one “severe occupational staffing shortage,” with a 
lack of qualified applicants, non-competitive salary, recruitment challenges, private sector 
competition, and high staff turnover being the main reasons (VA OIG, 19-00346--241, 
September 24, 2019). Ultimately, when staff are unhappy, they vote with their feet. As the VA is 
seeing turnover as a chronic situation across the agency, it is time to capture learnings from those 
leaving, engage with employees, and take a close look at the company culture. Instead, the VA is 




I found that the scheduling scandal was the start of the move to privatize care.  In 
response to this, Congress took action to allow veterans who faced long waiting times for care, or 
who had to travel a long distance to receive care at a VA facility, to seek private care. The VA 
may now close more than 1,100 facilities to privatize more medical care.  In his memoir, 
Secretary David Shulkin wrote that President Donald Trump wanted to close large parts of the 
VA down.  "I am (Shulkin, 2019) convinced that the path now chosen, if allowed to continue, 
will leave veterans with fewer options, a severely weakened VA, and a private healthcare system 
not designed to meet the complex requirements of high-need veterans.” 
Partnership counterexample  
People Finding – Culture #4 (relevant, TOE TAG Score = 7)  
 
In biology, an ecosystem is a community of interacting organisms and their physical 
environment. Innovation communities likewise form metaphorical ecosystems, where the 
"organisms" are organizations and individual researchers. To assist with gaining validity, I am 
looking at counterexamples of public-private-academic innovation partnership ecosystems 
between the government, academia, and industry.  
The NSA LAS is a counterexample of the VACI.  The Laboratory for Analytic Sciences 
(LAS) at North Carolina State University, funded by the National Security Agency (NSA), is a 
collaborative, long-term research enterprise focused on improving innovation at this government 
agency. This lab serves as a counterexample to the VA innovation process as it is showing more 
promise in encouraging innovation.  
I discussed LAS with UMD associate professor Dr. Kathleen Vogel. She presented "Big 




p.172) notes that the LAS innovation center is designed to “explore ideas and alternative 
perspectives, gain new insights, generate new knowledge, or obtain new information.” This 
mission is very similar to the origins of VACI. The table below compares the program 
characteristics between the VACI and LAS (based on Vogel & Taylor, 2019).  
I believe that the LAS public-private-academic partnership is a counterexample in that it 
avoided the pitfalls of VACI. The key people differences include that it was formally structured 
and had stronger communications with the ecosystem partnership. VACI had many 
organizational and leadership changes over the project lifecycle, and a lack of leadership of 
VACI to see through the support needed for innovation in the operations and support processes. 
The interrelationships between different organizations is another failure group due to lack of 
cooperation and transparency.  
 
 
Table 14 Comparison between VACI and LAS 
Program Characteristics VACI Intel (LAS) (based on 
Vogel & Taylor 2019) 
Started by Obama’s Open 
Government directive 
(2008) 
Intelligence Vision 2015  




Dedicated facility No, virtual Yes, NCS 
Participant entry Selection through 
voting  
Rotational  
Open source (was) software 
(is) interfaces 
Information, data 
Improve the mission by 
changing the culture 
Innovation Collaboration 




Unstable, many changes 
Sustainability Many challenges Many challenges 
Organization type Semiformal Skunk works 





Yes, lack of Operations 
in DevOps process 
No intake process 
 
 
Forget the past  





VACI is recommending that the VA forgets what made the VA successful in the past. In 
its medium social media posting, “The VHA Innovators Network Adopts the Three Box Solution 
Framework”, (VHA Innovation on Medium, July 10, 2019), VACI freely acknowledges that it 
wants to forget what made the VA successful in the past. The Three Box Challenge is an overly 
simplified management ‘airport book’ similar to the ‘One Minute Manager.’. It suggests an 
organization can put its innovation into three boxes. Box 1 is current business. Box 2 is the past. 
Box 3 is the future.  
Vijay Govindarajan writes (Chapter 5) that “the hardest question that businesses never 
ask themselves is what should we stop doing”. Govindarajan recommends that organizations 
forget what made the business successful in the past. VACI is pushing unlearning of VistA to 
come to terms with the loss of in-house software development. This finding is expanded on in 
the VistA modernization finding section.  
This ‘forget the past’ culture is also exhibited in the lack of forthcoming information 
from VACI. They have stonewalled my FOIA requests. When I initially talked to the VACI 
director, he said that he would provide any documentation needed to complete my dissertation. 
However, no additional project information was forthcoming. The VACI director told me that 
information was disposed of with the administration change. I redirected my inquiries to the 
FOIA office and got into an endless loop between FOIA and VACI that has resulted in no 





William Faulkner is credited for the quote “The past is never dead. It’s not even past.” 
Ignoring the past, the VA is stumbling forward. The logical conclusion is that by forgetting the 
past, the VA is doomed to repeat it.  An example of making the same mistake over again is the 
four failed attempts to modernize VistA over the past twenty years.   
 
Radiologist approval 
People Finding – Communication #1 (very relevant, TOE TAG Score = 9)  
 
RAPTOR has user acceptance throughout the VA radiology organization. The table 
below shows the executive leadership stakeholders who endorsed RAPTOR. Many levels of 
users, including the lead VHA Radiologist and Radiography Technologist, approved of 
RAPTOR. It passed user acceptance testing (UAT). 
 




Requester Michael Cortright 
Portfolio Manager, VHA 
Innovation Program (VACI) 
Submits new service request (NSR). 
Submits business requirements. 
Monitors progress of request.  




Endorses this request. Provides 
strategic direction to the program. 
Elicits executive support and 












Provides final approval of BRD with 
sign-off authority. Provides strategic 
direction to the program. Elicits 








Provides background on current 
system and processes. Describes 





In a correspondences, the Lead VHA Radiography Technologist and Radiology Quality 
Officer said that every one of the more than 130 sites should enter a National Service Request 
(NSR) for RAPTOR. This shows his impatience that VACI is delaying the release of the 
software. In this correspondence he also states his perceived usefulness of RAPTOR, and that he 
has been personally advocating for RAPTOR for over four years. He suggests overwhelming the 
New Service Request (NSR) process. 
The rank and file radiologists also perceived the usefulness of RAPTOR. I have several 
videos from RSNA conferences where I had the opportunity to introduce RAPTOR to VA 
radiologists across the country. In these video testimonials shown below, they discuss the 
usefulness and the ease of use of RAPTOR.  
This is an explicit case of a communication breakdown between the radiology community 
and VACI. While the message is unanimously positive from radiologists who want to use 
RAPTOR, VACI did not provide the operations resources required to allow RAPTOR to be 










RAPTOR awarded one of the top five Medical Imaging IT Projects of the Year 
People Finding – Communication #2 (very relevant, TOE TAG Score = 8) 
 
Prior to RAPTOR being awarded one of the top five Medical Imaging IT Projects of the 
Year in 2012, the prototype was completed, and the innovator and developers were waiting for 
VACI to move forward with building out the prototype. After the award, VACI initially hesitated 
but eventually funded the prototype buildout. The industry award ameliorated the delay in 




 Appendix 1 is an excerpt of an article published in the Radiology Business Journal on 
the top five Medical Imaging IT Projects of 2012. The article announced the exclusivity of being 
one of the Top 5. Communications with several VACI managers stated that this award and the 
subsequent publicity was responsible for funding the prototype buildout. This is another explicit 
case of a communication breakdown between the radiology community and VACI. 
As I reflect on this award now, I am very happy to have received the designation. 
RAPTOR received the award for the prototype concept and the potential benefits in efficiency 
and effectiveness that it could have provided the VA. The patient safety benefits are detailed in 
the process finding.  
 
Premature publicity from press  
People Finding – Communication #3 (relevant, TOE TAG Score = 5)  
 
External radiology press prematurely publicized RAPTOR. There are two articles about 
RAPTOR that were published on the radiology site Aunt Minnie. AuntMinnie.com is the largest 
and most comprehensive online community for medical imaging professionals worldwide. The 
first article included the abstract in the 2012 edition of AuntMinnie.com’s annual RSNA 
preview, “Road to RSNA”. The second article was a post- RSNA interview with Dr. Medverd. It 
is included in its entirety in Appendix III of this research. In my discussion with the lead 
radiologist innovator during the findings phase, he felt that this was important at the time to help 





There is a clear connection between the findings and the premature publicity. The 
prototype was an important first step, but RAPTOR was not ready for takeoff. In fact, when we 
were awarded the contract to build out the application, we used the prototype for inspiration but 
restarted the development. My process findings show that after the development and user 
acceptance, RAPTOR was still not ready as operations delayed the project rollout and ultimately 
failed operate the software.  
 
 
Social media to offset negative reporting  
People Finding – Communication #4 (less relevant, TOE TAG Score = 2)  
  
Since the VA Open Government Plan of 2010, the VA uses social media to highlight its 
successes and to offset negative reporting. Current VACI director Dr. Ryan Vega noted in an 
interview that the VA’s “longstanding view is shaped by the negative press” and “VA is leading 
the way in innovation in IT.” (Vega, August 8, 2019). In the VA Open Government Plan, it states 
(2010, p.7): “Celebrate Open Government Successes; In addition to sharing our successes in 
creating a more open VA within the Agency, we must also communicate our efforts to those 
outside VA. That is why we will continue our existing social media efforts through tools such as 
Facebook and Twitter and expand to other new media as well.” 
Over the course of performing this research, I noted that the VACI website became obsolete. 
Several of the project references have been wiped from the internet, possibly due to several 
reorganizations. For example, the official website (innovation.va.gov) notes that “With the 




Networks (MISSION) Act of 2018 (Pub. L. 115-182, hereinafter MISSION Act), Sec. 152., we 
are shifting our focus to innovation initiatives enabled by the new law and exploring 
opportunities to maximize VA assets. Accordingly, VA enterprise innovation leadership 
transitioned operational control of programs supporting individual administrations, such as 
the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), back to their respective organization.”  
 The above is a counterexample that supports my communications findings. This 
reorganization quote represents government ‘non-speak’. Rather than say how IT innovation is in 
chaos, the social media post talks about exploring an opportunity to maximize VA assets. These 
findings show how VACI uses communications to thwart innovation.  
 
 
Governments have often failed to sustain and maintain innovation over time 
People Finding – Organization #1 (very relevant, TOE TAG Score = 9) 
 
Several studies (Lee, 2014; Vogel & Tyler, 2019) found that the US government has 
failed to sustain innovation over time due to a variety of elements including communication 
channels, and the organization. A striking example of this is shown in slide 2 the VAOI&T 
Comprehensive Plan (VA OI&T, 2017), where 234 of 299 projects are being migrated or 
stopped. RAPTOR was caught in the 78 % of canceled projects per year. 
 
Table 16 VA OI&T 2017 Project Count 




299 65 234  
 
 
The VA has undergone significant leadership changes. The GAO found (2019) that the 
VA has experienced leadership instability over the past two years in several senior positions. 
Reinvention and resifting support occur every time the leadership changes. All the RAPTOR 
stakeholders named in the Radiologist Approval finding table above have left the VA. Using 
induction on the specific RAPTOR use case of high staff turnover was true all over the VA. The 
VA OIG reports (VA OIG, 2019) that there are 49,000 vacant positions. Ninety six percent of 
VA facilities reported at least one severe occupational shortage. Staffing shortages and turnover 
are the root cause of failing to maintain innovation. 
A rare direct quote of owning their shortcomings shows how the VA’s IT organization 
inhibited innovation, including what I personally experienced with RAPTOR. In the VAOI&T 
Transformation (2016 year in review) presentation, the OI&T admits that “Prior to 
transformation, our relationships with OI&T and other VA employees suffered because we had 
no dedicated, coordinated methods of receiving employee feedback, and no mechanism for bi-
directional communication between staff and leadership. This led to general employee 
dissatisfaction, a high rate of employee burnout, and a lack of trust in OI&T.” This 
organizational quote directly relates to many of the people findings, including communication. 
The OI&T organization’s lack of operational resources is a finding of operations maintaining 





The failure to adopt organizational policy  
People Finding – Organization #2 (very relevant, TOE TAG Score = 8)  
 
The failure to adopt organizational policy is a failure of ethics and policy adoption. 
Earlier in the literature review, I modeled TAM on the open source policy and telehealth 
implementations of VA OI&T. Based on my findings of diffusion of innovation adoption, I 
complete the TOE TAM model.  
Policy diffusion scholars have studied diffusion by concentrating on the stage of policy 
initiation (Damanpour & Schneider, 2006; Graham, Shipan, & Volden, 2012). Borrowing the 
TAM notions of the innovation initiation stage suggested by Zaltman et al. (1973), the stage of 
policy initiation can be subdivided as follows: knowledge awareness, formation of attitudes 
toward the innovation, and adoption decision.  
The VA CIO office noted the organizational roadblocks in implementing the 2014 Open 
Source Policy memo. This bias against open source software that RAPTOR experienced was not 
unique. The VA CIO noted in his presentation at the 2015 OSEHRA Conference that the effort 
to promote OSS at the VA “kept running into roadblocks”. He noted VA stakeholders’ lack of 
education and support of OSS. The CIO lamented that the VA needed to get the OSS message 
out and that VA Open Source Policy effort had no momentum or leadership support to change.  
 
For counterexamples to verify my findings, I look to my VistA experience from before 
RAPTOR. This counterexample shows the gap between a successful adoption of innovation in 




One of my first VA OI&T software development experiences with VistA Imaging was 
Patch 46, the TeleReader. The TeleReader was an enhancement to VistA Imaging that (Darkins, 
p. 762), “gave VHA a robust IT infrastructure to complement its fledgling telehealth expansion. 
Close collaboration between clinicians and the VHA IT community created a multimedia health 
record.”  The TeleReader project as part of the VA TeleHealth program is a positive example of 
policy diffusion in adoption over a twenty-year period (1994 to 2014). As shown in the figure 
below, the TeleReader was a VistA Imaging software module that supported the remote reading 
of consult imaging examinations at the reading center. 
 
Figure 39 The VistA Imaging TeleReader as an example of VA diffusion in innovation 
 
Darkins notes the VA’s challenges in creating large telehealth networks mirroring the 
experience of other organizations (nationally and internationally) in implementing and sustaining 
their programs with associated challenges, which include clinical buy-in, credentialing and 




streams, clinical risk management, relationships with IT/biomedical engineering, and ensuring 
the quality of care. This TeleReader example shows a successful VA innovation being supported 
with post-development resources, unlike what occurred with RAPTOR. 
 
Table 17 VA Innovation vs. TAM Model Sustained Diffusion Adoption 
 VA Innovation TAM Model Sustained Diffusion Adoption   
RAPTOR Adoption - Too few operational resources 
available within the VACI to successfully 
generate, develop, and diffuse the innovation 
 
Open Source Policy Adoption - Culture, Communication inhibits 
Technology Acceptance 
 
Telehealth Adoption - Successful diffusion of innovation  
 
 
VACI is a semiformal organization 
People Finding – Organization #3 (relevant, TOE TAG Score = 7)  
 
A semiformal organization is believed to foster innovativeness (Robbins & Judge, 2009; 
Walker, 2007). These structures adapt to unstable conditions and change. They are characterized 
by individuals performing their tasks outside of a clearly defined hierarchy or structure. A 
semiformal organization can operate flexibly and adapt quickly to a rapidly changing 




VACI is the VA’s attempt to create a semiformal innovation organization. The VistA 
Modernization Report observed (May, 2010, p.36): “We believe one of the biggest challenges 
the VA will have around the VistA project will be a culture change in the overall way they 
procure software, incentivize the open source communities to participate, and speed 
development.” Shortly after this report at the VistA eHealth University Conference in August 
2010, I went to the introduction of the VACI. VACI was formed to organize scattered VA 
innovation initiatives. The modernization reports notes (p.38): “Are there significant cultural 
barriers? Any time changes are made in an organization, there are impacts to agency culture. At 
the point that these changes become a barrier, the momentum moving forward with strategic 
change may be slowed.”  
The VA Open Government plan (June 25, 2010, p. 3) noted that “Candidly, VA has not always 
been the model for government performance or service delivery. However, with strong 
leadership, good governance, and a new commitment to creating a culture that is open, 
transparent, participatory, and collaborative, we will achieve our objective and create a high 
performing VA of which our citizens, our nation, and most importantly, our Veterans and their 
families can be proud. Peter Levin noted (Fedscoop video, 2010) how overwhelmed the 
leadership was by the number and quality of engaged employees who participate in bettering 





Figure 40 Secretary Bob McDonald speaking at OSEHRA Conference, (photo by Casertano 
July 30, 2015) 
 
On July 30, 2015, VA Secretary Robert McDonald spoke at the OSEHRA Conference. 
Impressively, he spoke without a script, as shown in the photograph from his speech above.  
McDonald stressed that direction of his leadership is to change the discussion away from 
problems within the VA management to a focus of putting VA customers first. McDonald joked 
that when he joined the VA, the General Counsel (lawyers) ran the department. This joke is 




organization is a safe place to work because if you follow the rules, you’re never going to be 
criticized. You go to General Counsel for each opinion, so you never have to take any personal 
risk.” McDonald has called the VA’s rule-based culture as a culture of learned helplessness. This 
was my experience with the VA. Everyone can blame external circumstances for his or her 
inability to act.  
In Learned Helplessness in Organizations, Ashlenas (2012) describes concentric circles 
of excuses that absolve managers from accountability for change or improvement. Rather than 
finding creative ways to deal with regulations or budget cuts, they accept the status quo and 
blame external conditions for the problems that exist. I experienced the helplessness 
phenomenon often at the VA. One example of this is the development team had completed its 
work seven months earlier (October 2015) and waited to hear about next steps. “It has been 
seven months since we completed development of the EWD version of RAPTOR.  This week, 
VA Innovations reached out to us to meet to help them with their build script. We quickly 
assisted VA Innovations troubleshoot its build.  SAN diagnosed the VA Innovations script and 
found it missing several Cache database routines. Please note that SAN's code, testing and 
documentation of the EWD version of RAPTOR is not the reason for the seven-month delay.”  
This learned helplessness culture has the power to permeate an organization. Like a 
spreading infection, managers pass on learned helplessness from group to group and level to 
level. Eventually the standard response to any initiative is some variation of “We’d love to do 






Many name, mission, and leadership changes  
People Finding – Organization #4 (less relevant, TOE TAG Score = 3)  
 
 
One of the subtle, but interesting, findings was how VA Innovation has changed its name 
and mission over the past ten years. VACI changed its leadership, name, and mission four times 
in ten years. What started as the VA Innovators Initiative, VAI2, then became VACI, and is now 
called either iNET, the Ecosystem, or VAI. There are several trends I have found in the changes 
through the years, in open communications, and in technology. VACI was formed to promote 
transparency and openness, and this has shifted to less transparency. Another trend is that in the 
beginning, VACI supported in-house information systems projects with funding. Now as the VA 
is moving away from in-house software development, VACI’s mission has shrunk. 
Earlier in the literature review in Figures 13 and 14 I captured screen shots of the broken 
VACI websites.  This is an unfortunate sign of the broken organization and culture. My finding 
is that foreshadowing of the broken websites matches the broken expectations from the 










Process Findings:  The breakdown of VA processes inhibiting innovation  
 
My findings on DevOps, radiology workflow, and project management show the 
underlying process issues currently inhibiting innovation at the VA. 
A lack of coordination between Development & Operations during a critical transition 
time caused the DevOps process to break. In the operations phase, VACI had limited resources 
and wanted to turn over the software to OI&T and PCS for deployment. Unfortunately, OI&T 
did not provide any resources to support the design, development, and testing of RAPTOR. This 
lack of communication, integration and coordination of resources resulted in a delayed schedule 
of transition. Although Sandbox development was not maturely implemented, and VACI 
management contracted and misaligned RAPTOR project resources, RAPTOR software was 
delivered on time and on budget, and successfully passed UAT and is certified for software 
quality.    
The radiology scheduling scandal at Phoenix impacted the VA culture, and the VA 
technology management failures of the Enterprise Scheduling system impacted the perception of 
the project’s software functionality and the radiology ordering process. The radiology support 
assistants (clerks) had no access to radiology appointments, and RAPTOR functionality would 
have improved this as well as having important potential patient safety benefits in alignment with 
its safety mission. The RAPTOR order cancelation functionality was designed to not permit 
unauthorized mass cancelations. The RAPTOR business case performed by the VHA Innovation 




efficiency in workflow. RAPTOR’s perceived efficiency and effectiveness benefits would have 
alleviated the scheduling and ordering processes that resulted in the current VA crisis.  
The figure below illustrates the detailed findings of the three examined VACI processes: 
DevOps, radiology workflow, and project management. The table below shows the relevancy of 
the three processes that impacted my research. 
 







Table 18 Table of Process Findings 






10 to 8 
#1. There was no 
coordination between 
Development & 
Operations during critical 
transition time.  
#2. VA OI&T and PCS 
are counterexamples of 
software development 
methodology from the 
VACI.  
#1. The VA 
Technology 
Management failures 
of the Enterprise 
Scheduling System 
impacted the radiology 
ordering process. 
#2. RAPTOR had very 
important potential 
patient safety benefits  
 
 








7 to 4 
#3. RAPTOR successfully 
passed UAT and was 
successfully certified as 
OSEHRA Level #2. 
#4. Sandbox development 
was not maturely 
implemented. 
 
#3. Radiology support 
assistants (clerks) had 
no access to radiology 
appointments. 
RAPTOR functionality 
would have improved 

























3 to 1 
  
 




due to efficiency 
in workflow. 
12. The process of 
selecting an 
innovation process 




No coordination between Development & Operations 
Process Finding – DevOps #1 (very relevant, TOE TAG Score = 9)  
 
In the literature review, I defined the DevOps process. I earlier noted that the adoption of 
DevOps requires changes at the organizational level. My finding is that while development was 





As noted in the May 2015 RAPTOR bimonthly report risk log from the development 
team to VACI management shown below, there was no coordination between developers and the 
regional OI&T for the critical integration period to operational support. 
 
Risk #: VA Requests Delay in Delivering Production Servers  
Date Initially Logged: September 23, 2014 
Type: Schedule  
Issue:  VACI requests developers delay in delivering production servers. There has been 
no coordination between developers and Regional OI&T on server configuration for over 
a year and counting.  
Mitigation: Resume discussions between developers and Regional OI&T. Re-baseline 
plan.  
Impact: HIGH Impact for Production schedule 
 
 
 In fact, this delay of operations had very relevant consequences causing RAPTOR not to 
be introduced clinically. VACI ‘ran out the clock’ on being unable to successfully stand up 
RAPTOR. Ultimately, VistA modernization was canceled, and RAPTOR was swept away along 







Software development methodology counterexamples  
Process Finding – DevOps #2 (very relevant, TOE TAG Score = 8)  
 
The purpose of counterexamples is to test the adequacy of a generalization. I created the 
table below to show my personal experiences with three different types of software development 
at the VA. I was in three different organizations and used three different software methodologies. 
These different characteristics are counterexamples between three different software 
development methodologies. My three software experiences were with multiple VistA Imaging 
patches for OI&T, integrating a commercial teleradiology software with VistA while at PCS, and 
open source RAPTOR development at VACI.  
 
 
Table 19 Different VA Software Development Characteristics 













































VA was unhappy 
with the resources 








did not obtain 






IT led by 
technologists  
Highly structured 







With my years at the VA, I was fortunate to spend my initial years as an OI&T VistA 
developer. The VistA Imaging development team was a mix of developers who practiced GOTS 
waterfall software development. My role was to ensure internally developed VistA would 
successfully interface with my new patches and with COTS acquisition modalities and PACS. 
I was then selected as a software architect for PCS. This role was overseeing the interfacing of 
COTS products in teleradiology and PACS. Finally, as described throughout this paper, my 
RAPTOR idea was selected to be a VACI innovation. 
  This finding shows that using what I have observed in three different areas of the VA 
(OI&T, PCS, and VACI) as a basis for asserting that I encountered three different software 
methodologies, challenges, and organizational management. I infer that the agile software 
process is the best methodology from the three different types. Unfortunately, with the 
outsourcing of software development, the VA is contractually tied to interfacing with a 
commercial proprietary EHR. 
While each has its own unique set of challenges, the VA has shown with these examples 
that people, process, and technology challenges matter more than a development methodology. 
Another way of stating this is that if the VA is at risk and in chaos, it will not be successful no 
matter what methodology developers use. RAPTOR was delivered on time and on budget and 
was still not successfully made operational due to a lack of operational resources. 
 
   
RAPTOR successfully passed UAT and is OSEHRA certified 





Below are screenshots from the OSEHRA Technical Journal (2016) that show that 
RAPTOR has been successfully certified as Level 2. This speaks to the quality of the software. 
OSEHRA has created certification standards (OSEHRA, 2019) in which open community 
members inspect and certify code for compliance of good software engineering practices. The 
two screenshots below show that RAPTOR can accommodate specific VA interoperability needs 
and serve the needs of the open source community with Apache licenses and documentation. For 
example, the Level documentation 2 requires that a basic set of documentation be provided to 
label the intended purpose and requirements of the codebase, the installation instructions of 
RAPTOR, and a description on how to test the code. 
This finding shows that not only was RAPTOR accepted by the radiologist users, it was 
also approved by OSEHRA, an independent agency expert in open source, that the VA set up to 
confirm the quality of the software. This testing was done under no contractual obligation, as I 
was not paid to support this testing. I supported this certification because I am proud of the 
software and wanted to stand behind the quality of my team’s work. I also thought that this 






Figure 42 RAPTOR completed OSEHRA compliance checklist 
 
 
Figure 43 RAPTOR successfully completed OSEHRA open source certification 
 
Sandbox development was not maturely implemented 





The idea of a VistA test environment was long overdue. As described in the VistA 
Modernization Strategy (2010), the lack of a virtual test environment was a barrier to innovation. 
At the August 2010 Introduction to Innovations Program kick-off for VA employees at Tampa, 
Fl., I first heard the concept of the sandbox development environment. Accessing the 
development environment took at least four different attempts: Single laptop, multiple laptop, 
single virtual laptop account (that had to be shared), and sandbox that migrated several 
platforms. This environmental immaturity caused the developers much rework in rehosting our 
development and impacted our already tight schedule.  
As noted in the May 2015 RAPTOR bimonthly report risk log from the development 
team to VACI management shown below, the lack of maturity between development and 
operations had an impact on project resources being wasted. 
  
Risk Log Issue #1 
 
Issue: The previous sandbox (cloud1) is non-optimal and required a transaction to a new 
environment cloud2. Cloud2 has some performance questions that might be addressed 
by migrating to new cluster environment (see risk #18).  
Mitigation: SAN has spent many resources creating and populating advanced imaging 
test data (including CPRS textual patient order data and imaging data) and installed the 
data loader into the sandbox. Monitor user comments during UAT. SAN requested VA 






In my DevOps model, I identified four operational domains that VACI was required to 
provide for the RAPTOR project. The first was a VistA development environment known as the 
“sandbox”. The figure below shows the network topography of the sandbox within the VA and 
outside the firewall. The platform of the sandbox evolved over the project, from a standalone 
encrypted laptop to a virtual machine and then to an Amazon web service (AWS) cloud-based 
platform. 
 
Figure 44 VACI “Sandbox” 
 
The second proposed operations task was to “seed” VistA data into that environment. The 
third was to automate the build processes to enable enterprise development. The fourth task was 





As shown in the DevOps model above, a transition took place from development to 
operation. However, when the application was turned over to OI&T, no support was given to 
deploy and sustain the software, meaning it was not maintained. Many radiologists throughout 
the country requested to pilot the software (RSNA testimonials 2011 to 2017). However, because 
of a number of organizational factors, such as the leadership void that resulted from the 
retirement of the VA Chief Radiology Consultant, and an incomplete DevOps process that failed 
to prioritize VACI and OI&T operations, the PCS did not devote any resources to deploy the 
software. The DevOps process failed due to the operational tasks that were poorly performed.  
 
The failures of the Enterprise Scheduling system  
Process Finding – Radiology Workflow #1 (very relevant, TOE TAG Score = 9)  
 
The failures of the Enterprise Scheduling system impacted the perception of the project’s 
software functionality and the radiology ordering process.  The VA has been trying to update its 
VistA-based scheduling system, developed in the 1980s, since 2000. As of 2019, despite several 
failed attempts and millions of dollars spent, the current system (screenshot shown below) is 
almost 40 years old with the MS-DOS look. It is easy to compare this ancient system to the more 





Figure 45 Current VistA Scheduling and Appointment System 
 
Scheduling systems have had a shameful legacy of failure (GAO, 2010). Scheduling 
system failures have extended throughout all of HIT and have impacted software development 
and radiology scheduling processes. My finding is that it impacted both radiology workflow 
software modules such as RAPTOR and was used to replace VistA. RAPTOR and VistA got 
caught up in the fire and haze that scheduling has brought to VA IT.  
The GAO (2010, 2012, 2019) blames a broad range of VA managerial weaknesses that 
have plagued a series of failed projects. In 2012, there was a community-sourced submission for 
an open source scheduling system (OSEHRA Scheduling Contest, 2012). This contested project 
was known as the VistA Scheduling Enhancement (VSE) (Fedscoop, 2019). After years of delay 




“management of requirements, meeting user needs and continuity of leadership”. In 2014, the 
VA released an RFP for a new Medical Appointment Scheduling (MAS) System. The VA signed 
a contract with Epic to bring its scheduling software to the VA in 2015. The Epic scheduling 
project started before the decision was made to go with the Cerner EHR. When that happened, it 
set up a question that would eventually need to be answered: Does VA try to deploy Epic 
scheduling with the Cerner Millennium EHR, or does it scrap the Epic scheduling project and go 
with Cerner’s scheduling capability? The VA canceled the Epic contract. Epic was paid $25 
million of a $625 million contract (Politico, 2018).  
 As the users’ perception is that scheduling is a key part of the radiology workflow, the 
RAPTOR project was caught up in this plague of scheduling IT failures. As shown in the 
radiology protocol workflow figures, scheduling is an important component in protocol 
workflow. In 2013, the VistA Evolution Radiology Package GUI Business Requirements 
Document (BRD) required an integrated scheduling solution. The following is an excerpt from 
the BRD, illustrating that to the end-user (here an imaging technologist), scheduling patients and 
equipment is a part of the RIS.  
 
   User Story 2.2 - As a clerk or technologist, I want to schedule patients from the pending study (orders 
to be fulfilled) list to the MAS scheduling package using a GUI interface so patients can receive an 
appointment time and the radiology department can fulfill orders at a scheduled time. 
    User Story 2.2.2 - As a clerk or technologist, I want all clinics in the MAS package that refer 
to a single piece of medical equipment to be aggregated in one calendar so I can view the 






Potential RAPTOR patient safety benefits  
Process Finding – Radiology Workflow #2 (very relevant, TOE TAG Score = 8)  
 
Although it was never released clinically, RAPTOR had several important safety 
benefits. The table below highlights many potential benefits. RAPTOR was designed to improve 
adherence to Federal Regulations / Standards of Care and increased regulatory compliance. 
RAPTOR was designed in compliance with the Joint Commission Revised Requirements 
for Diagnostic Imaging Services. This JACHO requirement was effective July 1, 2014, including 
the Joint Commission Safety Checklist, and administering renal protective measures prior to 
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duplicate radiology 
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• Reduction in paper-
based processes 
• Reduction in the 
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scanning 
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By not implementing RAPTOR, the VA creates a critical gap in data integrity, provider-
to-provider care coordination, clinical decision support, patient safety, improved radiologist and 
department operational efficiency, and technology optimization. These benefits are key best 
practices for workflow optimization in healthcare systems. 
RAPTOR’s order cancelation workflow  
Process Finding – Radiology Workflow #3 (relevant, TOE TAG Score = 6)  
 
RAPTOR’s redesigned order cancelation workflow would reduce illegal employee 
waitlist manipulations. According to the Washington Post (Davidson, 2019), fabricated waitlist 
assertions have bedeviled the VA since it was consumed by scandal in 2014. In order to reduce 
the waitlist, VA employees were ordered to remove the patient’s names illegally. This corrupt 
process was supported by current information technology. The RAPTOR order cancelation 
functionality was designed to not permit unauthorized mass cancelations. RAPTOR also linked 
new orders to previous canceled orders. The following screenshots capture the RAPTOR order 
cancelation functionality. The first figure shows that the order cancelation in RAPTOR was only 
permitted by a privileged VistA user. Typically, only the physician or a designated signature is 
allowed access to cancel an order. The second figure below shows the replaced order in 
RAPTOR, with an audit trail note linking the original order to the new order. The final figure in 
the sequence shows this displayed in CPRS. Therefore, I claim that RAPTOR’s redesigned order 





Figure 46 Cancel Order from RAPTOR 
 
 







Figure 48 CPRS displaying Replaced Order 
 
 
Radiology clerks have no access to radiology appointments  
Process Finding – Radiology Workflow #4 (relevant, TOE TAG Score = 6)  
 
The VAOIG (2015) found that radiology support assistants (clerks) have no access to 
radiology appointments. RAPTOR functionality would have improved this situation. As shown 
in the figures below, RAPTOR’s functionality would have provided insight into radiology 
appointments and potentially could have alleviated some of the pressure on this choke point.  
In fact, I had several conversations with VACI leadership to enhance this functionality as 
it was being requested by the users and it made sense to provide this functionality as part of the 
radiology workflow. The current command line appointment system is shown below.  
The implications of this finding can easily be shown in the screenshots. There is a huge 




emulator. It is easy to see the HCI impact on why radiology appointments have been such a 
recurrent issue with the VA.  
 
Figure 49 RAPTOR Pass Box functionality supports appointment management 
 
 







Figure 51 VA Command Line Scheduling System 
 
VACI management misaligned RAPTOR project resources 
Process Finding – Project Management #1 (relevant, TOE TAG Score = 7)  
 
I found that on the RAPTOR project level, there was a misalignment of resources by 
management and contracting. As noted earlier, there was a shortage of operational resources that 
resulted in the failure of the DevOps process. Additionally, during the development phase there 
were at least four Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) resources on our weekly calls. The only 
deliverable the development team received from PWC was a preliminary 508 testing report. 
Before releasing VA software, the VA requires a certificate of compliance to section 508 of the 
Rehabilitation Act. In all previous software projects, a final 508 report was delivered at or near 
the end of coding. When I asked the VACI project lead about receiving a preliminary (but not 
final) report, he said that the innovations coordinator thought they were a good idea, although all 




summary finding is that VACI project managers are not empowered to manage project resources 
or priorities. 
There are two individual findings: Too many resources for unneeded early 508 oversight 
compliance and a severe shortage of operational resources. VACI contracting shortchanged the 
development team in several important areas including VistA data loading, test automation, and 
providing users with a comment tracking system. 
VistA data loading and RAPTOR test automation were not included in the development 
contract. These should have been budgeted for as they were critical to the successful 
development phase. Test automation was reviewed by the OSEHRA certification.  
VACI did not have a practical handle on the operational resource issues. Despite multiple 
inquiries to get radiology data, the development team was told “it is what it is”. The 
implication(s) of this was a misalignment of resources, spending application development 
resources to do VACI’s tasking. 
A final VACI mismanagement was moving the RAPTOR application out of the 
development environment.  After development, there was a year-long delay with operations 
while VACI tried to identify the correct resource.  This is discussed in more detail in the 
technology findings.  
VACI portfolio management  
Process Finding – Project Management #2 (relevant, TOE TAG Score = 4)  
 
In my large cache of VA documentation, I found several examples of VACI management 




content is a good example of being an insider to the VACI culture. Appendix II is the content of 
the VACI ‘good news story’ that was published on an internal website. This ‘marketing’ type of 
positive organizational communication is prevalent from VACI project management and 
continues to this day. This VACI marketing message was a project management communication 
to radiologists. 
An excerpt from the notification that RAPTOR has been selected as a VA Innovation is, 
“VA Innovation Competition has been intense. Over 45,000 users voted on 6,500 ideas that were 
originally submitted on the VHA Employee Innovation Competition website. Of those, 125 were 
invited to submit a proposal, and 101 proposals were received by the deadline. You are one of 32 
that have made it to the final stage. This is a truly terrific accomplishment. Again, 
congratulations! You are about to embark on an exciting journey, and we are eager to assist and 
guide you through the process. Signed VHA Innovation Program & VA Innovation Initiative 
(VAi2).” 
The (Fedscoop, 2010) YouTube video hosted by VA CTO Peter Levin, shows that 
RAPTOR is one of the selected innovations. This is an external communication channel that the 
CTO used to tout the VACI portfolio. This screen shows that RAPTOR was a key project in the 





Figure 52 Online Radiology Protocoling Tool Integrated with CPRS/VistA listed in the 
VHA & OIT Innovation Initiative (still from Dr. Peter Levin discusses innovation at the 
Dept. of Veterans Affairs YouTube video)  
  
Business case cost benefit justification  
Process Finding – Project Management #3 (less relevant, TOE TAG Score = 3)  
 
The RAPTOR business case performed by VHA Innovation Selection Board estimates 
substantial tangible and intangible cost/resource savings due to efficiency in workflow. The 
following is an excerpt from the VHA Innovation Selection Board business case for national 
action on the RAPTOR prototype (the RAPTOR business case justification). This shows the 
value of the RAPTOR application to the business of radiology. The finding also shows the waste 
in developing RAPTOR for several millions of dollars but not going forward with it use after it is 





“Implementation of RAPTOR will lead to substantial tangible and intangible cost/resource 
savings in addition to patient care improvements and compliance gains detailed elsewhere in this 
document.  
Conservative estimates of tangible economic benefits of RAPTOR implementation include: 
 
- Avoid estimated $23 million per year of costs from preventable complications of 
intravenous contrast administration adverse events. 
- Reduce radiology technologist and other support personnel manual labor, liberating 
an estimated $5.5 million worth of time per year. This conserved effort can be applied 
to other productive tasks, increasing overall department efficiency. 
- Reduce radiologist and nuclear medicine physician labor, liberating an estimated $3.7 
million plus worth of radiologist time per year. This conserved effort can be applied 
to other productive tasks, increasing efficiency. 
- Costs incurred by typical IT projects include acquisition, contracting, and custom 
integration. All substantial costs can typically inflate to 80% over the total lifecycle. 
These costs are negated by RAPTOR. 
- Transition from paper to electronic workflow promises substantial workflow 
efficiencies and quality and safety gains in addition to economic and ecological 
benefits of paper and printing avoidance. Paper and printing savings alone are 




Intangible (and difficult to assign value) benefits of RAPTOR implementation likely value at 
magnitudes of scale greater than the selected economic benefits listed above. Two such examples 
include: 
- Avoid as much as 12% wasted effort expended on assigning protocols to requisitions 
that ultimately do not advance to exam completion (e.g. duplicate orders, canceled 
orders, unauthorized orders). 
- Workplace quality: Current paper processes for protocol assignment represents a 
chore. RAPTOR optimization and streamlining of workflow will improve employee 
attitude and satisfaction surrounding this necessary department function.” 
 
Project Initiation changes  
Process Finding – Project Management #4 (less relevant, TOE TAG Score = 1)  
 
The process of selecting an innovation process has changed over time, from employee 
vote to shark tank selection to spark-seed-spread. This change shows the evolution away from 
information technology projects. The appendix has examples of each of the three selection 
processes.  
 The implication of this shows several project initiations trends. One is that VACI is 
moving away from inclusion. Voting has the greatest employee inclusion, then to shark tank 
which has a public theatrical aspect, but lesser employee inclusion and spark-seed-spread has 




 Another initiation trend is smaller projects, in both resources and size. The initial 
RAPTOR prototype contract was for $500K. The spark-seed-spread funding started at $50K.  
The result of this reduction of funding is that software prototypes are much less developed or that 
innovation is not IT based at all. This fits in with the VACI pattern away from internal software 
development.  
Findings on Technology: IT shortcomings are not the reason behind the rejection of VA 
VistA and RAPTOR 
 
My findings on VistA modernization, Office of Information & Technology (OI&T) and 
open source show the underlying technology issues that currently plague the VA are not the 
reason behind the rejection of VA VistA and RAPTOR. 
The use of the open-source framework and tools had no adverse impact on the project 
development schedule and budget, and RAPTOR's open-source code library was reused by at 
least one other project. The decision not to utilize the open source policy is a failure of policy 
diffusion in the technology adoption model. 
Although security is a priority at the VA, the operational phase did not support RAPTOR 
security maintenance. After UAT, Portland attempted to advance RAPTOR to national OI&T 
implementation. It was held up by OI&T operations’ hesitation in moving from Class III (local) 
innovation to Class I (national OI&T support). Every RAPTOR component was on the VA 
OI&T listing of approved tools known as the Technical Reference Model (TRM). No additional 
functional enhancements were required by RAPTOR to pass the VISTA Intake Program. The 




being its highest priority. Upon the June 22, 2016 testimony to Congress of Dr. Shulkin, the 
VistA Evolution plan was scrapped. The VHA is phasing out in-house software development. 
Peter Levin, VA CTO, defines VA innovation as invention plus implementation (Fedscoop, 
2010). Levin highlighted seven attributes of implementation: open architecture, modular, scalable, 
standards based, extensible, reliable, and maintainable. In his YouTube talk, he tells a story of 
technology challenge regarding modular software. On his first day in office, the VBA Secretary 
attempted to change a single digit from 60 to 30 days on a letter. This one-digit change took 11 
months to implement. In contrast to enhanced RAPTOR modularity, the development team 
swapped out the entire middle ware section in one month. As championed by CTO Levin, 
RAPTOR was an open architecture (we swapped out the middleware). The front-end RAPTOR 
software is developed in Drupal, a highly scalable Content Management System (CMS). Large 
websites such as Weather.com and Time.com use Drupal. RAPTOR introduced RSNA standards-
based radiology lexicon (RadLex) codes and worked with all VistA standardized codes and 
business processes. Therefore, I could not find a single technological reason for the rejection of 
RAPTOR. This is consistent with the false technical narrative for replacing VistA. There are no 
technical disqualifications against these applications. 
The figure below illustrates the detailed findings of the three examined VACI 







Figure 53 Technology Findings 
 
The table below shows the relevancy of the three technologies that impacted my research. It 
organizes the technology findings into open source, OI&T, and VistA modernization and labels 
them based on their relevance to my research question and maps the overall findings data source 
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#1. RAPTOR is the 
highest radiology 
priority in the VistA 
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Open source development not well-known at VACI  
Technology Finding – Open Source #1 (very relevant, TOE TAG Score = 9)  
 
 
Within the DevOps process, open source development was new to operations. Many 
operational misconceptions existed throughout the process. While presenting RAPTOR at the 
Drupal Government Days 2012 conference (Drupal, 2012), I learned that many federal agencies 
are realizing significant IT savings from using open source application development which 
reduces lifecycle costs over average federal software development. Additional costs incurred by 
typical IT projects include acquisition, contracting, and custom integration. All these substantial 
costs can typically inflate to 80% over the total lifecycle. These IT costs are negated by open 
source RAPTOR. 
Another open source misconception is that Dr. Shulkin has asserted that the VistA 
electronic medical record system needs to be replaced because the VA cannot retain VistA 
developers. I believe his assertions are based on some false assumptions. Open source 
development attracts better talent than proprietary software. Many experts suggest open source is 




ability to interact with other developers to discuss innovative solutions. Giving developers 
freedom and flexibility is an important way to attract and nurture top development talent. 
 During the RAPTOR development, VACI forced us to switch from the Linux open 
source development environment to Microsoft Windows Server and then back to open source 
Linux. VACI wanted us to use an unsupported version (Windows Server 2008) that was no 
longer available for purchase. We had to use Windows Server 2012 and then downgrade to 2008. 
This needless transition between open and proprietary show that many misconceptions exist at 
the VA regarding open source. 
 
Use of open source has no adverse impact on schedule and budget  
Technology Finding – Open Source #2 (very relevant, TOE TAG Score = 8)  
 
Use of the open source framework and tools has no adverse impact on the project 
development schedule and budget. RAPTOR’s innovative application architecture is based on 
reusing open source tools and principles and is fully consistent with the VistA modernization 
strategy. By designing the layered application into discrete open components, RAPTOR offers 
the VA a wide range of interoperability potential and short development cycles. RAPTOR’s 
presentation and radiology process logic was built on a robust and secure Drupal open source 
CMS. RAPTOR reuses MDWS web services to pull clinical data from CPRS using data objects. 
The design and development of RAPTOR required the project team to consider and analyze 
potential services as discrete, standardized building blocks. The RAPTOR team analyzed their 
programmatic options and made several design choices. During the proof of concept phase, 




Apache, MySQL, and PHP (LAMP). I justified all open tools used to manage the RAPTOR 
project and saved the VA tens of thousands of dollars of Microsoft licenses. 
Open source is designed as a community-based source software development and 
education. The source code is available to the general public for use or modification from the 
original design. It is not just using another vendor’s code, but a true collaboration such that 
organizations take code, improve upon it, and release those enhancements back into the 
community. For example, RAPTOR developers took open Drupal code modules to get started 
and delivered value to the VA very quickly, on time and on budget. Development software 
support options include no direct costs.  
Should VistA migrate its ecosystem to open source Linux, the cost of hardware and 
software will decrease. VistA also has the flexibility to be run on two different implementations 
of MUMPS (Massachusetts General Hospital Utility Multi-Programming System) when Linux is 
used, one of which is used extensively by the open source community (FIS's GT.M) and one 
which is used by the VA (InterSystems' Cache). This is a plus as it helps to keep downward 
pressure on software costs when there is no vendor lock-in. 
 
RAPTOR’s open source code was reused  
Technology Finding – Open Source #3 (relevant, TOE TAG Score = 7)  
 
RAPTOR’s open source code was reused by at least one other project. Code reuse is one 
of the strongest arguments for OSS. Open source is reusable when the module supports the same 




process because the OSS allows developers to freely adopt the existing code, and adapt it as 
needed. 
In a June 29, 2016 conversation with a presidential scholar I noted that “PwC are reusing 
RAPTOR’s EWD.js Java Library for the Daily Plan interface with VistA”. The Daily Plan 
(Patient Safety, 2009) provides patients with an itinerary for each day in the hospital. These 
patient-specific reports, one or two pages in length, reflect current orders such as allergies, 
medications, procedures, and diet. The presidential scholar forwarded this reuse information to a 
VACI director who responded that, “VA is going to replace VistA with Cerner which changes 
the game for everyone.”  
RAPTOR and the Daily Plan both pull data out of VistA and then aggregate the data for 
web content. This data pull business process is a key component of VistA modernization.   
 
OSEHRA closing  
Technology Finding – Open Source #4 (less relevant, TOE TAG Score = 3)  
 
After about ten years in existence, OSEHRA is closing due to lack of funding from the VA. 
In 2010, VA recognized that VistA’s rate of innovation and improvement had slowed substantially, 
and the codebase was unnecessarily isolated from private sector components, technology, and 
outcome-improving impact. To address those issues, VA established OSEHRA, the mechanism to 
open the aperture to broadly-based public and private sector contributions. 
OSEHRA was founded in 2010 as the open source health record custodian. OSEHRA 




variety of supporting resources. OSEHRA was formed to support the open source VistA 
community. OSEHRA was the bi-directional gatekeeper of VistA systems. OSEHRA helped to 
identify, analyze, prioritize, and certify open source software candidates, such as RAPTOR, for 
VA intake. For example, RAPTOR was verified and certified by OSEHRA as a part of the VistA 
intake process. This certification was discussed in the process findings (DevOps #3). Second, 
OSEHRA fosters an open ecosystem (shown in Figure 31) in which many organizations, including 
the VA, can equally participate. This private public academic partnership ecosystem is discussed 
as a people finding. These organizations include private companies, academic institutions, state 
government agencies, and federal government agencies. 
In an October 2019 email to community members, OSEHRA announced that unless it 
receives additional funding from the VA, it will be forced to close.  The nonprofit has struggled to 
sustain its operations, as the VA has turned away from open source software. No additional funding 
was available and OSEHRA is closed for operations as shown in the notice in the figure below. 
 





Lack of security maintenance  
Technology Finding – OI&T #1 (very relevant, TOE TAG Score = 10)  
 
Although security is a very important concern at the VA, the operational phase did not 
support RAPTOR security maintenance. This paradox leads me to the previous technology 
finding that many misconceptions about open source software persisted through the RAPTOR 
DevOps process. For example, the development team handed over a UAT-approved web 
application server to operations. The lack of dedicated support experience in patching resulted in 
the application being inaccessible. After the first Microsoft software patch, VA Operations could 
not restart RAPTOR. This shows a lack of support ownership in Operations and a breakdown of 
the DevOps. This lack of action was not the fault of the open source software and tools as they 
provided solid information security in VistA.  
As a note, DevOps is now commonly referred to in the IT industry as DevSecOps.  This 
shows the importance of security in the DevOps process.  This highlights how critical the failure 
of VA OI&T operations was in not maintaining RAPTOR security.  
 
The VHA is phasing out in-house software development  
Technology Finding – OI&T #2 (very relevant, TOE TAG Score = 9)  
 
In-house software development was once notably more common in the federal 
government, including the VA, than it is now. I have noted that the phasing out of in-house 




software development. Looking at the current 2019 VistA Imaging webpage shown below, one 
may conclude that VistA’s peak was around ten years ago, based on the last event, a record 
number of images stored (July 2009).  
 
Figure 55 Current VistA Imaging webpage 
 
When I was a VistA software developer, I saw the sunset of VistARAD in 2009. Then in 
2010 when I was at PCS, I assisted with the commercial PACS replacement initiative of 
VistARAD. Presently, I can see that non-maintenance VistA software re-engineering is being 
phased out. Later in this chapter, my technology finding is that the VA is stopping in-house 
software development.  
My current finding is the VACI is using the simplified “three boxes” management 





Standardization of approved architecture and components  
Technology Finding – OI&T #3 (relevant, TOE TAG Score = 4)  
 
My finding is that standardization has been an ongoing issue with the VA in technology, 
architecture, processes, and costing. This finding is specific for technology and business models.  
These models are frameworks that help guide standardizations to minimize cost, complexity, and 
risk. While the VA has been undergoing upheaval, technology, process, and cost standardization 
models are a buffer against disorganization in patient care.   
Every RAPTOR component was on the VA OI&T listing of approved tools known as the 
Technical Reference Model (TRM) and is located at www.va.gov/trm/. For example, MySQL 
version 5.6.x had been approved by VA OI&T Architecture for CY2015 and 2016. This is 
relevant because every component from RAPTOR, including the open source tools that 
RAPTOR introduced for clinical use, meet all architectural, performance, and security 
requirements. This demonstrates the technical acceptance of RAPTOR components revealing 
that RAPTOR had no technical architecture issues.  
The lack of standardization in costs is discussed further in Faulty VistA Cost Model, 
Technology Finding – VistA Modernization #3. There was no standard cost model until the 
Technology Business Management framework was introduced after VistA modernization was 
canceled. 
 




OI&T and VACI delays  
Technology Finding – OI&T #4 (relevant, TOE TAG Score = 4)  
 
After UAT, Portland attempted to advance RAPTOR to national OI&T implementation. 
It was held up by OI&T operations and VACI. After UAT, the radiologists at test sites had 
several options. One option was they could have passed on RAPTOR. The preference Portland 
chose was the approval for clinical use of RAPTOR, after which the radiologists tried to move it 
forward to promote it for VA operations support. The Portland UAT site liked RAPTOR and 
chose to move it forward to improve radiology workflow. The following correspondence 
originated from a UAT site manager to OI&T and is followed by OI&T’s response. This shows 
that despite a successful UAT, OI&T was against supporting innovation projects.  
 
UAT Manager: I’d like to take a moment to introduce the proposed integration of RAPTOR: 
The Radiology Protocol Tool and Recorder (RAPTOR) software is designed to render the labor-
intensive process of protocol assignment and the often paper-based workflow in imaging 
departments obsolete, according to its developers. It's programmed to search for information 
from a patient's medical record that is important for protocol decisions and display it in a 
dashboard synchronized with an electronic protocoling tool. 
Funding from the VA Innovation Initiative was used for the project.  VA Innovation is 
facilitating the evaluation and advancement of RAPTOR. The Innovator anticipates that it will 
eventually be rolled out for use in every Imaging Department of the VA Health Care Network.  I 
thank you for your support and consideration in assisting with this platform integration. OI&T 




This was just the beginning of several years of delays and frustration in getting an 
approved and certified innovation project into the radiology clinic. OI&T delayed even after 
RAPTOR was certified for software quality by OSEHRA. They attempted to create a new 
installation script to reduce reliance on developers. This simple task was never successfully 
completed. Thus, while RAPTOR development finished on time, operations had no timeline to 
maintain what was transitioned to them. Although the development team stayed involved in 
several years of meetings, VACI was unwilling to pay for any post-UAT development. This lack 
of a critical resource caused a very long and unnecessary delay. This delay turned into a 
cancelation once the VistA modernization was canceled.  This finding is discussed further in 
Shulkin canceled VistA Modernization (Technology Finding – VistA Modernization #2). 
 
The VistA Evolution Roadmap and RAPTOR 
Technology Finding – VistA Modernization #1 (very relevant, TOE TAG Score = 10)  
 
Released in 2014, the VistA Evolution Roadmap was the main innovation pipeline. 
RAPTOR is the highest radiology priority in the VistA Evolution Roadmap.  The figure below is 
an excerpt from VistA Evolution Roadmap, dated March 24, 2014. It shows that RAPTOR was 
the highest radiology priority in the VistA Evolution Roadmap and that the next step was to 
deploy RAPTOR across the enterprise. The full page that follows shows that RAPTOR’s 







Figure 56 RAPTOR in the VistA Evolution Roadmap (March 24, 2014) 
 
In an email from OSEHRA dated, December 1, 2014, titled VA Design Patterns Briefing 
and VistA Evolution Update: Questions and Answers: 
 
 * *Question*: What effect will the VistA Evolution work have on the future innovation projects 
from VHA? 
*Answer*: The VistA Evolution Program will oversee the transformation of VistA so that it 
adheres to a service-oriented architecture design pattern. This results in a vendor-agnostic 
technology platform that is highly responsive to changing clinical needs: new functionality can 












VistA 4 will update the radiology application to transition radiology operations from 
paper- based to a paper-light practice. These enhancements will address the current 
practice demand with emphasis on increased efficiency, improved documentation, and 
enhanced patient safety. 
 
VistA 4 radiology and imaging enhancements will leverage some of the innovative work 
undertaken at by community VistA users for a new radiology user interface. This GUI 
may be used as a model user interface for the following radiology functions: enter order, 
schedule study, register patient, case edit study, protocol study; display status of patients 
who are in the department; display key management parameters: unscheduled orders, 
incomplete studies, un-dictated studies. 
 
Key functionalities targeted for the radiology interface include scheduling exams from a 
list of orders. This user interface will enhance functionality of the scheduling application 
to allow auto-populating in the radiology application of the scheduled appointment time, 
eliminating the need for duplicate entry. Additional new capabilities will consist of: 
 
● Ability to assign orders for imaging studies to radiologists so they can be protocoled. 
● Select acquisition protocols for ordered and scheduled imaging studies with 
rationale for selection. 
● Communicate imaging instructions to technologists. 
● Communicate patient communications from clerk to radiologist and technologist, and. 
● Enter radiation dosage. 
As listed above, VistA 4 radiology will include 




electronic protocols and a dashboard display of 
the patient’s status, which will facilitate 
communication between radiologists and 
technologists. Incorporating protocols within 
radiology procedures will ensure that important 
safety information such as allergies and renal 
functions are clearly communicated. Radiology 
CDS capabilities will improve ordering guidelines 
to follow appropriateness criteria as defined by 
the American College of Radiologists.  
VistA 4 Imaging will build upon current image management capabilities to  
support enterprise image distribution and viewing. Such enhancements 
 include the ability to import studies from external entities, improved image  
viewing functions, support for structured DICOM reports and integration  
and tracking of radiation dose metrics. These features will also enable 
 imaging interoperability with our partners, including the DoD. 
 
The VistA 4 Radiology and Imaging System enhancements will improve the efficiency, 
quality of care and Veteran safety through efficient workflows, timely processing of 
orders, improved communications among staff, more complete documentation, and 
support for optimal scanning protocol. These enhancements will benefit clinicians by 
allowing simultaneous availability of patient images and data while planning and 
providing care, less time be spent locating images and improved communication among 
radiology clinicians and specialist. 
Imaging best practice protocols 
combined with clinical decision 
support CDS at the time of order entry 
helps remind providers of evidence-
based and local guidelines, reduces 
unnecessary testing and provides 
patient safety checks throughout the 
procedure. 
Radiology and Imaging 




VistA modernization canceled  
Technology Finding – VistA Modernization #2 (very relevant TOE TAG Score = 10)  
 
Upon the June 22, 2016 testimony to Congress of Dr. Shulkin, the VistA 
Evolution plan was scrapped. On June 26, 2016, I received word that the VistA Evolution 
program was scrapped for a COTS replacement of VistA. This resulted in the canceling 
of RAPTOR. This announcement has reverberations to present day in-house software 
development being unseated.  
After the decision to move to a commercial EHR, Dr. Shulkin was asked what the 
response was from those involved. A paraphrase of his response, grouping stakeholders 
according to their knowledge of VistA, was that those who do not use VistA, including 
politicians, are generally pleased and those who use VistA, including VA employees who 
use it daily, are not enthusiastic.  One critic in the hardhats community wrote that, “this is 
a declaration of victory without an actual implementation.  Silencing the staff is a 
common effort that has been used in the past and the reality is that the staff is bullied into 
accepting a lessor system (Hardhats forum topic LSNW4NYZBp8).” 
In June 2018, two years after announcing the VistA modernization is dead, the 
VA established the Office of Electronic Health Record Modernization.  The two-year gap 
between announcements is illustrative of how unprepared VA management was of this 





Faulty VistA cost model  
Technology Finding – VistA Modernization #3 (relevant TOE TAG Score = 4)  
 
There was no standard cost model until the Technology Business Management 
framework was introduced after VistA modernization was canceled.  The GAO report, 
“Electronic Health Records, VA needs to identify and report system costs” (July 2019) 
found that “VA’s total does not accurately reflect the development and sustainment costs 
for VistA.” The GAO advised that VA’s failure to keep track of its spending on VistA 
means “the department, legislators, and the public do not have the comprehensive, 
reliable information needed to understand how much it actually cost to develop and 
maintain the system.” 
I found many different examples of the faulty VistA cost model impacting 
business decisions.  The VA report that evaluated against open source VistA did not 
choose distinct service models and therefore will not have accurate cost information. 
Secretary Shulkin announced in January 2017 that he would decide regarding the future 
of VA’s EHR platform in July 2017. The Grant Thornton report (May 1, 2017) addressed 
four strategic options for modernizing the VA EHR. On June 22, 2017, Secretary Shulkin 
announced that he was canceling VistA modernization. This timing shows the importance 
of this report in canceling VistA COTS EHR. It is not a coincidence that the $16 bn 
amount is consistent with the no-bid contract awarded to Cerner for their COTS EHR.  
The following passage is from the Grant Thornton report. It describes and lists 






“The four strategic options are as follows:  
 
∙ Option 1- Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) EHR: VA selects and implements a COTS 
EHR product and uses it for clinical and revenue cycle functionality. Although not all 
needs may be met by a single vendor, VA has the option to purchase additional COTS 
functionality and incorporate/integrate it with the primary COTS solution. The COTS 
EHR product will be hosted within a VA-purchased and operated, federally certified, 
secure cloud environment. Total Cost = $16.2B  
 
Option 2 - COTS EHR combined with the Joint Legacy Viewer (JLV) and electronic 
Health Management Platform (eHMP): This option is similar to Option 1: COTS plus 
VA retains the JLV and eHMP, both VistA packages, to develop and implement 
additional capabilities to fill gaps in COTS EHR capabilities. The COTS EHR product 
will be hosted within a VA-purchased, federally certified, secure cloud environment. 
Total Cost = $18.7B  
 
∙ Option 3 - VistA commercialization: VA transfers VistA to a third-party vendor, and 
after modernization by the vendor, VA purchases licenses to use VistA as Software as a 
Service (SaaS). VA will receive considerations for pricing such as reduced licensing and 
implementation costs in exchange for VistA intellectual property rights. VA may also 
negotiate other terms such as directed development of new functionality to meet VA’s 
specific requirements. In the SaaS arrangement, the vendor provides the software on a 
subscription basis and is responsible for hosting the software in a federally certified, 





∙ Option 4 - COTS EHR provided as SaaS: This option is similar to Option 1: COTS; 
however, in this option, the COTS EHR product is hosted and fully supported and 
managed by the vendor. In the SaaS arrangement, the vendor provides the software on a 
subscription basis and is responsible for hosting the software in a federally certified, 
secure cloud environment. Total Cost = $16.0B “ 
 
 
These options are essentially similar Software as a Service (SaaS) service 
variations of cloud computing. An accurate cost estimate would have priced different 
service variations including SaaS, Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a 
Service (IaaS). 
SaaS can be defined (Sulaiman et.al, 2019) as a software distribution model in 
which a third-party provider hosts an application and makes it available to customers 
over the Internet. The service provider will install all the applications and software 
required and ready for use by the user.  
PaaS –PaaS provides a platform for computer users through the provision of hardware, 
networking, and operating systems. Users will design and develop their own applications 
in this model. It also linked between SaaS and IaaS. 
IaaS – It is a form of cloud computing that provides virtualized computing resources. 
IaaS provides storage space and basic computing to users so they can develop the 
application in its own environment. 
The VISTA Intake Program  





The VISTA Intake Program (VIP) was launched in Jan 2015. Paul Tibbits, MD, 
VA CTO, in his presentation at the 2015 World Open VistA Forum noted that OSS is 
jointly approved by both the VA and OSEHRA to vet VIP candidates. To be nominated, 
code must be intact with no remaining enhancements necessary to be functionally aligned 
with VistA. No additional functional enhancements were required by RAPTOR to pass 
the VISTA Intake Program. This milestone shows that RAPTOR was technologically 
ready to be clinically introduced to radiologists and could be supported by OI&T.  This 
makes the reality of the delays and cancelation much harder to justify.  RAPTOR was 
essentially on the cusp of clinical introduction.  It passed every hurdle and pre-requisite.   
 
Summary of Findings 
 
 
In analyzing autoethnographic data, my intent is to gain a cultural understanding 
of innovation at the VA. With about twenty years of software development experience in 
a variety of roles at the VA and DOD HIT, I am intimately connected to the people, 
processes, and technology in a cultural context.  Therefore, my autoethnographic analysis 
and interpretation involved shifting my research between myself, RAPTOR, VistA, and 
other VACI stakeholders.    
To organize and prioritize my findings, I introduce an intuitive synthesis of 
organizational information systems and ethics management and categorize it using the 




Technology Acceptance failure Groups (TOE TAG) concept included several diverse 
models including TOE, TAM, OIS, and ethics management. This adaptive concept 
includes ethics as a response to understand communication breakdowns, process non-
compliance and technology failures.  This inductive synthesis was used on generalized 
findings that I connected from my specific data and experiences.  
The following table is an overall summary of my findings. They represent a blend 
between different software projects, organizational context, and personal observations 
that were validated by data.   The consistency between total number of findings (24) and 
distribution (uniform) between people, process, and technology is consistent with total 
ethical issues of cloud computing (Sulaiman, 2019).   
 
Table 22 Matrix of Findings Importance vs. PPT 
 
Significance Very Relevant Relevant Less Relevant 








#1 Mission vs. Rules 
Culture.  
#2 Whistleblower 








#5 Forget the past. 
 
COMMUNICATION 
#4. VACI uses social 




 #3 Impact of 
Scheduling Scandal.  
 
COMMUNICATION  
#1 Radiologist approval 
of RAPTOR.  
#2 RAPTOR was 
awarded one of the top 
5 Medical Imaging IT 
Projects of the Year  
 
ORGANIZATION 
#1 Government have 
often failed to sustain 
and maintain 
innovation over time. 
#2 The failure to adapt 
to organizational 
policy.  














#4. VACI changed its 
name, leadership, and 






#1. There was no 
coordination between 
DevOps  
#3. VA OI&T and PCS are 
counterexamples of the 
Project Management 












critical transition time.  
#2. VA OI&T and PCS 
are counterexamples of 
software development 
methodology from the 
VACI.  
 
Radiology Workflow  
#1. The VA 
Technology 
Management failures of 
Enterprise Scheduling 
System impacted the 
radiology ordering 
process. 
#2. RAPTOR had very 
important potential 




methodology from VACI. 
#4. Sandbox development 
was not maturely 
implemented. 
 
Radiology Workflow  
#3. RAPTOR’s order 
cancelation workflow would 
reduce illegal employee 
waitlist manipulations.  
#4. Radiology clerks had no 
access to radiology 
appointments. RAPTOR 
functionality would have 
improved this situation.  
 
Project Management 
#1. VACI contracting 
shortchanged development 
team in several important 
areas including VistA data 
loading, test automation, and 
performed by VHA 
Innovation Selection 
Board estimates 
substantial tangible and 
intangible cost/resource 
savings due to 
efficiency in workflow. 
 
#4. The process of 
selecting an innovation 









providing users with 
comment tracking system.  















#1. Open source 
software 
misconceptions through 
the DevOps process.  
# 2. Use of open source 
has no adverse impact 










VistA Modernization  
Open Source  
#3. RAPTOR’s open source 
code was reused. 
#4. Faulty cost information. 
 
OI&T  
#3. Approved Architecture 
and Components. 





VistA Modernization  






#1. RAPTOR is the 
highest radiology 
priority in the VistA 
Evolution Roadmap, 
the main innovation 
pipeline.  









Table 21 Specific RAPTOR failure findings 
OIS failure 
groups 




Overlooking of one or more 
dimensions or not focusing on 
one or more dimensions soon 
enough  
DevOps – no focus on OI&T 





Improper balance between too 
much iteration and too few 
feedback loops 
Lack of Schedule functionality 





Too few financial resources or 
human resources within the OIS 
to successfully generate, develop 
and diffuse the innovation 
DevOps – no focus on 
implementation after 
development 






Improper stakeholder group 
representativeness, non-
representative organization or 
individual for the group, or non-
representative individual for the 
organization 
Change of Chief Radiologist 
sponsor 









Improper balance between 
consulting and participating with 
too many stakeholders  





Too few strong ties in the 
innovation network, leading to, 
for example, trust issues and 
difficulties in cooperation 
Difficulties in cooperation 





Too many strong ties, leading to, 
for example, ‘groupthink’, 
resulting in myopia and inertia 
within the innovation network 







The lack or underdevelopment of 
formal arrangements, e.g. 
collaboration contracts, IP 
arrangements, and non-disclosure 
agreements 
VACI semiformal organization 
tried to work between 
developers & OI&T and failed. 
Unnecessary delays. 






The lack or non-alignment of 
informal arrangements, e.g. 
shared vision, social values, 
culture and norms, mutual trust, 
goals of the different partners and 
business models 
VACI semiformal could not 




The lack of certain capacities of 
the innovation organization to 
maximally profit from the OIS, 






e.g. absorptive capacity or 
network management capacity 





Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
Although the VA has made four attempts to fully modernize VistA, it has been 
unable to do so over the past twenty years.  On April 4, 2019, the week I gave my 
dissertation proposal, Carol Harris, director of IT management at the GAO (GAO, 2019) 
gave her testimony to Congress, that the VA “From 2001 through 2018, VA pursued 
three efforts to modernize its health information system – the Veterans Health 
Information Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA). However, these efforts 
experienced high costs, challenges to ensuring interoperability of health data, and 
ultimately did not result in a modernized VistA. Regarding the department’s fourth and 
most recent effort, the Electronic Health Record Modernization, GAO recently reported 
(GAO, 2019) that the governance plan for this program was not yet defined”.  This 
testimony articulates the recent history the inability of VA HIT to innovate. 
The central question I ask is “Can healthcare IT at the VA be healed?” My 
findings show the sources of failure that are within the VA are due to people, process, 
and technology.  My findings are scored for relevancy based on my twenty years of 




indicative of those found in failure groups.  I show that there are many factors currently 
keeping the VA in chaos, and away from a stable and healthy environment. I have found 
the individual answers in my research questions on categories of people, process, and 
technology.     
 
Behavioral Integrity, Walking the talk - Authenticity 
I found that human behavior in corporate and government settings has a huge 
impact on how the organization’s, culture, and methods of communication negatively 
influence innovation. My findings show that talking about changes or culture is easy 
within the VA but putting them into practice is more difficult. When the VA says all the 
right things but does not act on them, employees can pick up on this and become 
disengaged. It is important to practice what you preach, otherwise confusion and 
resentment can build up, leading to the possibility of a toxic environment. This is the 
situation from the VA over the past few years. 
 
Mixed external communications 
The GAO (2015) has identified several issues at the VA that result in a lack of 
clarity, poor management, and oversight. These gaps include ambiguous policies and 
inconsistent processes, inadequate oversight and accountability, information technology 
challenges, inadequate training, and unclear resource needs and allocation priorities. 
Understanding why you are doing something and what you are working towards is key to 




really helps employees stay motivated.  I found that VACI uses social media 
communications to publicize the positive aspects of transformation, but I found that 
propaganda distorts reality and serves as marketing against the negative press and 
scandals that are reported. The content used in social media does not accurately reflect 
the true progress within the VA, which results in misleading the public and demoralizing 
those who experience roadblocks in innovative progress within the VA. This highlights a 
lack of transparency and openness that was espoused in the initial VACI rollout. The 
semiformal VACI organization has caused it to change its name, mission, and leadership 
every few years.  This has resulted in a lack of follow-through on innovation projects, 
and a lack of resources for projects.  The semiformal nature has also resulted in a lack of 
responsibility making it easy to forget the past and turn away from VistA historic 
successes.  
In VA’s controlling culture, I use the theory of mission and rules cultures to show 
that the VA is unable to innovate within its guiding principles. Secretary McDonald joked 
that the VA was run by lawyers.  He defined a rules-based organization as a safe place 
that never takes risks. VACI remains rules-based thereby hampering innovation.  
In my findings, I contrast other innovative organizations as counterexamples.  
Retaliation against whistleblowers, groupthink, and forgetting the past are all signs of a 
culture under siege, which I have experienced firsthand. I also show by counterexamples 
that the VA’s private-public-academic partnership failed by not sustaining innovation 
when compared to other examples.   I was part of three different divisions at the VA and I 






In a sense, autoethnography is self-disclosure. I had struggles with self-disclosure, 
particularly struggles with trying to decide what and how to disclose about my research 
on project cancelation. Therefore, based on my understanding of autoethnography, I 
primarily relied on self-reports of the experience. My reports that stemmed from insider 
knowledge that  I’ve lived through.  My research utilizes my academic tools and 
training—my knowledge of communication, ethnography, and observation, of 
relationships, self-disclosure processes, and stigma management.  
I have observed how my autoethnography happened to a variety of audiences; I 
am the person—the researcher—who lived through and observed the experience. Thus, 
another joy of autoethnography: I can provide valuable, insider insight not possible with 
other research techniques (e.g., surveys, others’ self-reports); in terms of 
autoethnography. I can use autoethnography to provide an account of what happened 
during and after my speech act presentations.  That is why I included specific interactions 
in this research. 
 
 
So, what have I found – and why does it matter? 
 
The headlines are startling.  VA is the largest integrated US healthcare system. Its 




delayed, or flawed, resulting in the waste of hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars. The 
GAO concluded that the VA is “susceptible to waste, fraud, and mismanagement”. 
My research findings show the underlying issues that currently affect the VA. 
When I started the research, my plan was to only study the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the RAPTOR application. What I did not know when I started was the profound effect of 
people, process, and technology that impacted the result of the project and the VACI 
program. Although I have been studying the VA since 2002, I was looking narrowly at 
the technical literature to learn the VistA application and the clinical literature to learn the 
radiology workflow. When I entered the PhD program and began my research journey, I 
quickly had to broaden my literature review to understand the human side of information 
technology; the culture, communications, and organization that impact the software. I had 
participated in the DevOps process, although it was never called that. I realized writing 
my proposal that the DevOps label fit what I had experienced.  
 
What do I know now that I did not know before?  
I am backwards when compared to many typical iSchool students. I have much 
experience, but my academic background is in electrical engineering. My timeline of 30 
years in IT is rich with worldly HIT experiences.  I have been working on VistA since 
2002 and began designing RAPTOR in 2010.  One of my strengths is being aware of 
what I don’t know and one of my weaknesses is being unable to fake what I don’t know.   
The biggest lesson was learning research methods for information studies.  I have 




different iterations. I attempted both quantitative and qualitative studies, mixed methods, 
action research and finally autoethnography. I had never heard of action research or 
autoethnography until I read about them a year into my PhD program. 
The coursework I took in HCI design and data visualization was perfect for 
summarizing what I achieved in RAPTOR design.  Unfortunately, it was too late for the 
design of RAPTOR and not applicable for writing this dissertation.  Much of my 
integrated paper initial literature collection focused on HCI and data visualization.  After 
making the commitment to studying the organization, I had to come up to speed in ethical 
management and organizational culture and policies. 
I have been called a decent writer for an engineer, but academic writing at this 
scale and level has been a challenge.  Having the time to work through my research was a 
luxury not often afforded me in industry.  As an engineer, I needed every minute to see 
through all the ramifications of committing to a design. In this case, it is a research design 
instead of software. 
It has been said that one of the hardest things to write about is yourself, let alone your 
own failures.  Having spent many years of my professional life on a project that was 
canceled was a series of events that many people would like to repress rather than relive 
over 57,000 words.   
Who should care?  
 
One of the lessons I learned at the iSchool conference was how innovative it is to 




papers in HIT and I found it to be a worthwhile endeavor. Why are over 70% of HIT 
projects a failure?  I think that my systematic approach to understanding the lessons 
learned through failure was a good requiem for the future. 
Based on the VA’s lack of openness, forgetting and suppressing past and current 
missteps, this research will not be welcomed officially.  Unofficially, there are many 
different constructive interpretations of the many failures at the VA.  Adding my research 
to the record may not be welcome in some quarters, but bad decisions continue to be 
made.  Whether through ignorance or ignoring a fair critique of these events, they spend 
massive amounts of money to justify their poor decisions.     
Limitations 
  
This research is a personal exploration from my memories of my work and the 
larger sociological understanding of the VA. I was not the only developer who worked on 
the VistA or RAPTOR software, so I solicited and received feedback from several 
individuals who were with me for their constant review throughout my many drafts.  
Methodological Limitations 
 
After my integrated paper, I made the decision to continue this research as 
autoethnographic. Not being able to use data-driven, quantitative findings, which is the 
norm for longitudinal studies, has an advantage in validating the hypothesis agnostically. 
Autoethnographic experiences may be different from one person to another depending on 
their role and their cultural perspective on the event or series of events. This evolution 




readers that I am at the center of this and that the story is mine. Several key findings went 
through multiple feedback iterations.  
A good example of different perspectives making a more rounded finding is 
RAPTOR’s premature publicity (People Finding, Communication #3). In my mind, the 
publicity from a well-respected industry media (Aunt Minnie) was a positive, in that it 
“pushed” the VA to move forward with building out the prototype. After several 
conversations with the lead radiologist innovator, he felt that in hindsight, the story was 
premature and less positive than I had initially portrayed it. My amended finding includes 
both perspectives to the event. His radiologist perspective was that since he was quoted in 
the article (included in Appendix III), he received many unwanted questions around the 
status of the software after it was “poised for take-off”. It was poised but never flew. 
I spent much of this writing considering autoethnographic ethics.  There were 
many examples and voices to include in my findings but out of respect for the people 
involved, not all were included.  
 
Relative Uniqueness of RAPTOR test case 
 
I have used the RAPTOR project as a case study to the entire 40-year VistA 
program that has many diverse code module projects that have their own story. There are 
many differences between the entire VistA multi-domain environments, scope, and 
history and RAPTOR, a modernized radiology workflow module. To improve the 
narrative and strengthen my findings, I have grouped VistA with RAPTOR. My finding 
(Technology Finding, VistA Modernization #2), places the cancelation of RAPTOR as a 




VistA EHR modernization has been canceled than its innovative radiology web module. 
As a result, I feel that there are many commonalities in my intention of writing this. 
There is a feeling of injustice about the cancelations. I point to the unrealized benefits of 
RAPTOR as well as the industry-wide recognition of VistA as a pioneering health 
information technology platform, as well as helping others and hopefully bringing about 
change. The scale of injustice increases when considering this fraud, waste and abuse of 
taxpayer resources and the limiting of our veterans’ timely access to care, compliance to 
patient safety guidelines, and cost avoidance of unnecessary procedures. 
In psychological terms, I am feeling a similar grief to that of many VA 
stakeholders. The VistA hardhats are feeling their loss of identity. A person who loses 
their primary identity mourns a lost sense of self. I am fortunate that I have this research 
to understand my story and to create a new narrative.  However, I see the hardhats on the 
Google groups community forum writing that VistA will be coming back when the VA 
finally comes to its senses. The hardhats discuss every negative VA headline as a reason 
that VistA will return. Our VistA identity has been lost and the grief is compounded by 
the lack of control we had in the decision.  With every new finding, our grief and lost 
sense of self is mourned. 
Another loss being felt by the VistA community is a deep sense of disorientation 
due to unfilled expectations.  We share a deep sense of unfairness due to the unexpected 
political shift in that cancelation decision.  In writing this autoethnography, it helped me 
deal with a lost sense of stability. Researching my findings helped me to understand how 





Lack of previous studies in the research area 
 
As shown in my bibliography, I found much research on the history of the VA 
and VistA.  However, I found no academic research and no judicated information on 
VACI.  My initial reasoning for the lack of information was that this is current, and 
contemporary organizations will not have academic research.  However, over the journey 
of my research I found that the VA is being uncooperative in sharing less than flattering 
data, trying to control the narrative, and forgetting the past.  This made researching and 
writing this more critical to preserve it for future research as a foundation to be built on 
by new research. 
The information I have used to support my findings is from diverse sources, and I 
have collected it over the past ten plus years. A small sampling of the diversity of data 
collected and used includes correspondences, videos, websites, Google groups, and 
Powerpoint presentations.  The scope of my collection is detailed in my methodology.  
This series of events from within the VA that impacted both RAPTOR and VistA 
is a common phenomenon in the private and public health IT sector, and the goal is that 
by conducting the research in this manner, from a humanistic perspective, it will help 
other organizations detect earlier in product innovation efforts, to identify root causes for 
unsustainable innovation environments.  
 





 The scope of my dissertation became wider as my research journey continued. As 
I documented, my research widened beyond my original RAPTOR project to the VACI 
organization within the VA.  As I focused on people, process, and technology, I touched 
on many areas including organizational behavior and public policy that I am not trained 
in.  
In telling my story, I took the ethnical choice to not include anyone that I did not inform 
explicitly about my research.  While I included correspondences, I removed all 
identifiable information and edited for brevity and clarification. 
 
Contributions to Knowledge 
 
Systems Thinking 
Based on my 35 years of electronic system engineering, I offer the lens of systems 
thinking as a framework for looking at challenges and failures. My systematic look at the 
VACI includes the interdependencies between people, process, and technology and I 
have looked at specific parts, such as public private academic partnerships, the DevOps 
process, and open source technology. I have taken an in-depth look at the RAPTOR 
project as an example of a bottom-up view over an extended period of the software 
lifecycle.  
Some of the systems engineering questions that I ask include: What additional 
insight into the VACI community of practice processes and considerations can be 
realized by this project? How effective is the VACI innovation processes? Can the VA 




strategy? Can the VA use this research to modify its decision to retire VistA? Can I 
assess the broader impact of the research in the health care marketplace? Can this be a 
use case demonstration of open source, open standards development to achieve a 
customized, license-free, stable enterprise solution economically? 
Autoethnography Process 
 In the methods section, I introduce the Autoethnographic Research Process 
(Figure 30). I often think visually and systematically. I was surprised that I couldn’t find 
a process diagram that illustrates the autoethnographic research process. Once I 
understood and committed to using autoethnography, I started with putting myself into 
the reflective tasks.  I then came across the Kolb Learning Cycle and how it was used in 
education.  I thought that it could be adapted for autoethnography.  The reflection tasks I 




A toe tag is an historical artifact signifying the identification of death. As shown 
in the figure below, it typically has descriptors about the deceased and the cause of death 





Figure 57 TOE TAG 
 
 
In my literature review, I attempted to find the theory that best fit my 
understanding of my situation.  As VACI is a semiformal organization, I had difficulty 
matching the information system theory to my observations. The theory journey led me to 
TOE TAM, a hybrid of two distinct enterprise adoption models. Once I came upon failure 
groups in organizational innovation systems, I used inductive synthesis to gain insight 
into my observations and which can be used in other situations.  The key insight was that 
information system theory alone was not enough.  Once I lined up ethical management 
with OIS, it was clear how well that failures of ethics lined up with breakdowns of 
systems.   
Table 13 is the findings relevancy criteria named TOE TAG. TOE TAG is a 
summary of organizational innovation system failure groups blended with ethical 
management.  These criteria can be used in ethical management audits.  It is richer than 







Recommendations for Future Research 
 
When I was planning to use action research to measure the effectiveness of the 
RAPTOR tool, I initially wrote many pages on the HCI and data visualization design and 
development decisions. I had access to several site sets of data of the current manual 
process. Radiology workflow improvement is an area of future research that I can 
explore, or the VA may explore soon. At my Doctoral Consortium presentation for the 
Conference on Health on IT and Analytics (CHITA), this was a recommendation of Dr. 
Agarwal, Director of the Center for Health Information & Decision Systems (CHIDS).  
Dr. Agarwal suggested that systemic overview of radiology workflow was needed based 
on new technologies.   
A future research suggestion made by the lead radiologist innovator would be to 
include information from other VACI portfolio projects, for example the Daily Plan.  I 
didn’t pursue this based on several limitations. I requested the directory of projects from 
my FOIA requests, which as I noted has not been granted. Another limitation was to 
refocus away from RAPTOR, which would have been to change the autoethnographic 
case study.  However, this makes perfect sense as a follow-up to validate my findings, or 
as counterexamples of my experiences, especially in the DevOps process. If I can gain 
access to many different projects, this could enhance the scope of discussion. Other 




An obvious avenue for future research would be to apply the TOE TAG criteria to 
another case study. As was discussed by my committee, examples include other VA 
agencies, large IT shops, and other large bureaucratic organizations. Other case studies 
will improve the credibility of my relevancy criteria. 
At the iConference, I was discussing with Dr. Irene Lopatovoska of the Pratt 
Institute my model of autoethnography as a feedback system. She noted that this model 
doesn’t include emotion and non-linear recall of events and she suggested a potential 




 This autoethnographic research was a challenge of passion and patience.  Twenty-
five years after completing my master’s, I returned to school and felt that RAPTOR 
would be the perfect vehicle to research.  After years of design and development 
gestation, it was on the cusp of being used clinically.  Four years later, I can look back at 
a series of setbacks through which I had to persevere.  When the cancelation of RAPTOR 
and VistA modernization made my initial research and methodology doubtful, I 
continued investigating until I found an ethnographic approach that I could continue with 
my doctoral journey. I found autoethnographic methodology allowed me to come to 
terms with my fate. 
The analysis and interpretation of my findings has required my memory and 
insight into several different approaches and theories.  With little to no guideposts along 




narratively meaningful autoethnography.  I was fortunate that I was able to collect the 
unstructured fragments of my experience and creatively weave a narrative.  My personal 
data interpretation was built with systems theory framework in mind, and in the end, I 





Appendix I: The Top Five Medical-imaging IT Projects of 2012 
 
The following is an excerpt of the article “The Top Five Medical-Imaging IT 
Projects of 2012, originally edited by C. Proval. The original article ran in the Radiology 
Business Journal (RBJ). It is edited here to only include RAPTOR and not the other four 
projects. For the related People finding and its implication, see Communication #2. 
 
“The Top Five Medical-imaging IT Projects of 2012 
One hallmark unites the winning entries in the top five medical-imaging IT projects of 
2012, cosponsored by Radiology Business Journal and the Society for Imaging 
Informatics in Medicine (SIIM): Each project represents a view beyond the traditional 
acquisition, archiving, and communication of radiological images. All of the winning 
entries take a global view of medical imaging: mining the data in the DICOM headers 
and dose sheets to produce a relevant number for patients’ exposure to radiation; solving 
the technical and operational problems of including non-DICOM images in PACS; 
creating a nonlinear, flexible workflow layer that can tell the radiologist whether a brain 
tumor has grown before he or she looks at the image, as well as creating a worklist for a 
geographically disparate organization; solving the interoperability issues inherent in the 
movement of pathology images to create a digital consultation portal for pathology; and 
scouring the electronic medical record (EMR) for the data required to create a safe 




The entries were judged on their innovation/ingenuity, on whether they met 
critical/urgent/unmet needs, on whether they improved quality, on the product/tool/idea 
validation or evaluation, and on the universality of the application. All six judges are 
members of the SIIM board: Donald K. Dennison is an imaging-vendor executive; J. 
Raymond Geis, MD, is a radiologist with Advanced Medical Imaging Consultants, PC 
(Fort Collins, Colorado); David S Hirschorn, MD, is director of radiology informatics at 
Staten Island University Hospital in New York; Elizabeth A. Krupinski, PhD, FSIIM, is a 
research professor in the departments of radiology and psychology at the University of 
Arizona; Wyatt M. Tellis, PhD, is an informaticist in the radiology and biomedical 
imaging department at the University of California–San Francisco; and James T. Whitfill, 
MD, is CMIO of Southwest Diagnostic Imaging, Ltd (Scottsdale, Arizona). “ 
 
“The Radiology Protocol Tool and Recorder (RAPTOR) System Medverd, a radiologist 
on staff at Washington’s VA Puget Sound Health Care System, Seattle Division, also 
holds a faculty appointment at the University of Washington. He has long held the belief 
that making protocols for advanced imaging exams is undervalued in private, public, and 
university settings. “The process is not optimized,” he says. “You get a piece of paper 
with one or two lines on it providing the clinical provider’s problem and questions to be 
answered; then, when one wants more information, it’s often time consuming and 
cumbersome. If you talk to any radiologist who has protocol responsibility for cross-
sectional imaging, he or she will tell you there’s a constant battle between efficiency and 
effectiveness for that task.” Using funding from the VA Innovations Initiative and 




information from the EMR, with an extensible design that could be rolled out nationally. 
Because the VA has a legacy health IT architecture with a vast repository of health 
information, Medverd approached the project with the intention of designing the 
application in layers. He planned to use Web services, for example, to virtualize the 
electronic health record, so that a Web application (as opposed to software that needs to 
be installed on every user’s computer) could be used. “With Web services, all we need to 
do is build a sort of data-adapter layer into the content-management system for the 
presentation of the data,” he explains. A happy discovery was the availability of the VA’s 
Medical Domain Web Services (MDWS), which Medverd and his team used to virtualize 
the health records. “Frankly, I was not aware of it when I first submitted the idea, and I 
thought we’d have to build it ourselves,” he says. “The discovery of MDWS was great 
because somebody else had already done the work, and that’s the advantage of working 
in layers. That MDWS layer provides the interactivity with the legacy archives that we 
would have had to build, if it weren’t there.” For a Veterans Integrated Service Network 
(VISN) to implement RAPTOR, the VISN’s protocol library would be uploaded to the 
RAPTOR server. Through the uploading process, the VISN would also cross-link the 
protocol library with commonly accepted naming conventions in the RSNA’s RadLex. 
Medverd’s goal of improving efficiency and patient safety throughout the VA system 
appears within reach. “Given the amount of enthusiasm folks have had, I’m very 
optimistic that we’re going to move forward,” he says. Problem/Objective The paper-
based workflow predominantly used to create protocols for advanced medical imaging at 
Veterans Health Administration (VHA) facilities is subject to numerous process errors. 




frameworks to provide an efficient Web environment, with decision support for contrast 
risk assessment and protocol assignment. Solution the RAPTOR system extracts relevant 
information for each patient from the EMR and displays it next to the imaging 
requisition. The Web interface provides access from a variety of systems and includes 
features to sort the worklist, flag relevant allergy history and renal-function tests, suggest 
relevant department-approved imaging protocols, suggest standardized pre- and post-
exam hydration, and suggest premedication for those with a history of contrast reactions. 
This offers a significant advantage over the prior system by ensuring legibility, 
standardization, prioritization, multiuser access, and improved patient safety. Additional 
features of RAPTOR will include secure messaging, restricted ordering access for 
specialized studies, recognition of order duplication, and logging of physicians’ and staff 
members’ input into the protocol decision-making process. While this solution will 
initially be deployed as a pilot at selected VHA facilities, the goal will be deployment 
across the entire VHA enterprise. Results A review of the current paper-based protocol 
workflow at one VHA facility evaluated 341 MRI orders over the course of a month, of 
which 61% were for neuroradiology, 12% were for musculoskeletal imaging, and 6% 
were for body imaging. The average paper protocol required an elapsed time of 11 days 
from the time that the study was ordered to the day that the patient was successfully 
contacted to schedule the exam. It was found that approximately 15% of exams for which 
protocols had been completed were never performed; for 1%, orders were duplicated but 
both had protocols prepared, and for 2.5%, protocols were unsigned. Rare (but observed) 
clerical errors, such as mismatched patient information, further corrupted this system. 




data-query capabilities. Unproductive and redundant protocol-making efforts are 
minimized, the speed of the protocol process is increased due to prioritization and 
distribution of work within a multiuser-accessible electronic work list, fulfillment of 
enterprise quality and safety goals is improved due to automated identification and 
flagging of patients at risk for harm from the performance of advanced medical imaging, 
and ambiguity in medical-decision responsibility is eliminated through the capture of 
documentation logs and electronic signatures.”  
Cheryl Proval is editor, Radiology Business Journal. Kris Kyes, technical editor, and 






Appendix II: VACI “good news” story on RAPTOR 
 
The following is an excerpt of the contents of an internal VACI website. I assisted 
in writing this content. For the related Process finding and its implication, see Project 
Management #2. 
 
““Wow.” “This is excellent.” “I want to use this now.” These are some of the 
enthusiastic and complementary comments have been received from the VHA National 
Radiology Chief and radiologists in VHA facilities across the nation in response to 
demonstrations of the recently completed Radiology Protocol Tool Recorder (RAPTOR) 
prototype software funded through the VHA Innovation Program. RAPTOR was even 
named as one of the “Top 5 Medical Imaging IT Projects of 2012” by the Society for 
Imaging Informatics in Medicine (SIIM) and Radiology Business Journal (RBJ). 
RAPTOR is tailored to optimize advanced medical imaging protocoling and performance 
at VHA facilities. VA Radiologists review all clinician orders for advanced diagnostic 
imaging (Computerized Tomography, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, and Nuclear 
Medicine tests) and assign specific protocol instructions directing how each examination 
must be performed so that the clinical questions are answered. This is an error-prone 
highly manual process that is paper based and can takes weeks to complete. 
VA Radiologists frequently do not receive enough information on exam 
requisitions to optimize the quality and safety of their protocol decisions. Efforts to 




negatively impact Radiologist productivity and imaging department efficiency. Similarly, 
paper-based systems have inherent inefficiencies compared to electronic solutions. By 
leveraging open source tools and standards, RAPTOR has capitalized on opportunities for 
interactivity between VHA information systems to maximize radiologist protocoling 
effectiveness while preserving productivity and simultaneously assuring safety through 
automated identification of risks and contraindications of some imaging studies for some 
patients. RAPTOR leverages VHA’s Class I Medical Domain Web Services (MDWS) to 
interact and extract information from Veterans Health Information Systems and 
Technology Architecture (VistA). MDWS is a suite is equipped with the capacity to 
virtualize any legacy VistA Remote Procedure Call (RPC) as a web service. 
Beyond its promised patient care and department efficiency benefits, RAPTOR 
represents an early use case of how the VA (and the government, in general) can exploit 
mature open source, open standards application development to modernize its 
information systems in a relatively short time, with zero licensing costs, low 
administrative burden and in accordance with the American Council for Technology – 
Industry Advisory Council VistA Modernization Report. To date, the RAPTOR project 
has been invited to present at both the upcoming Drupal Government Days National 






Appendix III: RAPTOR VA protocol software poised for takeoff 
 
The following unedited article was written by C. Keen in AuntMinnie.com and published 
on the web on March 29, 2013. For the related People finding and its implication, see 
Communication #3. 
 
RAPTOR VA protocol software poised for takeoff 
By Cynthia E. Keen. AuntMinnie.com staff writer 
 
March 29, 2013 -After more than a year of laboratory development and testing, 
radiologists at the Veterans Affairs’ Puget Sound Health Care System in Seattle are 
hopeful that software called RAPTOR designed to help manage medical imaging 
protocol selection and workflow will be authorized to move into a real-world pilot 
program. 
 
The Radiology Protocol Tool and Recorder (RAPTOR) software is designed to render 
the labor-intensive process of protocol assignment and the often paper-based workflow 
in imaging departments obsolete, according to its developers. It is programmed to 
search for information from a patient's medical record that is important for protocol 





Based on a radiologist's individualized parameters or a radiology department's 
requirements, RAPTOR will automatically extract and prioritize orders and relevant 
information from the VA's VistA electronic medical record (EMR) using Medical 
Domain Web Services (MDWS). Information required for protocol decisions, such as 
patient allergies, renal function, clinician contact information, key clinical notes, 
specific lab values, and radiology reports, is automatically populated into the dashboard 
and can be easily accessed by authorized users. 
 
"RAPTOR is designed to provide radiologists with seamless, just-in-time patient 
information, not only to assign protocols but also to track exam acquisition and 
study interpretation phases of the workflow," explained lead developer Dr. Jonathan 
Medverd, who is also an assistant professor in the department of radiology at the 
University of Washington. 
 
"Data moves instantly to the next staff member responsible and is distributed within a 
multiuser accessible work. List," he said. "Priorities can be assigned on the fly. 










Although protocol assignment critically affects quality and safety within a radiology 
department, its importance can be overlooked, Medverd said. In hospitals with paper-
based records, radiologists may not have access to search for data they need for 
protocol assignments. And while they may have access to EMRs, this usually means 
logging into another computer and then searching through electronic data. Patient 
information is often available, but quick access is rare. 
"No matter how well-intentioned radiologists may be to select the best and safest 
protocol for a patient, they may not have time to be as thorough as they would like to 
be," he said. "Protocoling is a step that you try to do well, but you try to do it as fast as 
possible because you have to get on to the business of interpreting images. Because 
few imaging departments measure the quality of protocol assignment, they do not 
know how well they are doing. You cannot assess performance - and patient safety -
when it is not measured. 
Nor can you assess department efficiency and productivity with respect to protocol 
assignment." 
 
RAPTOR not only provides information and keeps a detailed record of it and decisions 
made, it facilitates communication with the ordering physician and other radiologists by 
secure messaging, Medverd said. It maintains a library of the department's standardized 




test hydration or medications. In fact, RAPTOR suggests the use of pre- and post-exam 
hydration or medication for patients, when appropriate, and recommends the best 
standardized protocols. 
 
The software can screen for history of contrast reaction and report it immediately. It 
will also identify when written informed consent is needed for administration of 
intravenous contrast agents. II can even automatically recognize unauthorized orders 




RAPTOR is designed to eliminate the inefficiencies of paper-based workflow and 
workflow environments where patient information is contained in siloed health IT 
systems. It will also provide a comprehensive, time-stamped permanent record of all 
activities related to protocol assignment- a record that is seldom acquired and retained 
by a RIS, he said. 
 
RAPTOR is currently in a process to receive approval to transition from the 
"laboratory sandbox" to a pilot program at the Seattle VA's radiology department and 
three other West Coast VA facilities. Its accuracy and performance will be measured 




Funding from the VA Innovation Initiative was used for the project, according to 
Medverd. He said that the office is facilitating the evaluation and advancement of 
RAPTOR. If the software works as planned, Medverd anticipates that it will eventually 
be rolled out for use m every 1mag1ng department of the VA healthcare system. 
 
''We have a record of innovation," he concluded in his interview with AuntMinnie.com. 
"The VA developed one of the earliest EMRs for its medical centers as well as deployed 
one of the first filmless radiology departments in the world." 
 
Information on RAPTOR was also presented at RSNA 2012 and in an article 
published online January 4 in the Journal of Digital Imaging. --
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